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The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze and evaluate American foreign
policy toward the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea
during the period 1952 to the oresent. The basic procedure followed was a thorough
examination of uublic documents, speeches, selected interviews, newspapers, journal
articles, and other sources.
This study is essentially historical in its approach. However, in keeping with
current academic conventions, the focus was in part on the "processes" involved in
formulating decisions by emphasizing the interplay among key congressional figures,
executive decisions, "opinion leaders", United Nation debates and etc.
While giving attention to those activities which bear directly on policy making,
it is necessary that style factors in decision making be balanced off against other
elements prevailing in the domestic and international environment within which the
total foreign policy-making machinery functions.
Operating within this context, then, the study shows that it is safe to hypoth-
esize a very low priority for African policy issues in the American policy-making
system. In this regard the relations between the United States and Portuguese Africa
are in many ways typically "African", in the sense that these relations illuminate a
central weakness in the formulation and execution of American foreign nolicy. This
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weakness manifests itself in our relations with Portugal by exposing a confusing if
not contradictory duality; from enthusiastic support for self-determination for
colonial peoples in Portuguese Africa there has been a drift toward regret that there
should be so much turmoil.
On the basis of this study, it may be concluded that the dilemma confronting the
United States in Portuguese Africa is a very real one. The closest friends and most
significant allies of the United States are the West European powers that have in
the cast been the most successful in gathering colonial possessions. Even though
these allies have in great part divested themselves of their overseas dependencies
,
a
particularly unfortunate problem is presented by Portugal, a NATO ally which, in the
past
,
has denied that its extensive overseas holding are non—self—governing dependen-
cies .
In the United Nations and presumably even more vigorously behind the scenes, the
United States, although it has tried to soften the tone and content of the more
hostile resolutions, has usually lined up with Portugal’s critics; however, this has
not eliminated the charge that it has been NATO's support and arms that have enabled
Portugal to carry on expensive colonial warfare. Relationships are further complica-
ted by Washington's desire to extend its occupancy of a strategically important base
in the Azores, held by agreement with Portugal since the end of World War II.
What then are the implications for future United States-Portuguese relations,
especially in view of the recent political changes in Portugal? Indications of appre-
ciable political-military stress in Portugal and its African Territories are more than
sufficient to warrant a thorough policy review. As it stands American policy toward
Portugal and its Territories lacks coherence. The first task of formulating a
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United States policy would be to help create a strategically sterile environment in
Africa. Basically, this objective will require taking the initiative to remove
Southern Africa as an area of direct or indirect cold war military competition. This,
in turn, means attention to the possibility of an understanding or agreement between
the United States and the Soviet Union, tacit, or explicit, regarding security matters
in Southern Africa. Such an understanding encouraged by a new spirit of "detente"
between the two major superpowers is a distinct possibility.
PREFACE
This dissertation was written before the recent
Portuguese coup of April 25, 1974. My examination of Amer-
ican foreign policy towards Portugal and its territories,
which is essentially historical, deals exclusively with
events beginning in 1952 continuing up to 1972.
Obviously, American foreign policy can be studied
from different perspectives and for different purposes. In
keeping with current academic conventions, one might want to
focus on the "processes" involved in formulating decisions,
emphasizing the interplay among key congressional figures,
"opinion leaders," executive agencies, etc., while giving
attention to the content of actual policies only to the ex-
tent that it can be treated as one among many variables that
affect the process. By concentrating on those activities
which bear directly on policy-making, however, one neglects
to consider that because of the powerful constraints that
exist to check the purely subjective goals of any decision-
maker, it is necessary that style factors in decision-making
be balanced off against other elements prevailing in the
domestic and international environment within which the total
foreign policy-making machinery functions.
Operating within this context, then, it is safe to
hypothesize a very low priority for African policy issues in
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the American policy-making system. In this regard the rela-
tions between the United States and Portuguese Africa are in
many ways typically "African," in the sense that these rela-
tions illuminate a central weakness in the formulation and
execution of American foreign policy. This weakness manifests
itself m our relations with Portugal and the rest of Africa
by exposing a confusing if not contradictory duality; from
enthusiastic support for self-determination for colonial
peoples in Africa there has been a drift toward regret that
there should be so much turmoil. The United States still
finds it impossible to turn its back on rising peoples, but
from time to time it gives plain indications that it wishes
they would sit tight and not start trouble. The effect on
Africans was best portrayed by Tom Mboya, then General Secre-
tary of the Kenya Federation of Labour, who wrote in 1956 that
for Africans America was the symbol of the anticolonial strug-
gle, but that as a result of the American alliance with the
colonial powers and its neutrality on colonial issues, "this
feeling is gradually changing to puzzled disappointment."
The dilemma confronting the United States is a very
real one. The closest friends and most significant allies of
the United States are the West European powers that have in
the past been the most successful in gathering colonial pos-
sessions under their imperial wings. Even though these allies
have in great part divested themselves of their overseas
dependencies, it is inevitable that they should in some impor-
Vtant respects and on some important issues base their poli-
cies on interests and assumptions that are at variance with
those of the United States. As this thesis will show, a par-
ticularly unfortunate problem is presented by Portugal, a
NATO ally which, in the past, has denied that its extensive
overseas holdings are non-self-governing dependencies.
Portugal- is sure to be confronted by continuing dis-
affection in its African territories, and until the recent
changes in its political system, appeared incapable of meet-
ing the kind of demands the present anticolonialist era in-
sistently puts forward. In the United Nations and presum-
ably even more vigorously behind the scenes, the United
States
,
although it has tried to soften the tone and content
of the more hostile resolutions, has usually lined up with
Portugal's critics; however, this has not eliminated the
charge that it has been NATO's support and arms that have
enabled Portugal to carry on expensive colonial warfare in
Angola (a similar charge was also made concerning the French
in Algeria) . Relationships are further complicated by Wash-
ington's desire to extend its occupancy of a strategically
important base in the Azores, held by agreement with Portugal
since the end of World War II.
What then are the implications for future United
States-Portuguese relations, especially in view of the recent
political changes in Portugal? This dissertation will examine
the pros and cons of three possible alternatives for American
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foreign policy toward Portuguese Africa. The last chapter
of the dissertation will attempt to speculate as to the
feasibility of these policy choices in dealing with the new
Portuguese government. Option 1: complete dissociation from
all military, technical and economic support of Portugal,
public and private, in the hope that (with or without support
for liberation movements) this would forcibly speed the
process of self-determination for the territories. Option 2:
increased across-the-board support for the Spinola government
with the aim of encouraging democratization, modernization,
metropolitan integration into Europe and reform in the Afri-
can territories. Option 3: both selective dissociation and
association, tying all economic and technical relations to
programs of economic, educational and political reform but
eliminating all further military assistance.
As it stands, however, American policy has lacked the
coherence of any of these options . Thus indications of appre-
ciable political-military stress in Portugal and its African
territories are more than sufficient to warrant a thorough
policy review. Otherwise, there is the risk of awakening
later to the realization that American policy has only helped
to or has facilitated the consolidation of Angola and Mozam-
bique into a Pretoria-led coalition of white-ruled states.
In all of this, inconsistencies between statement and action,
between public and private involvement, raise precisely the
Vll
sorts of questions about the credibility and consequences of
policy that the tragedy of the Vietnam war must force us to
examine with great care.
Vlll
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XINTRODUCTION
The Portuguese empire in Africa is made up of Angola,
Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, the Cape Verde Islands, and
the islands of Sao Tome and Principe. All are considered
overseas provinces of Portugal. Since the abolition in 1961
of the "estatuto do indigenato" (native's statute), which
applied to the first three provinces, Africans, subject to
educational and residential qualifications, theoretically
enjoy the same status as Europeans. Angola and Mozambique,
whose combined area of 800,000 square miles is more than
twenty times that of continental Portugal and whose population
of eleven million people is two million more than Portugal's,
are by far the most important of the Portuguese African ter-
ritories and the main reasons why Dr. Caetano was determined
to maintain Portugal's position in Africa.
In the study of international affairs, Portuguese
Africa has special significance. Intense discussions of
Portugal continue in the United Nations at a time when ethnic
nationalism, insurgency, and guerrilla conflict are increas-
ingly acute. The Portuguese territories offer an unusual
challenge to United States foreign policy experts.
To illustrate the point, Portuguese Guinea is a pos-
sible door to the Cape Verde Islands, which could become a
major maritime base for a great power, and Mozambique is
XI
located on the increasingly important Indian Ocean. Angola
and Mozambique are geopolitically the strategic flanks to
transport between white- and black-ruled Africa. All of
these situations demonstrate how manifold are the internation-
al implications of trends in Portuguese Africa, especially
m view of the emerging economic interlock of Mozambique,
Rhodesia, and South Africa.
1CHAPTER I
THE SALAZAR AND CAETANO ERAS 1928-1972
Prime Minister Antonio de Salazar, from the time he
became Prime Minister of Portugal in 1930 until his departure
in 1968, was inspired by the ideal that Portugal should re-
tain its African territories. In fact, his plan was to develop
these territories with Portuguese rather than foreign capital.
Despite international pressure to give up the colonies, Sal-
azar was determined to control both the budget of Portugal
and the colonies. His wish was to end permanently the spec-
ulation that Portugal would have to relinquish its African
territories.^" Accordingly, the new government viewed all
foreign activities and loan offers with distrust.
In the 1930s and 1940s, Portugal ignored most of the
humanitarian-inspired attacks from abroad. Occasional critics
of her African policies were credited Bolsheviks or inter-
national Jews. Skillfully moving Portugal from the Axis camp
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Portugal
joined in 1949, Salazar allied his country with those nations
2
who sympathized with her colonial position in Africa.
At the end of the Second World War, it became apparent
to the Salazar government that the stronger Portugal's ties
1James Duffy, Portugal in Africa (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1962), p. 206.
^ Ibid
. , p . 206
.
2with Western Europe and America became, the stronger Portu-
gal's position in Africa would become. During the War, the
government had tempered its Fascist sympathies to the extent
of permitting the United States to construct and maintain an
air base in the Azores, and it was this military association
which was largely responsible for her entry into NATO. Por-
tuguese diplomacy, of course, exploited this membership to
the hilt in Britain and the United States. Britain once
again became Portugal's oldest ally, while toward the United
States Portugal put forth the face of militant anti-Communism
in Europe and Africa. 3
Throughout the 1950s, these tactics were successful.
While a minority of opinion in both countries questioned the
moral and political reliability of the Salazar dictatorship,
the seeming necessities of the Western Alliance or of colonial
policies in Africa obliged Britain, the United States, and
more often than not, France in effect to dance to the Portu-
guese tune. Thus, until late 1960, the Portuguese government
relied on both military and diplomatic support to strengthen
her control over the territories, provoking world protest
against her repressive colonial policies. These powerful
alliances bolstered Salazar's position at home.^
3 Ibid
. ,
p . 208 .
^African nationalism was assiduously interpreted by
Portuguese statesmen into a Communist menace, against which
the Portuguese colonies were represented as the last bulwarks
of Western European civilization. The necessity of maintaining
3Shortly after Salazar had taken office it became
apparent that there was a new direction with regard to the
Portuguese policy in Africa: a policy of overseas provincial
integration and an assimilation policy which inevitably had
to result in less autonomy for the territories themselves.
Gilberto Freyre, noted Brazilian sociologist, postulates the
concept of "lustropicology
" as a basis for the systematic
study of ecological and social integration in a tropical
environment. He states that Portuguese expansion in the
fifteenth century produced a peculiar civilization in the
Cape Verde Islands. White Portuguese and Black Africans,
because of the isolation of the archipelago and prolific
miscegenation, formed a social and racial harmony unknown
r
elsewhere in the tropics.
Salazar 1 s new African policy as reflected in the
Colonial Act of 1930 and the Organic Charter of 1933 provided
internal cohesion within the Western Alliance moved Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles to praise Salazar and join Portu-
guese Foreign Minister Cunha (in a joint statement) in Decem-
ber, 1955, during the height of the Goan controversy, to refer
to the "Portuguese province of Goa." Khrushchev then demanded
that Goa and the other Portuguese colonies in India "must and
will be returned to India." (Subsequently, the Soviet leaders
repeatedly endorsed India's claim to Goa.) See Department of
State Bulletin
,
(December 2, 1955), p. 1008. In May, 1960,
President Eisenhower, returning from the Paris Summit Confer-
ence, visited Portugal and later declared that the U.S. and
Portugal "have worked together without a single difference of
opinion." Prime Minister Salazar was reported to have urged
President Eisenhower to comprehend Portugal's civilizing mis-
sion in Africa and to insure that the U.S. do nothing—either
by omission or commission—to weaken it. See New York Times ,
May 24, 1960, p. 13.
^Gilberto Freyre, Urn Brasileiro emterras portuguesas
(Rio de Janero: n.p., 1953).
4for a new administrative system which in effect sought to
integrate the overseas provinces into the mother country.
This concept was eventually embodied in Portugal's Constitu-
tion of 1951. In that year the legal status of the overseas
possessions was changed from colonies to provinces. 6
Salazar had repeatedly denied accusations that Portu-
gal occupied its overseas territories for material gain only.
In a speech on November 30, 1967, he stated: "Our course is
set for us by a centuries-old history which moulded the Por-
tuguese Community into its present Euro-African form, and
also by that historical experience which has enabled us to
learn by our contact with widely varied peoples all over the
world. Material interests have not been the essential aim of
Portuguese action in the world, rather have we sacrificed them
for the progress of the population." 7
The idea of an integrated, multiracial society was
an essential component of the Salazar policy. Intermarriage
6Thomas Okuma, Angola In Ferment (Boston: Beacon Hill
Press, 1962)
,
p. 33. Okuma writes that outwardly there were
many manifestations of this new orientation. The letter heads
of official documents were changed from "Colonia de Angola"
to "Provincia de Angola." Throughout the territory, towns
with local names were renamed. Names such as Bocoio Catabola,
were changed to European names: Vila Sousa Lara and Nova
Sintra
.
7Washington Post
,
December 23, 1967, p. 18. Foreign
Minister Nogueira (speaking while unofficially touring the
U.S.) accused the major Western nations of "failure" in their
African policies, wasting money given for aid, misleading
Africans with illusory promises of freedom, investing in un-
productive schemes, hampering African economic development by
price control of raw materials, exploitation of natural re-
5and cultural assimilation were encouraged in order to accel-
erate the process of creating Portuguese citizens in the
African provinces. Salazar went on to attack those people
who laugh at Portuguese "paternalism" towards certain back-
ward peoples, and at Portugal's "missionary spirit" as being
both degrading and uncivilized. He continued to believe in
Portugal s mission in the world and consequently felt that
Portugal had rights and duties which imposed a certain line
of behavior on the Portuguese people— "that of tenacious
resistance to the forces of disintegration which infiltrate
into the overseas provinces from abroad." 8 To promote this
"assimilation process," the official policy prior to 1953
made provision for a native "elite" (assimilados) in the
overseas territories who by virtue of certain cultural stan-
dards could enjoy the same civil rights as the Portuguese.
However, by 19 50, less than 1 percent of the population was
assimilated, and the system was abolished in 1953. From then
on all inhabitants were entitled to full Portuguese citizen-
, . 9
ship.
sources, lending money "in order to merely repay past loans
and interest. " He charged that Communist bloc nations
"blackmailed" the West into an anti-colonial policy based on
a "complex of culpability." See New York Times, October 9,
1967.
^Ibid
. , p . 18
.
^ Ibid
.
,
p. 18
6In 1953, the status of assimilado was abolished,
although the term is still widely used, and the benefits of
full Portuguese citizenship granted to assimilated Africans.
At the same time, however, the new statute allowed for the
revocation of citizenship granted to Africans if they failed
to comport themselves in a manner considered proper by the
authorities. This left-handed gift aroused suspicion in the
minds of the assimilados.
Midnight came for the Cinderella colony of Angola
early in 1961. Before the year was out, it was apparent that
Portugal was engaged in a struggle that she could not win.
Nor could the Salazar government be certain that policies
that had so manifestly failed in Angola would succeed in
Mozambique and Guinea, beyond whose borders militant African
opposition-forces were gathering. The government hinted at
liberal reforms in the colonies and continued to speak of
multiracial societies living harmoniously, but when the re-
bellion broke out in Angola, it was widely believed that the
days of the Portuguese in Africa were numbered.
Salazar then took the unprecedented step of permitting
the state-controlled Portuguese press to publish a long list
of particulars indicting his government as both "autocratic"
and "repressive." The opposition charged that "fear governs
social relations within the nation and that the government
is guilty of flagrant violations of the civil rights promised
by the Portuguese Constitution." The attack added that Por-
tugal’s international standing suffered from angry attacks
7on Portugal's African policies in the United Nations and the
outbreak at the Angolan capitol. 10
The initial outbreak of violence was followed by a
series of spontaneous upheavals that plunged Angola into
protracted unrest. Switching from conventional to guerrilla
tactics, the UPA (Union of Angolan Peoples) established strong-
holds in the nearly impenetrable bush of the northeastern
quarter of the country. While the level of fighting declined,
the UPA changed its name the following April to the Angolan
Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) with the hope of
gaining international recognition. Salazar later commenting
on the Portuguese government tactics, stated: "The violence
and savagery of the rebellious Angolans" forced the govern-
ment to take steps toward an immediate solution. He further
emphasized that "an understanding" between the United States
and Portugal was imperative to "avoid situations which might
be prejudicial ... to the United States, the West in general,
and to the Portuguese nation.
^New York Herald Tribune
,
February 9, 1961, p. 69.
The following explanation was offered in Lisbon for Salazar's
sudden willingness to publish criticism of his own regime:
his hand was forced by publication of the attack in an Oporto
newspaper, long an opposing center of his regime; he dis-
covered secret parachute reinforcements to Angola's capitol,
leading him to believe trouble brewed there; and he knew he
must achieve national unity quickly in metropolitan Portugal
before a threat to the country's 400-year overseas empire was
realized. He believed the best way to obtain colony support
from Portuguese allies, especially the U.S., lay partly in
dismantling Portugal's international reputation as a dictator-
ship .
-^New York Times, May 30, 1961, p. 1.
8In 1966
, first the MPLA (People'
ment of Angola) and then UNITA (National
s Liberation Move-
Union for the Total
independence of Angola) opened fronts in eastern Angola.
But in spite of a gradual increase in guerrilla strength and
foreign assistance, the Angolan nationalists remain frag-
mented in rival movements, the differences mainly being
ideological and ethnic.
Insurgency inevitably spread to Portugal's other
African territories. in Guinea-Bissau, a thin wedge of ter-
ritory on the west coast between Senegal and the Republic of
Guinea, the PAIGC (African Independence Party for Guinea and
Cape Verde) spearheaded the drive for independence by
assaulting Portuguese military outposts in the last months
of 1962.
The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) launched
the military phase of its revolution in the northern districts
of Niassa and Cabo Delgado in September, 1964. Under the
late Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO penetrated into Mozambique,
while promoting limited social and educational services for
the inhabitants in rebel-held areas. Mondlane 's death by
assassination in early 1969 temporarily hampered the south-
ward thrust of FRELIMO guerrillas until Samora Machel, one of
12Africa Report
,
vol. 12, no. 8 (November 1967); vol.
15, no. 5 (May 1970) . The reader is cautioned that the above
citation carries a heavy anti-Portuguese bias. See also
Portuguese Africa: A Handbook
,
eds. David M. Abshire and
Michael A. Samuels (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 429, for a
slightly biased pro-Portuguese account. See also New York
Times
,
June 7, 1971, p. 8, and The Toronto Globe and Mail,
January 10, 1971.
9the members of the
dency a year later.
military commander,
triumvirate, assumed the FRELIMO presi-
Since then Machel, who was Mondlane
'
s
has attempted to cripple the construction
Of the internationally financed Cabora Basse dam on the Zam-
1 3bezi River.
As the crescendo of protest against Portugal's often
brutal suppression of the African insurgents rose in the out-
side world, particularly at the United Nations, and as the
importance of several newly formed Portuguese African parties
m exile began to increase, Portuguese repression in the
colonies intensified. Professor James Duffy interprets these
events in the following manner: "Communism was the most damning
label that the Portuguese could attach to the Union of Angolan
Peoples, the movement that had directed much of the nationa-
listic activity in northern Angola, and such a tactic was
clearly consistent with the anti-Communist image Portugal had
been projecting to the world. The Salazar regime need not
have been over-cynical to realize that in the Western World,
especially in the United States, a cry of Communism is often
.
. 14
sufficient to condemn."
On June 27, 1962, United States Secretary of State
Dean Rusk visited Portugal. The New York Times observed that
13"portugal ' s Changing Fortunes in Africa," Current
History
,
March 1973, pp. 106-107.
l^Duffy, op. cit.
,
p. 217.
Several factors
.
10
have lowered the temperature between
Lisbon and Washington to the lowest degree in many years.
The United States is blamed for not having sided openly with
Portugal when the luxury liner Santa Maria was seized in Jan-
uary, 1961." Since then the United States' condemnation of
Portugal's administration in Angola, its frequent siding
with the anti-Portuguese African-Asian bloc in the United
Nations, and its alleged failure to do something when India
invaded Portuguese Goa all led Salazar to accuse the United
States of "welching on an ally in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
Salazar went on to proclaim a policy of bilateral
cooperation with countries that were willing to concur fully
with Portugal. He stated that the U.S. had undermined the
worldwide position of its allies, notably of Portugal, and he
omitted the United States and Britain from the list of coun-
tries with which Portugal had satisfactory relations.
^
The post-Salazar government of Marcello Caetano,
although seemingly more modern and popular, has disappointed
those who had hoped that it might act to extricate Portugal
from its colonial wars. It is impossible to know how the
government would have fared in a free and open election. In
15New York Times
,
June 28, 1962; February 4, 1961.
Henrique Galvao, Santa Maria: My Crusade for Portugal
,
(Lis-
bon: n.p., 1963). It was Galvao's contention that he suc-
ceeded in focusing world attention on Salazar's dictatorship
and the plight of the African colonies; thus creating a dis-
cord between Portugal and her NATO allies, who refused Sal-
azar's request to treat the incident as piracy.
^New York Times, October 29, 1969, p. 46.
11
the October, 1969 election only 20 percent nf 4-uY U P o the population
was enfranchised and 40 percent abstained from voting. The
Caetano government candidates defeated the harassed opposi-
tion by a vote of 980,000 to 134, 000. 17 After this care-
fully supervised election, the new government pledged itself
to defending the constitutional assertion that overseas
provinces" of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique constituted
integral, inalienable parts of Portugal. On October 7, 1969,
Premier Caetano, speaking at a political rally in Lisbon,
endorsed the African policy of his predecessor, but added
that a "progressive administrative autonomy" for the overseas
territories was desirable. He stated his opposition to pro-
posals that the government enter into negotiations with rebel
groups in Africa. "For the first time since the outbreak of
the national wars in Portuguese Africa in 1961, the colonial
question is debated
. .
.
publicly.
. . . Premier Caetano
indicated last month that the elections would disclose the
public attitude toward the African policy. Since then, the
major political groups have made public their position on
the colonial issue and it is clear that there is a substantial
sector favoring a change in policy." 18 Jeune Afrigue later
reported that Caetano remains committed to the maintenance
of Lisbon's authority in the African territories, but he has
17 Ibid
. ,
p . 46
.
1
8
New York Times
,
October 5, 1969, p. 6.
12
expressed a willingness for some public discussion of African
policy
,
and has admitted that "military solutions by them-
selves cannot solve the problems of the colonies." 19 Accor-
dingly, Portugal has persevered in its African "mission" in
the face of a nascent domestic stress that may well adversely
affect its capability for realizing its Euro-African ambitions.
Equipping and maintaining an African expeditionary
force of some 130,000 to 140,000 men requires related defense
and security expenditures that consume 45 percent (or approx-
imately $400 million) of the national budget, 20 funds much
needed for the modernization of agriculture, education
,
and
communications. Seeking gainful employment and/or escape
from military service, hundreds of thousands of Portuguese
have emigrated, both legally and illegally. "Each year, an
estimated 100,000 Portuguese risk arrest by walking hundreds
of miles, jamming into crowded, unsafe trucks or taking boats
to sneak across Portugal's frontiers and find jobs in France,
West Germany and elsewhere." By way of contrast, perhaps
5,000 annually accept the government's offer of free trans-
portation to the African territories where free land awaits
them for the asking. There are reportedly 600,000 Portuguese
x Jeune Afrique (Tunis), October 21, 1969, p. 11.
20
"Portugal At War: Hawks, Doves, and Owls," Africa
Report
,
vol. 14, no. 7 (November 1969), p. 18.
^ 1The Washington Post
,
May 2, 1971, p. 14.
13
emigrants in France alone, 22 and Portugal's total population
has decreased during the past decade to 8.6 million (a 2 per-
cent drop in the last decade)
, well below the presumed figure
of ten million.
While it is true that emigrant workers are responsi-
ble for millions of dollars in foreign earnings coming back
into Portugal via their families, manpower shortages consti-
tute a spur to war-related inflation and have already led to
the importation of some 15,000 Cape Verdian and African
workers to meet needs for unskilled labor. 24 This response,
in turn, threatens social stability, as the government un-
wittingly creates a new potential for internal, in this case,
racial, conflict. Incessant government propaganda stressing
the alleged "barbarism" of African "terrorists," has nurtured
a bitter climate of opinion within which repressed anti-war
sentiment may understandably find deflected expression in
anti-black reaction. Portugal's population reflects, in
short, a certain indicator that points to present and poten-
tial social dysfunction. It represents a serious, long-term
constraint upon Portugal's capacity to maintain and expand
economic, military and settlement programs designed to pre-
serve its political rule in Africa— for a key to all these
programs is manpower.
22The Financial Times (London), May 21, 1971, p. 33.
2^ Ibid
.
,
September 14, 1971, p. 57.
24 Ibid., July 9, 1971, p. 21.
14
Western Europe, not Africa, attracts Portugal's
emigrants, and also buys half of Portugal's exports. The
government has begun negotiations for association with the
European Common Market (EEC)
,
the only way it could avoid
stultifying economic isolation in the wake of the probable
entry of Great Britain and other Portuguese partners of the
European Free Trade. Association (EFTA) into that market.
But while a new generation of modern economists and business-
men, spurred on by concern over Portugal's still respectable,
but recently declining economic growth rate (a reduction of
the GNP growth rate from 6.3% in 1968 to 4.7% in 1969), 25
work for association or integration into Western Europe's
expanding and prosperous economic system, they face implacable
opposition from the country's Africa-first vintage Salazar-
ists, who demand a contrary set of national priorities.
Prime Minister Caetano reaffirmed that Portugal will continue
to defend her overseas territories. He declared that while
the African nationalists are receiving moral and material
support from many groups, Portugal is waging its war without
outside financial aid, in the face of international criticism,
and at a cost of almost half the national budget. He stated
that Portugal had much to gain from participating in a Euro-
pean Economic Market, but that political integration was not
25The Washington Post
,
August 18, 1971, p. 43.
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possible because
little influence
m a European federation Portugal would have
in decision-making. 26 Ultra-right politi-
cians, Africa-linked economic interests and officers heading
Portugal's swollen and frustrated armed services demand even
greater resources for campaigns to repress insurgency in
Portugal's far-flung African "provinces." They are the first
to recognize that it would be difficult enough to make the
adjustments necessary to prepare metropolitan Portugal’s
gradual association with the EEC without an attempt to accom-
modate Portugal's colonial structure. To them, Africa is
more important. Consequently, a fundamental Europe versus
Africa cleavage has begun to polarize the ruling stratum of
Portuguese society.
Of more immediate consequence, a degree of war weari-
ness has been evident. 27 The view of the regime's foremost
colonial experts, apparently shared by Caetano, is that Por-
tugal cannot lose the wars in Africa militarily or economically,
but only politically. "The Algerian war was lost in Paris,"
2 6 *Prime Minister Caetano speaking on September 27,
1970, commemorating his government's second anniversary.
^ 7Noticias e Factos (New York)
,
no. 180, September 29,
1970; The Financial Times (London), January 8, 1971. The ARA,
the first effective and disciplined urban underground, has
eluded police and successfully destroyed ships and aircraft,
disrupted communication, and damaged NATO facilities. See
The Times (London)
,
March 11, 1971, p. 5c; The Guardian (Man-
chester)
,
June 4, 1971; New York Times
,
October 2, 1971, p. 16,
for a fuller comprehensive analysis of these movements. Gov-
ernment officials have claimed the "real" enemy may be at home.
In terms reminiscent of those employed by American officials
reacting to the unpopularity of the war in Vietnam, Lisbon
16
so Caetano has said. Gaetano has insisted that the Portuguese
people remain firm in their determination to preserve the
African provinces and that the government must convince na-
tionalists that they are better off with Portugal than with-
out her.
Caetano has waged a two-pronged offensive to increase
military effectiveness in the colonies, on the one hand, and
has promoted social and economic development, on the other.
The absence of public protest in Portugal does not
necessarily mean that the Portuguese people are solidly sup-
porting the colonial wars. It is due rather to the harsh
controls on information and expression as well as official
intimidation. The government has categorically proclaimed
that to question official colonial policy is treason.
The principle catalysts of Portugal's internal fer-
ment are the nationalist guerrillas in Africa, who, after a
decade of insurgency, continue, albeit slowly and indecisively,
to expand the geographic span of their action. They are still
restricted to thinly populated rural areas in Angola and
2 8Mozambique, although they have reduced Portuguese control
authorities denounce universities as centers of "subversion."
See Le Monde (Paris), June 2, 1971, p. 9; The Guardian (Man-
chester), December 31, 1971, p. 8; Diario de Noticias (Lis-
bon), December 17, 1970, p. 16.
2 8 The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) operates
in the Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete districts of Mozambique.
According to some reports, a smaller group, the Mozambique
Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) is also active in the Tete
region. The Daily Telegraph (London), October 5, 1971; The
Financial Times (London), October 6, 1971, p. 56.
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to a few towns and islands in the diminutive colony of Guinea
Using mines and booby traps with increasing effectiveness as
part of a strategy of minimal physical contact, African na-
tionalists, belonging to PRELIMO of Mozambique, or the MPLA,
UNITA or FNLA of Angola, also raid army garrisons and prose-
lytize peasants in the outlying savanna and forest regions
of Angola and Mozambique. 29 m the close quarters of Guinea,
forces of the PAIGC are reported to have begun using grenade
launchers, bazookas, mortars and rockets against Portuguese
installations. The PAIGC is considered the most effective of
the liberation movements in Portuguese Africa. Still at a
"tolerable" level, Portuguese casualties in the three ter-
ritories gradually mounted, totaling currently 50,000 dead
and 20,000 wounded in battle or accidents.
Government response has included the building of
numerous airfields and integrative networks of paved roads.
In order to finance this, Lisbon opened the door to external
investment in extractive enterprise: oil, iron, and diamonds.
The result has been a predictable, disjunctive and irrever-
sible break with the economic and social lethargy of the pre-
insurgency period.
2 QMPLA represents the People's Liberation Movement
of Angola; the UNITA represents the Total Independence of
Angola; and the FNLA represents The National Liberation Front
of Angola.
^The Daily Telegraph (London), August 5, 1971, p. 21
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Political opinion in Portugal varies concerning the
effect the colonial wars are having on Portugal's inter-
national position. One of the main arguments the liberals
put forth for ending the wars is that they have isolated the
country. Portugal's only allies on the colonial issue are
the white supremacist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia,
who disdain the Portuguese multi-racial ideal. Some anxious
South African leaders privately express doubts about the
ability of half a million resident Portuguese and, in dis-
paraging South African terms, "their halfbreeds" (over 100,000
mesticos)
,
to emulate the Rhodesian whites. Nevertheless,
South Africa is investing heavily in the Cunene (Angola) and
Cabora Bassa (Mozambique) hydroelectric schemes— the latter
a half billion dollar project whose generators will provide
South Africa with abundant electrical power. Coupled with
increasing Portuguese dependence upon South African guerrillas,
this economic linkage, which extends to trade and private in-
vestment, pushes Angola and Mozambique into an ever-increasing
integration into white Southern Africa.
The liberals feel that Portugal's future lies in
Europe: closer ties with the European Free Trade Association
and negotiations alongside Great Britain for membership in
the EEC. "Everything is conditioned by the colonial problem,"
^William A. Hance and others, Southern Africa and
the United States
,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1968),
p. 32
.
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says a leader of the nationalists;
"vast new spheres of
friendship and trade will be opened to us not only in Africa,
but in the rest of the Third World and the Communist coun-
tries
.
"
Conclusion
Contemporary critics of Portugal's presence in Africa
charge that economic exploitation is the basis of Portuguese
colonialism. They often emphasize, to the exclusion of other
factors, economic reasons for Portugal's past and present
stake in the tropics. These agruments contrast the actual
and potential mineral wealth, agricultural procedure, and
abundant sources of hydroelectric power in Angola and Mozam-
bique with the lack of them in Portugal. The Portuguese goal
is often characterized as making the African dominions yield
a profit in investments, furnishing raw materials, and pro-
viding protected markets for metropolitan industries.
African revolutionaries and their sympathizers reit-
erate these economic explanations of Portuguese behavior in
a steady stream of books, pamphlets, and leaflets. Marxist
in outlook, the authors couch their analysis of Portugal's
colonial motives almost exclusively in economic terms. With
the exception of revolutionary leaders such as Eduardo Mond-
lane and Amilcar Cabral, who identified other reasons for
Portugal's retention of African colonies, many of those
20
favorable to African liberation emphasize the economic
rationale for Portuguese colonialism.
It may further be stated that events of the last
ten years demonstrate the interrelationship of Africa and
Portuguese stability. Since the beginning of the African
liberation struggles during the 1960s, the regime for the
first time in years has witnessed in Portugal mounting resis-
tance to recent bombings, derailment of trains, and other
acts of sabotage. As seen by the Lisbon power establishment,
the nationalist wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau
disturbed the political equilibrium. Officially the govern-
ment fears that subversion is spreading from the colonies to
the metropole. Premier Caetano remarked in June, 1971, that
strikes, explosions, and the dissemination of rumors against
the regime are the weapons of agents from outside the
TO
country.
"
Increasing Lisbon's fears of a subversive connection
between revolutionaries in Africa and at home are the dis-
quieting statements of African nationalists. Asserting that
their struggle is exclusively directed against the government
and not the Portuguese people, the leaders of African libera-
tion movements have applauded the activities toppling the New
State. Mario de Andrade, of the MPLA, noted that "the forces
opposing dictatorship in the colonies and the forces opposing
32Piario de Noticias (Lisbon), June 16, 1971, p. 20.
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dictatorship within Portugal are fighting a co^on enemy.'.
Similarly, Amilcar Cabral broadcasted in a "Message to the
People of Portugal" on Radio Khartoum: "What Marcello Caetano
fears is that the Portuguese people will know that Guinea
and Cape Verde will be part of a free and independent Africa,
willing to collaborate openly and loyally with the Portu-
guese people." 33 From within Portugal, the Accao Revolucionario
Armada (ARA)
,
a Leftist urban guerrilla force responsible for
most of the underground activity in the past year, upholds the
nationalist movements in their struggles for independence. 34
Giving further credibility to the threat of a common front is
the liaison maintained in Algiers between the Frente de
Libertacao de Portugal and a coordinating committee of African
nationalist movements in Portuguese territories formed in
1961, the Conferencia das Organizacoes Nacionalistas das
Colonias Portuguesas (CONCP)
.
At the very least a defeat in Africa would discredit
and weaken the army, the main bulwark of the government and
final arbiter of politics since the 1820s. Whereas the army's
strength and prestige has soared since NATO membership and the
wars in Africa, it is still obliged to watch the political
front at home. During the pre-election campaign of 1969 the
army leaders hinted at possible intervention, causing opposi-
33The Times (London), June 8, 1969, p. 154.
34 Ibid.
,
p. 154.
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tion Democrats to endorse publicly Gaetano’s regime. The
2EEosicionistas declared their loyalty, once more proving that
the army wields ultimate power. An imprudent settlement in
Africa without the army’s adherence or one damaging its posi-
tion could prove dangerous to the nrptsonfy u t, n p ese t government, which
IS already beset with powerful right-wing critics. 35
The loss of the African colonies entails grave poli-
tical implications for the Lisbon government. For similar
reasons any diminution of control in the territories also
involves serious problems for the authoritarian regime. The
wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau provide a
rationale for curtailing civil rights in Portugal. m his
first public address as Premier, Gaetano explained that the
overseas insurgencies required national unity and ’’made any
restoration of civil liberties in Portugal impossible.” 36
This union of affairs is of crucial importance to any anal-
ysis of Portuguese policy, although it is often ignored by
all but the most perceptive critics of Lisbon's role in
Africa. Eduardo Mondlane understood the interrelatedness of
Portugal and Africa when he suggested an inverse view of
John Stuart Mill's significant assertion that empire abroad
was incompatible with democracy at home. The revolutionary
leader declared that "since the Fascist government has
35Douglas A. Wheeler, "Thaw in Portugal," Foreiqn
Affairs
,
vol . XLVIII (1969), no. 4, pp. 776-777.
3 fiNew York Times
, September 28, 1968.
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eliminated democracy within Portugal itself, it can scarcely
allow a greater measure of freedom to the supposedly more
backward people of its colonies." 37 Those who felt that civil
liberties and party elections endangered the New state often
felt the same way about liberalization in Africa.
For this reason Premier Caetano's initial pledges of
increased local administrative autonomy for the overseas prov-
inces carried with them a double threat to conservative groups
in Portugal. A loosening of ties that bind the colonies to
the mother country weakens Lisbon's position there and poses
the possibility of a similar slackening at home. The old
guard believed more decentralization presaged independence in
Africa and liberalization in Portugal, and their ominous
mobilization quickly resulted in Caetano proclaiming his
"unshakable determination to remain in Africa.'' 38 Past events
and present policies shape much of Lisbon's response to
nationalist movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-
Bissau
.
Lisbon policy-makers do not admit that these self-
serving political considerations determine the retention of
African colonies. Rather they tout Portugal's historical
mission as justification for remaining in Africa despite the
(n.p.
:
37Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle For Mozambiaue
1969), p. 124. “
—
38Piario de Noticias (Lisbon), April 16, 1971, p. 2.
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military opposition of nationalist forces and the disapproval
of much of the international community. i„ the words of
Adriano Moreira, former Minister for Overseas, the Portuguese
"have always had a clear notion that they were the instru-
ments of a great national and civilizing mission. "33 Sum-
marized, the mission is to transform African people into a
Lusitanian community, by miscegenation and Christianization to
achieve social integration. By linking nationalism and the
"civilizing mission," Portugal revealed yet another expression
of national insecurity. For if by civilizing, the Portuguese
mean assimilation of large numbers of African people, then
the added citizens increase the chances of Portuguese national
survival
.
Gilberto Freyre, the Brazilian sociologist, is the
chief theoretician and proponent of the Portuguese "mission"
and what he calls "Lustropicology .
" Believing the Portuguese
uniquely qualified by long and relatively harmonious relations
with non-European peoples, Freyre envisions Portugal's role
as promoting racial fusion and Christian conversion in order
to produce a seemingly homogenized society like that of the
Cape Verde Islands or Brazil. In short, a new or luso-
tropical civilization is the "mission" of Portugal in southern
latitudes
.
39Adriano Moreira, Portugal's Stand In Africa (New
York: University Publishers, 1962), p. 95.
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Portuguese spokesmen applaud Freyre's recognition
of their task and adopt his contentions to buttress their
case for holding onto African soil. Frequent references to
or quotations from Freyre's works are reproduced under the
gurse of scholarship to reinforce Portugal's arguments for
remaining in Africa. In spite of ten years of active guer-
rilla warfare and repeated criticism in the United Nations,
there exist no outward signs of ideological wavering on the
part of Lisbon. So convinced are Portuguese officials of
their mission that they entertain no public doubts as to its
righteousness. In a press interview, Caetano argued that the
primary reason for defense of the colonies "is because mil-
lions of Portuguese, black and white, live there who trust
Portugal and wish to continue living under its banner and
enjoying its peace." 40 That Lisbon's protestations of a
civilizing mission" smack of rank hypocrisy when practice is
measured against principle is charged by the opponents of
Portugal's policies in Africa, but the evidence suggests that
the Portuguese are victims of self-delusion. From their pub-
lic statements and publications it appears that Portuguese
officials and apologists resolutely deny an alternative to
the Lusitanian "mission."
In the mind of the Portuguese, non-economic factors
for retaining Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau exert
great power, although they are nonetheless self-serving.
40
p . 20
.
Seara Nova (Lisbon)
,
quoted in Atlas
,
January 1971,
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Nostalgia, patriotism national revival, political stability
and the call of destiny are significant motives in Lisbon's
unyielding colonial rule. Drunk with history, Portugal is
compelled to preserve its heritage and to maintain continuity
and solidarity with the past, present and future. The three
colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau have,
fact, hardened Lisbon's convictions of its historic mis-
sion just as the seizure of Goa by India in 1961 steeled
resistance to further losses of territory lest all fall as a
row of dominos. 4 ^
Against the complexities of almost five centuries of
domination, Africa's control by Lisbon defies a simplistic
explanation based solely on economic leverage. An explanation,
encompassing a wide range of forces, helps to explain why a
tiny state on the rim of western Europe carries out three
long and costly wars against the aspirations of its colonies.
After all, Portugal is not the first state to become bogged
down in colonial wars for historical and political reasons
while seeking after a great national purpose.
Perhaps this is partially the reason why world opinion
concerning Portuguese colonialism has taken a softer tone than
in the past. At the United Nations, for example, the United
States has reconsidered its once condemning attitude toward
the colonial problem.
41Michael A. Samuels, "Southern Africa: The Strategies
of Change ,
" Interplay
, December 1970, p. 26.
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The united States as a world power is faced with the
problem of relating to an internal (colonial) war. She has
in theory three choices:
,1) aid the incumbent.
,2) aid the
insurgents,
, 3 , attempt to conciliate the two. George Model-
Skl haS convincingly argued that a fourth option of total non-
involvement does not exist concerning internal war. To do
nothing, especially in the case of a great power, in fact,
aids the "stronger party (usually the incumbent) to supprlss
the weaker irrespective of the merits of the case." 4 ? Thus,
some degree of involvement is inevitable.
If noninvolvement is not a realistic option, however,
neither is it realistic to assume that policy-makers will not
hedge their bets. Therefore, acts of both covert and overt
aid to incumbents as well as insurgents are combined with
offers of "good offices." Thus the third party's involvement
or intervention has a central thrust. Shifting, ingenious
and sometimes perilous combinations of advocacy, duplicity,
and mediation must be anticipated. 43
George Modelski, International Aspects of Civil
-
~ 2^
^Princeton, New Jersey: University Press, 1964 ) t
43 Ibid.
,
p. 26 .
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CHAPTER II
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN
PORTUGUESE AFRICA
Military
well to keep in mind that the Portuguese hold
important strategic maritime and air routes in the world:
the Azores
, Madeira, the Cape Verde Islands, Portuguese
Guinea, Angola and Mozambique. Because of their pivotal
positions, the Portuguese possessions could become econ-
omically and strategically important in certain conflict
situations. Military patrol aircraft operating from these
areas can effectively survey the eastern South Atlantic, the
Western Indian Ocean, and the seas south of the Cape. Portu-
gal itself has neither the naval nor the air power to effec-
tively control this area. From Portuguese possessions in the
Atlantic, a strong naval and air power could potentially con-
trol a substantial portion of the Atlantic and at the same time,
the gateway to the Mediterranean, metropolitan Portugal,
Madeira, and the Azores. In effect, they constitute a strate-
gic triangle in the North Atlantic.
It is no secret that the United States has shown in-
creasing interest in a naval presence in the Indian Ocean,
which, by necessity, would involve some degree of collaboration
29
With the Portuguese territories and South Africa. There are
also powerful special interests, inside and outside the
United States, which are presenting very forcefully the case
for alignment with the Southern African regimes, and which
use the "strategic importance" of their coastlines, and any
soviet shipping in that general area, as an argument for that
alignment. A major assumption, usually not explicitly stated,
is that independent African countries are irrevocably under
the influence of "Communism"; Portugal then becomes the
"bastion of western Christian civilization," and defender of
democracy
.
A high percentage of the world's shipping turning the
Cape and continuing on to the eastern coast of Africa and
into the Indian Ocean passes through the Mozambique Channel.
Mozambique has several excellent harbors. For example, the
bay where the new port of Nacala is located is so large that
it could accommodate the entire U.S. Seventh Fleet. If Por-
tuguese rule continues in Mozambique, or if an independent
Mozambique is pro-Western, this would be important especially
since the British have decided to withdraw east of Suez and
phase out all their aircraft carriers by the end of 1972
.
Significantly
,
Russian naval vessels for the first time in
about sixty years have visited the Persian Gulf and Moscow
is negotiating with India for Indian Ocean bases. It must
be pointed out that Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean
has been only very recent. It has been, in fact, sometimes
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non-existent, and at no stage more than a token force. Ves-
sels have been present in the Indian Ocean only since 1969;
at the peak in 1970 there were only twenty craft in that vast
ocean, including submarines and support craft. 1
Should unrest come to eastern Africa, or should the
United States become militarily engaged with a major Com-
munist power, the extensive air and port facilities offered
by Mozambique could well become an important support factor
(for possible U.S. involvement in the Indian Ocean). 2 How-
ever, the potentialities of Mozambique's harbors notwith-
standing, South African harbors are the only ones in Africa
south of the Sahara that have docking, bunkering, and repair
facilities for major naval vessels. The ports of Mozambique
should be viewed with these facts in mind. 2
One other important strategic area for the United
States is Portuguese Guinea with its naval base at Bissau,
the Cape Verde Islands. The latter, while physically separated
from the African continent, is a centerpost of the South
1The Economist (London), December 16, 1972, p. 12.
The Economist maintained that "the Russians may have reached
the maximum number of ships they can support without a regular
base." The Soviet Navy has no shore bases in the Indian Ocean,
and above all no air cover.
2
A publication on the Indian Ocean for the International
Institute of Strategic Studies, by Geoffrey Jukes, published
in June 1972, called the Soviet presence "much exaggerated."
The Report quoted official British and American statements to
the effect that there appeared to be no large Soviet submarine
force in operation. See also. The Times (London), June 16,
1972, p. 3.
^Rudolf Gruper, "The Strategic Importance of the Cape,"
Perspective
,
August 1967, pp. 4-5.
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Atlantic "strait” between Latin America and Africa. Because
Of the volume of shipping and other maritime communications
between Latin America, Africa, and Europe, the Cape Verde
complex, with its air base at Sol, the only facility of its
kind in the area, functions as a significant link in both sea
and air communications. The Portuguese have constructed an
operational naval base in the Cape Verde Islands. Cape Verde
could also provide an in-route air base for the airlift of
the forces of any great power into Africa.
Because of its vast natural resources and its unique
relations with the Congo, Angola serves as the door to one of
the most minerally rich parts of Africa. Of special impor-
tance are the Cunene River chain of dams and power stations
on the Angola
-Namibia border, and its strategic, as well as
economic, significance.
The Cunene scheme parallels to some extent the Cabora
Bassa Dam in Mozambique, which is under attack by FRELIMO and
the subject of heated debate in Africa and Europe, since both
Cunene and Cabora Bassa involve the mass removal of Africans,
settlement of European immigrants to take advantage
of the economic benefits of the schemes. 4
Cunene differs from Cabora Bassa in being a series of
small projects, managed mainly by local firms with large-scale
4New York Times
,
February 12, 1972, pp. 23-25.
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financing by international consortia of banks. Cabora Bassa
Will have ten times the power, but Cunene will eventually
cost twice as much. 5
The two dams are considered by critics 6 as an essen-
tial part of the process of strengthening the hold of the
white minority regimes in Southern Africa, through the econ-
omic and strategic links of the Portuguese colonies of Mozam-
bique and Angola with South Africa and Namibia—which South
Africa is "occupying in violation of international law." 7
There is also a "third dam" according to critics: "the Azores
agreement between the United States and Portugal, which will
provide the ailing Portuguese economy with almost half a
billion dollars in export credits and other assistance." 8
Seen in this light, the Cunene Dam scheme will form a
strategic barrier to the liberation movements of Angola (MPLA)
and Namibia (SWAPO) in areas of increasing tension. The
Namibian side in particular has been an area of conflict, with
Ovambo workers sent home after the general strike in the south
showing increasing resistance to South Africa's occupation. 9
5 Ibid
.
,
p. 25
.
gA symposium of sixty church and action group repre-
sentatives, organized by the World Council of Churches held in
West Germany, February 29-March 3, 1972.
7 ibid . The mandate to the churches to oppose involve-
ment in such schemes already exists in a resolution from the
World Council of Churches Central Committee, meeting in Addis
Ababa in January 1971.
8New York Times
,
February 12, 1972, p. 23.
9 Ibid
.
,
p . 23
.
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A consideration bearing heavily on U.S. relations with
Portugal is the significance to U.S. security of the Azores,
whrch the U.S. has been using for naval and air force bases
since 1951 and which sometimes has been called the single
most important air base the United States has anywhere. 10
Besides providing a strategic
serve the U.S. Navy
-as a vital
air transport base, the islands
communications center and con-
stitute the hub of its anti submarine operations in the
eastern Atlantic.
The Azores assist the U.S. Navy in protecting Amer-
ican shores from the "threat" of the Soviet Union's growing
nuclear submarine fleet. The time and distance factors inher-
ent in the Atlantic undersea battle-ground are important,
considering that, should American anti-submarine planes be
denied the use of the Azores bases, they would have to fly
four or five hours to and from the mid-Atlantic, thus severely
restricting their on-station time. 11 Nevertheless, in recent
years, normal use of the Azores has shown a significant
decline: although in 1962 it was estimated that approximately
80 percent of U.S. military air traffic depended upon the
Congressional Record
,
87th Cong., 2nd sess.
,
vol. 108,Part I, p. 1126.
'
1XNew York Times
,
November 20, 1962, p. 42. The best
U.S. Navy patrol aircraft, the turboprop P3, now operating
from the Azores, can carry equipment with which to protect
convoys and ferret out hostile underwater craft in the mid-
Atlantic, flying less than three hours en route.
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Azores, by 1970 that dependence had dropped to less than
20 percent. z
The need for retaining African rights to the air
bases, however, is heightened by a growing ^ ^
capability to execute the strategic deployment of ground
forces in conventional warfare. In 1963, for example, exer-
cise Big Lift in which the entire personnel of a U.S. armored
division was moved from Texas to Germany by using the facili-
ties at the Azores was successfully conducted. Big Lift
proved that planes can't do such jobs without the use of such
bases as the Azores.^
With increased tensions in the Middle East, the Azores
assume even greater importance. Fully loaded C-5 transports
can fly nonstop from the United States base in the Azores to
Israel. u.S. F-4s being delivered to Israel also go via the
Azores. Equipped with special fuel tanks they can make it
from the United States to Israel with one stop: the Azores. 14
The strategic importance of the Azores hardly needs
emphasis. From 1946 to 1951 the United States maintained a
military presence in the Azores on an informal basis. Then,
m September 1951, a formal agreement was signed granting the
12 Ibid
.
,
p. 42.
Congressional Record
, 88th Cong., 2nd sess.
, p. 13994 .
_ _
14U.S. Congress, House, Hearings before Subcommittee
on Africa
, 93rd Cong., 1st sess.T'April 6, 1973, p.“3oT:
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United States access to the Azores in time of war for the
duration of the NATO treaty. In peacetime, the agreement
gave the United States the right to maintain and improve mil-
itary facilities on the Azores for five years, after which
Lisbon could demand the evacuation of all U.S. personnel on
six month’s to one year's notice. 15 After lengthy negotia-
tions in 1957, this agreement was renewed until December 1962.
it was clear that U.S. strategists did view the Azores
as indispensable during the period from 1961 to 1963. His-
torian Arthur Schlesinger
,
Jr. has written that in the summer
of 1961 the "Joint Chiefs of Staff declared the Azores base
essential to American security in case of trouble over
„ , . ,16Berlin .
"
U.S. officials explain, however, that although the
U.S. military regard foreign bases as desirable, they are no
longer as essential, and they view with comparative equanimity
the recent losses and planned cutbacks in the U.S. bases
On June 29, 1956, Portuguese Defense Minister
Fernando Santos Const announced that Portugal was placing two
airfields on her metropolitan territory at the disposal of the
U.S. and other NATO members. He declared that "Portugal
quickly agreed to enlarge the two bases in view of certain
recent international developments she felt might have an ad-
verse effect on the system of western defense." The New York
Times reported: "... it was clear he was alluding to the
possibility that the United States bases in Iceland and North
Africa might not be available in the future for the defense
of West Europe." New York Times
,
June 6, 1956, p. 11.
"^Robert A. Diamond and David Fouquet, "Portugal and
the United States," Africa Report
,
vol. 15, no. 5 (May 1970),
pp. 15-16.
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throughout the world. 17 This thinking was behind ^ ^
willingness of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations-to say
nothing of Senator Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee-
to pay the $200 million price which Spain is reported to have
asked at the end of 1968 for a five-year renewal of u.S. base
rights. The Spaniards eventually had to accept $50 million
for a two-year renewal. The reluctance of Congress-and
particularly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—to sup-
port expensive foreign base arrangements has not been lost on
the Portuguese. Nor has it been lost on U.S. military and
diplomatic officials, who have said that if Portugal raised
the price for allowing a continued American presence in the
Azores, a withdrawal would be considered."^
Not only is this a clear indication of the value U.S.
officials now place on the Azores. It also suggests that the
leverage which Portugal can exert today over U.S. policy is
1 9
much reduced.
Aside from the Azores, Lisbon's contributions to the
evolving bargain with Washington—and NATO as a whole—have
17
Ibid
.
, p. 16
.
IPEven accepting the contention that the base had
residual importance within the framework of NATO defense, was
there no alternative to what Basil Davidson has described as
a "positive cornucopia of payment"? See Basil Davidson,
"Nixon Underwrites Portugal's Empire," New Statesman, vol. 83,
no. 2132 (January 28, 1972), p. 13.
19Senator Fulbright gave expression to this attitude
when he asked why Portugal, as a member of NATO, "could not
itself assume responsibility for the very minor activity con-
37
been very small. Portuguese armed forces have never been
expected to play anything but a minimal role in the defense
of the NATO area. it is well known that Portugal has diverted
between two-thirds and three-quarters of its armed forces to
the colonies, retaining enough at home only for necessary
internal security purposes. 20
Strong pressures confront Lisbon to withdraw from its
dependencies. In Portugal, there is a deepening disenchant-
ment at many levels of society with continuing three rear-
guard colonial wars. Spending upwards of 40 percent of her
national budget to equip and maintain a far-flung expeditionary
force
, Portugal lacks capital for industrial and agricultural
modernization. Social and educational reforms unsuccessfully
vie for funds with wars thousands of miles away. 21
Active opposition to the African wars has made its
appearance in the form of a disciplined and effective urban
underground movement, the Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA)
,
which advocates social and political reform in Portugal and
African independence for the colonies. In the spring of 1971,
the ARA launched a widespread campaign of sabotage which has
ducted from it." See U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before
the Committee on Foreign Relations
,
92nd Cong., 2nd sess.,
February 1-3, 1972, p. 52.
2
^see Thomas H. Henriksen, "Portugal's Changing
Fortunes in Africa," Current History, vol. 64, no. 379
(March 1973)
,
pp. 17-19.
21 Ibid
. ,
p . 18
.
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had singular and dramatic success in puncturing Portugal's
authoritarian tranquility, with blown-up ships and airplanes,
disrupted communication centers and damaged NATO installa-
tions. as a result of subversive activity, government offi-
cials speak of the "real" enemy being at home, and in Novem-
ber 1971, Premier Marcello Caetano asked the National Assem-
bly to declare a "state of subversion " thne
, us empowering the
government to deal severely with its critics." 22
At this period in time Portuguese armed forces had
risen from 80,000 men in 1962 to 182,000 men in 1971, with
some 130,000 in Africa, with the exception of some NATO-
assigned submarine-detection aircraft, the entire Portuguese
Air Force was in the colonies. One army division was ear-
marked for NATO duty in time of war, but it was at about
50 percent strength. 23
2 2
a
P* 18 * Portuguese Guinea guerrilla leaderAmilcar Cabral (at a special U.N. Security Council session
which opened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on January 28, 1972)stated: "Portugal would not be in a position to carry outthree wars against Africans without the economic aid of herNATO allies." See New York Times
, February 2, 1972, p. 34.Cabral (before his assassination) was the best known ofAfrica s guerrilla leaders, and his group, the African Partyfor the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) in the
opinion of many observers is the only nationalist group that
might actually succeed in its struggle in the foreseeable
future
.
2 3 •Tj-mes (London), January 2, 1971, p. 8. "The big-
gest items (of the military budget) are the costs of armed
forces overseas, re-equipping the Army and the Air Force, and
the acquisition of four submarines
. . . the blood offering
which Portugal is making for the security of its overseas
territories is by no means small. Official sources list
3,759 troops lost between 1961 and 1970 in Angola, Guinea and
Mozambique ..." For details of the 197 0 budget, see Por-
tugal Domestic
,
December 30, 1969, p. 2.
39
Most of the arms and training Portugal has received
is of little relevance to any conceivable scenario for NATO's
defense. Similarly, the Portuguese Navy—made up of U.S.,
French and German built destroyers, patrol ships, and mine-
sweepers is now more useful for the various anti-rebel patrol
missions along the Mozambique and Angolan coasts and in
Guinea's many inlets than for anything that NATO could have
, , .
. „
24had m mind.
For some observers the Azores base agreements of Decern
ber 1971 symbolize what has been wrong about U.S. approach to
the issue of African freedom for a long time. Dr. John Mar-
cum has stated the essential features of this situation: "it
required the Republican Administration of President Richard M.
Nixon to restore an inner consistency of Portuguese-American
relations. After a decade of ambivalence and fudging, the
U.S. government (like American private interests) chose the
incumbent.
"
25
24These observations give the lie to the oft—repeated
NATO position that military assistance provided to
Portugal was only for use in the NATO area. Official spokes-
men have painted themselves into a curious corner; they
acknowledge that Portugal's primary military efforts are con-
centrated in the colonies but insist that weapons supplied to
her have remained in Europe.
2 SJohn A. Marcum, The Politics of Indifference: Portu-
gal and Africa
,
Eastern African Studies, V. Maxwell School
of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, March 9,
1972. The Washington Post of May 10, 1972 reported on a trip
made by Clark MacGregor to Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, and
Angola. MacGregor, who had just become a vice president of
United Aircraft after managing the President's re-election
campaign, was "beyond doubt the most politically significant
40
In December 1971, with the successful negotiation
of a new Azores base accord, Marcello Caetano could now pro-
claim, "The treaty is a political act in which the solidarity
of interests between the two countries is recognized and it is
in the name of that solidarity that we put an instrument of
action at the disposal of our American friends and allies. 26
Militarily, the United States since 1961 has main-
tained "an embargo on all arms for use in Africa by any
parties involved in the disputes over the Portuguese terri-
tories." The Nixon Administration has pledged to continue
this embargo. But aside from the rewards of diplomatic pos-
turing its utility becomes questionable. The embargo, of
course
,
offends Portuguese sensitivities and, perhaps, stif-
fens their resistance to American advice. But as a member of
NATO, Lisbon has easy access to standard NATO weaponry. It is
able to purchase such crucial items as helicopters from France
and now manufactures most of its own needs in small arms and
ammunition. What it really needs from the United States, it
gets. "It is free to buy: herbicides (defoliants) for use
against insurgents' food crops without restrictions; heavy
American visitor to that area since Secretary of State Rogers'
visit." "MacGregor told a Beira news conference after his
tour that he was enjoying "an agreeable and different' holiday
and that he was happy to confirm all the fine things he had
understood constituted Portuguese policy in Africa."
2 6Noticias de Portugal (Lisbon), no. 1285, December 18,
1971, p. ITT
~
27 State Department Bulletin, (October 12, 1970),
vol. LXIII
,
no. 1633, p. 421.
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duty trucks and jeeps for military supply and patrol in the
African bush; helicopters for use by the Zambesi Development
Office in overflying (surveillance?) African insurgents and
serving the Cabora Bassa scheme; and, most importantly, Amer-
ican aircraft for air and freight services to the widely
separated African territories." 28
In the words of Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, David D. Newsom: "Though these air and freight
services can obviously carry military as well as civilian
passengers, the sale of passenger transport planes to Portu-
gal has not been deemed to come within the terms of our 1961
embargo." it is true that Boeing 727s sold to Portuguese
airlines with the approval of the American government have
long transported troops on government charter to and from
Africa and from one colony to another. But now even the in-
direction of charter is being abandoned. In January 1971,
Washington approved the sale of two Boeing 707s direct to
2 8 U.S. Congress, House, "U.S. Business Involvement inSouthern Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa,92nd Cong., 1st sess.r~June 3, 1971, p. 258.
29David D. Newsom, "United States Policy Toward Africa,"
Department of State Bulletin
,
(June 8, 1970), vol. LXII, no. 1615,
p. 718. According to Newsom, "herbicides are not subject to
special licensing arrangements and are not identified in U.S.
export figures . . . therefore there is no way of determining
how U.S. commercial exports of herbicides may have fluctuated
in recent years." The need for verification and control over
such exports
,
however
,
is strongly suggested by a statement from
the American Committee on Africa which alleges that: "U.S. ex-
ports of herbicides to Portugal quadrupled between 1969 and 1970,
the year Portugal began to use them in Angola." See New York
,
ACOA
,
"The Status of the Liberation Struggle in Africa," June 1,
1971, p. 33.
42
the Portuguese government which was known to want them in
order to increase the mobility of its expeditionary forces
.
30
Senator Edmund Muskie in a speech delivered before the African
Studies Association remarked: "I believe the United States
has a duty to itself as a nation committed to the principle of
self-determination to make our views known to the Portuguese
government in no uncertain terms. I believe we have a duty,
as a friend of African independence and peaceful development,
and as an ally of Portugal, to work as hard as we can to per-
suade Portugal to change her colonial policies .
"
31
The United States Commerce Department files indicate
that, as of August 15, 1969, Kaiser Jeep Africa (purchased
from the United States parent company and now completely
South African owned)
,
has sold jeeps to the Portuguese Army
in Mozambique for several years. The jeeps were declared by
the company to be its CJ-5 commercial model, not built to
military specifications. Under U.S. export control regula-
tions, commercial-type jeeps may be exported and/or re-
exported to free world" destinations under the provisions
3QThe Star (Johannesburg, weekly ed.), June 26, 1971,
p. 11. Also, International Herald Tribune (Paris), January 6,
1971, p. 7.
31Congressional Record
,
vol. 117, no. 65, May 5, 1971,
p. 6276. Senator Muskie remarked: "... the airplanes are
clearly used to further repressive policies in Africa, pol-
icies the U.S. is on record as opposing."
43
Of General License G-DEST. South Africa, Portugal, Angola
and Mozambique are included in Country Group v. Accordingly
such sales to these destinations involving U.s.
-origin jeeps
or foreign-origin jeeps using U.S.
-origin components are not
restricted under U.S. export control regulations. 32
In support of the U.S. government’s embargo of arms,
munitions, and implements of war for use in Portuguese Afri-
can territories, the Commerce Department maintains that it
exercises "surveillance over exports to Portugal and the
African territories of military noncombat vehicles, civil and
demilitarized aircraft." 33
With respect to the South African and Portuguese mil-
itary, "all exports to the military of commodities and tech-
nical data subject to the requirement of validated export
licenses are carefully reviewed in consultation with the
Department of State and, in certain cases, with the Depart-
ment of Defense to determine whether approval would be con-
sonant with the U.S. arms embargo policy established for these
destinations. " 3 ^
32Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales
Facts. (January 1971)' issued by the“u.S. Department“of~Defense
,
(Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office).
33 Ibid
.
34
U.S. Congress, House, Statement of Rauer H. Meyer,
Director, Office of Export Control, Bureau of East-West Trade,
Department of Commerce, "Implementation of the U.S. Arms
Embargo," Hearings before Subcommittee on Africa, 93rd Cong.,
1st sess., March 20, 1973, pp. 54-57.
44
Basil Davidson, in his article "Arms and the Portu-
guese, "35 argues that military aid has ^ extens . ve; var . ous
and continuous throughout the 1960s. "Most of it has come
from Portugal's NATO partners, with the United States, Prance
and West Germany well in the lead. Formally, of course, none
of these supplies to NATO are supposed to be used in Africa.
France has never bothered with this formal prohibition.
supplying Nord Atlas transports and Alouette helicopters
without stipulation, but Britain and West Germany have made
verbal conditions on their military aid. Thus, Britain could
give arms and equipment to Portugal with the understanding
that they were not to be used in Africa. The United States
has maintained a strict enforcement of its arms embargo on
all military arms to Portugal." 36
In addition to an annual million dollar "NATO subsidy"
and limited arms sales to Portugal, 37 the United States "con-
tinues to train Portuguese army, naval and air force officers
at such centers of advanced military learning as the Naval
35,Basil Davidson, "Arms and the Portuguese," Africa
Report
,
vol . 15, no. 5 (May 1970), pp. 10-15.
36 Ibid
.
,
p. 13.
37Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales
Facts (January 1971) lists I?1
. 3 million in military assis-
tance deliveries to Portugal in 1970 (p. 10) and military
sales totalling $1.1 million for the same year (p. 22), for
a combined total of $2.4 million in weaponry.
45
Post Graduate School at Monterey, California." 33 lt is
estimated that in excess of 100 Portuguese officers may be
receiving specialised training in the United States at any
given time. This training involves receiving useful skills
and experience in Europe through NATO seminars, training
exercises, maneuvers, intelligence exchanges and informal
contacts with American and French officers experienced in
counterinsurgency action in Vietnam and Algeria. 40
The NATO Defense College in Paris admits 50 students
per six-month term for upgrading of the officer corps of
the member nations. Portuguese officers attend along with
officers from other NATO countries, other special courses are
arranged at NATO level or bilaterally. One such course open
to NATO countries involves training in chemical and biological
warfare, at the Vilseck School in West Germany. 4 '*' A list of
officers promoted illustrates Portuguese participation. One
3 8Washington Post
,
April 4, 1971, p. 40.
3 9 ^ ,Robert A. Diamond and David Fouquet of the Con-
gressional Quarterly have reported a total of over 2,700 Por-
tuguese military personnel trained in the United States through
1970. Cited in Africa Report
,
p. 17. To administer military
assistance, sales and training in Portugal, the U.S. main-
tains a 24-man Military Assistance Advisory Group in Portugal.
The Mutual Defense Assistance agreement expressly stipulates
that assistance received is for the purpose of promoting an
integrated defense of the North Atlantic area, as defined in
the NATO treaty.
40Davidson, Africa Report
, pp. 10-11.
41
p . 4
.
Congressional Record
,
U.S. House, December 29, 1969,
46
officer, now in Mozambique, had completed a NATO course in
cryptography. Another had spent time at the Command Staff
College in Fort Leavenworth, next at the headquarters of the
U.S. First Infantry Division in Germany, and then in Angola.
A third had gone from NATO to the Portuguese General Staff in
Mozambique, and then back to NATO. The result is not only
that the Portuguese officers "maintain a broad outlook and
are up to date in military development and techniques, but
also that officers from other NATO countries learn about what
is happening in Africa from the Portuguese point of view." 42
In an article entitled "Arms From East and West Used
in Africa," James Hoagland, veteran African correspondent for
the Washington Post, stated: "In spite of our declaration in
1961 embargoing the sales of arms to Portugal for use in that
country's African colonies, we continue to supply the planes
and train the pilots that fly Portuguese soldiers there. "43
Mr. Hoagland 's article points out some practical steps which
have in fact been taken to support, rather than to oppose,
the denial of political self-determination in Portuguese
colonies. The article notes: "Two or three times every week
the (Portuguese) military charters Boeing 727 jetliners from
the government-owned airline to transport troops to Mozambique.
4 2Jornal de Exercito
,
September 1968, p. 15.
43James Hoagland, Washington Post, p. 18.
47
Charters have also been arranged in Boeing 707s to bring
troops from Portugal to the three territories." 44
The credibility of U.S. denials of involvement in the
Portuguese territories was severely strained when in 1965
CIA complicity in a plan to smuggle twenty B-26 bombers to
Portugal was revealed. Seven of the bombers had already been
shuttled to Portugal from Tucson, Arizona, when U.S. Customs,
evidently not in on the plot, caught up with the smugglers.
The pilot, John Hawke, an RAF veteran, and a French count,
Henri de Montmarin, were brought to court in Buffalo, New York,
to stand trial for munitions smuggling. Their defense was
that they had been hired by the CIA. 45
At the trial Lawrence Houston, the CIA general coun-
sel, testified that "the CIA knew about the shipments at least
five days before they began. Even so, he denied that the CIA
had any involvement in the affair. Judge John Henderson
informed attorneys that 'any questions calculated to improp-
erly discredit the U.S. and its representatives will be dis-
allowed,' and questioning along these lines was cut short." 47
44 Ibid.
,
p. 18
.
45Davidson, Africa Report
,
p. 17. See also, Martin
Caidin, in a letter to Ramparts (February 1967), p. 27.
4
^Ibid
. ,
p. 17
4
7
Ibid.
,
p. 17. In the fall of 1965, the United
States testified at the U.N. that the smuggling had been a
purely private affair which the government had stopped.
48
In an article entitled "The Africa Dossier," carried
in the normally conservative British Weekend Telegraph
. E .H.
Cookndge, wartime intelligence agent, claimed that the CIA
had strong links with PIDE, the Portuguese secret police, some
of whose officers are training in America, and that CIA
"Special Forces" instructors are with units of General Kauiza
de Arriaga, fighting FRELIMO in Mozambique. Cookridge alleged
that the CIA had also infiltrated FRELIMO Headquarters in Dar,
and keeps the Portuguese military command informed as to
48FRELIMO activities.
Secretary Newsom categorically denied that Portuguese
military personnel have taken counterinsurgency courses in
the U.S. since 1963. And it remains U.S. policy not to ex-
tend such training to the Portuguese military. "Two Portu-
guese officers have taken a course in Psychological Operations
at Fort Bragg, as have officers representing other NATO allies,
kut this course is currently not available to Portuguese mil-
itary personnel and will not be in the future." 49
James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs, Depart-
ment of Defense, made a statement to the House Subcommittee
on African Affairs to the effect that since 1961 the U.S.
policy has been to deny arms of U.S. origin to either side
4 8Weekend Telegraph (U.K.), January 1, 1972, p. 9.
4 9Newsom, op. cit
.
,
p. 719.
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involved in the dispute in Portuguese Africa, since that
time, according to Noyes, the U.S. has required and obtained
formal assurances from the government of Portugal that any
embargoed equipment provided by the U.S. government will be
restricted to use in the NATO areas.
Mr. Noyes assured the Committee that every alleged vio
lation of the U.S. equipment used by the Portuguese in Africa
has been investigated when brought to the attention of his
department. These investigations are normally followed by
discussions with Portuguese authorities. He stated, "We
know of no instance when the Portuguese violated their
assurances, and we stand ready to examine any such eivdence
to the contrary."'*'*'
Mr. Noyes concluded his remarks by reiterating the
official U.S. position with regard to Portugal as a NATO ally:
American relationships to Portugal and to NATO have
nothing to do with the wars Portugal is fighting inAfrica. NATO is purely a defensive alliance whose ter-
ritorial boundaries are confined to Europe and the NorthAtlantic. Its concern is exclusively the defense of
Europe ....
Moreover, the bilateral American military relations
with Portugal deal exclusively with American and European
defense. Maybe in 1961 Portugal did use American equip-
ment allocated to NATO use in Africa instead; but now
Portugal gives assurances that new equipment received is
only for use in Europe.
. .
.52
50Hearings before House Subcommittee on Africa, od. oil-..
p. 88 . —
51 Ibid
. , p . 87
.
5 2 Ibid
.
,
p. 87. Commenting on allegations of CIA
assistance to the Portuguese government, Noyes stated: "We
50
Critics of o.S. policy toward Portugal maintain that
even if it were true that no newly supplied o.S. weapons are
berng used by the Portuguese in Africa, the o.S. argument
would still depend on the assumption that the role of Portu-
gal's military in Europe is quite separate from its role in
Africa, so that cooperation in one area has nothing to do with
cooperation in the other. They see this assumption as false.
It is false because the Portuguese make no such clear
distinction. They see the mission of their armed forces as
the defense of the national territory. The national terri-
tory includes, by definition, the "overseas provinces." 54
Premier Caetano's public statement makes it clear
that his government expects more in the way of a quid pro quo
for American use of the Azores and continued Portuguese mem-
bership in NATO. In a fireside chat on December 18, 1971
,
Caetano told his domestic audience: "The treaty (the new
Azores Agreement) is a political act in which the solidarity
53
know of no basis for allegations that O.S. agencies haveprovided information on the location of liberation movementforces in Portuguese Africa. No U.S. agency provides anyintelligence information to the Portuguese outside of theirNATO responsibilities
. . . Training provided to the Portu-guese military by the Department of Defense is limited toPortugal's NATO mission, primarily to enhance its capability
in anti-submarine warfare and air defense."
53Davidson, Africa Report
, p. 18.
54
Ibid
.
, p. 18. See also, Statement by Barbara Rogersbefore the Subcommittee on Africa, op. cit
.
,
pp. 77-85.
51
Of interests between the two countries is recognized and it
is in the name of that solidarity that we put an instrument
of action at the disposal of our American friends who are
now allies." 5 Declaring that "internal difficulties in
North American politics" had obstructed an earlier accord,
the Portuguese government leader said that American aid in
the resolution of Portugal's economic and social problems
constituted not "payment" for the Azores bases but rather
"reciprocity. 1,56
Within American military circles there are those who
would stop the equivocating. In March 1970, Admiral George
Anderson of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board and a former ambassador to Portugal, told the House
Subcommittee on Africa that the United States in general had
erred in "putting over-emphasis on political progress."
Commending Portugal as an ally investing its own money in
what it "believes is right," he concluded: "I think again
that if we could stop the guerrilla warfare being waged
against the Portuguese, the Portuguese would then have more
of their own funds available to spend in accelerating the
55 .See Noticias de Portugal
,
no. 1285, December 18,1971, p. 11. Also, The Guardian for an English translation
and editorial comment, March 31, 1971, p. 17.
56 Ibid
.
,
p. 11.
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introduction of new schools, facilities nn v' d mtie
, work projects for
their African citizens." 57
Jennifer Davis, in a paper entitled "U.S. South
African Relations: Some Strategic Considerations," delivered
before the African Studies Association’s annual meeting, 58
pointed out "that recent revelations in the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate make it clear that published figures
do not tell the whole truth (about reported levels of U.S.
military aid to Portugal) .... Testimony was recently given
that more than one billion dollars allocated for the Food for
Peace Program had been used for military purposes. Testimony
offered by representatives of the Southern Africa Task Force,
United Presbyterian Church, to Senator Proxmire indicated
that m fact no one knows in how many different ways the U.S.
gives military aid, nor how much it adds up to." 59
Mr. Gil Fernandes of the Independence Party of Guinea
(Bissau) and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) expresses a view
widely shared among African spokesmen when he argues that the
United States "has decided to come to Lisbon's rescue by pro-
viding the funds to enable her to continue her military action.
57Hearings before Subcommittee on Africa, nP . nH
p. 915. — —
58
Jennifer Davis, "U.S. South African Relations: Some
Strategic Considerations," (Denver: African Studies Associa-
tion, November 1971), p. 4.
59 Ibid.
,
p. 4
.
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It has been our expectation that while drubbing Portugal on
the battlefield and isolating its forces within defensive
enclaves we could persuade Portugal's international friends
to bring real diplomatic pressure to persuade it to sit down
and talk with us.
. .
Despite some sympathy for the rebel cause when repre-
sented by such persons as the late, American-educated Eduardo
Mondlane, the American government has given little support to
African nationalists. For a few years there was a scholarship
program for nationalist (refugee) students and AID funding for
refugee schools in Tanzania and Zambia. And presumably a
trickle of funds has been expended for intelligence gathering
purposes, and, perhaps, on occasion to shore up what have been
seen as comparatively ''moderate,'' or "responsible" nationalist
elements. But in semi-clandestine conversations in Washington
lunchrooms or at diplomatic gatherings in Africa and elsewhere,
however, insurgent leaders have been told "that the United
States cannot aid them because it does not intervene in
another state's internal affairs—but that it can in fact
provide their colonial masters with military and economic
aid without really intruding." 61
6 0Gil Fernandes
,
"The Azores Over Africa," Africa
Today;, vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter 1972), pp. 3-6.
61
,Paul M. Whitaker, "Arms and the Nationalists,"
Africa Report
, vol. 15, no. 5 (May 1970), p. 12.
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Military and financial aid for the African nationalist
movements of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau, comes
from four main sources: neighboring independent states where
the movements have set up bases from which they direct their
operations inside the Portuguese-controlled territories; the
remainder of independent Africa, including collective aid
through the African Liberation Committee (ALC) of the Organ
ization of African Unity (OAU) ; the Soviet Union, Eastern
European and Asian Communist countries and Cuba; and the
TT 62West
.
The first presidential administration to make any
effort toward enticing Portugal onto a slippery path of re-
form was the Kennedy Administration. But American initiatives
either to inject a "U.N. presence" in the form of a visiting
mission
,
to promote "dialogue" between Lisbon and independent
African states, or "to reason directly with Premier Antonio
Salazar" (the purpose of George Ball's mission of 1963) 63
failed to lead to any concrete political concessions, let
alone negotiations with African nationalists. More signi-
ficantly, there is still no more than token African partici-
pation, at best, within top echelons of the provincial govern-
6
2
Ibid.
,
p. 12.
63George W. Ball, The Discipline of Power (Boston:
Little, Brown, Co., 1968),
~pp. 245-252.
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ments of Angola and Mozambique. « The catholic order of
Whrte Fathers withdrew from Mozambique in 1972 lamenting the
continued impossibility of Africanizing their services under
the Portuguese system. 66 ln Angola, the African population
13 SXClUded fr°m “ngful Participation in an economic
boom that is benefitting powerful urban settler interests
intent upon wresting increased autonomy from Lisbon
.
66
Mr. Gil Fernandes of the Independence Party of
Guinea (Bissau) reminds us that insurgent groups in Portu-
guese Africa are coming to view the United States as the "real
enemy," the ultimate source of Portuguese strength. And the
fact that these movements are increasingly committed to
working for profound structural change along socialist lines
suggests that short of overt military intervention, American
officials of a conservative hue may be tempted to authorize
covert activity designed to reduce the likelihood of their
success. In this regard, Washington's tolerance level may
64
1 , .
United Nations Document A/8023, Add. 3 , p 79 The°nlY
1
hlgh mestico (there are no Africans) In theAngolan provincial government, the Secretary of Educationwas replaced in 1971. One of Angola's seven deputies in AhePortuguese parliament is of African descln??
P l t
65
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United Nations Document A/842231, Add. 4, pp. 60-82.
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be tested less by anti-imperialist insurgent rhetQrlc ^
by felt obligations to protect concrete private African
interests
.
Conclusion
For the policy-maker, setting Africa in perspective
within the range of foreign policy priorities in America has
always been difficult because of the dual comment which
this country has maintained for freedom and independence for
oppressed nations and the cordon bond which, simultaneously,
it has tried to maintain with its European allies, coinci-
dentally colonialist powers.
Waldemar Nielsen, President of the African-American
institute, recognizes that while it is still possible to play
both sides at the moment, wisdom dictates more support for
the African side than has been given to this date. His book
The Great Powers in Africa
,
and the previous African Battle -
line, both stem from discussion groups in the Council on
Foreign Relations, and must be taken as representing a sig-
nificant, if still a minority, view among the foreign policy
elite
.
In particular Nielsen suggests a reexamination of
American ties with white Southern Africa. He indicates that
sound policy may involve Portugal's exclusion from NATO, and
restriction on the flow of American private investment. He
also advocates non-military aid to the liberation movements,
57
thus "checking the drift of the nationalist movements into
bitterness extremism, and growing dependence on Communist
support. " The resulting situat . on woui^ ^ creafce
future greater U.S. leverage towards a peaceful compromise
settlement
.
such a readjustment of U.S. policy must take into
consideration the necessity of imposing constraints upon the
activities of private interests that have operated in support
of Portugal on the side of the status quo. Africans have long
expressed the belief that, whereas internally the American
government will p iace restraints upon the activities of private
interests so as to protect social and individual rights and
well-being, it will countenance "anything the traffic will
bear" concerning American corporate and other private activi-
ties in Africa. This leaves private interests free to act in
such a manner as to contradict and undermine stated government
policy
.
Antonio Salazar, himself, understood this principle:
that private corporations with high budgets and technical
expertise could become a threat to effective political power
And yet in spite of his fear of the political consequences,
economic necessity born of war caused him to open the door
to American economic interests.
7Waldemar Nielsen, The Great Powers in Africa (New
York: Praeger, 1969), p. 3587
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Strategic Interests—Economic
Portugal African possessions have^^ ^
important role in the Portuguese economy, supplying raw
materials cheaply and providing a sheltered market for Portu-
guese goods. The African territories still take about 24
Percent of all Portuguese exports and supply about 13 percent
of all Portuguese imports. More important still, the colonies,
because of their trade with the rest of the world, proved a
valuable source of foreign exchange to the escudo tone. The
export of Angolan diamonds and coffee and the invisible ex-
ports of railway and harbor services from Mozambique play the
major role in earning such exchange; however, the level at
which wealth was generated was, until recently, very low. The
prize was small.
It is the discoveries made since the wars began that
now make the colonies really precious possessions. Forced by
the costs of the wars to seek new sources of revenue, and
lacking the organizational and technological knowledge and
capital necessary for engaging in resource exploration and
exploitation, the Portuguese were driven to open the doors of
their colonies to foreign investment. In 1965, restrictions
6 8Portugal, Department of Economic Affairs, Provinces
of Angola and Mozambique, Notes on the Economy of Anqola andMozambique
, 1969, pp. 13-157
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on non-Portuguese investment were relaxed and foreign inter-
ests moved in rapidly, SOOn uncovering great potential wealth;
on wells and iron mines are already in production, deposits
of sulphur, phosphates, diamonds, and copper are being ex-
plored. « Hugh hydro-electric projects, Cunene in Angola
and Cabora Basse in Mozambique, are being jointly developed
by the Portuguese and the South Africans and will provide a
vast flow of power-some to be sold, much to be used in fur-
ther development, especially to encourage white inmigration.
Portugal's own economic backwardness makes it diffi-
cult for her to carry out the projects immediately necessary
to maintain control of the colonies. Thus, it is impossible
to organize and finance long-term resource development.
The government in Lisbon found that the cost of a war
m Africa could not be counted simply in escudos spent on the
military. Numerous subsidiary services needed to be estab-
lished or developed rapidly. Thus at the outbreak of the
rebellion in Angola in 1961 there were less than 200 miles
of tarred roads in the entire colony, making it difficult to
shift troops rapidly; by the end of 1970 the government had
built 3,750 miles of paved road, spending 763 million escudos
($27 million) in 1967 and 1968 to reach that total.
Ibid., p. 15. See also. Journal of Commerce, (New
York), January 15, 1969.
^
^Portugal, Department of Economic Affairs, Province
of Angola, Notes on the Economy of Angola
,
1969, p. 13.
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once Portugal projected increasing economic activity
ln the COl°nieS
' 11 was that the weak and inefficient
infra-structures would have to be rapidly strengthened and
expanded, and the government was hard-pressed to find the
necessary funds. Increasingly it sought aid from foreign
governments and financial groups and found an early and
sympathetic response to its needs in the United States.
In 1967 General Electric provided the Portuguese with
credit loan of $1.2 million. At the same time the U.S.
Export-Import Bank granted a loan of $7.9 million, the full
amount being allocated to the purchase of diesel locomotives
for the transport of ore from the rapidly expanding Cassinga
iron mines in Angola. In 1968 the Angolan government pur-
chased more diesels from General Electric, at a cost of
$34.5 million, to be repaid in twelve semi-annual payments at
an interest rate of 7.25 percent. 71
Repeated loans were made available to the Portuguese
Airways Corporation, TAP, by the U.S. Export-Import Bank;
amounts involved include $6.5 million in 1966, $4.8 million
in 1968, another $2.7 million in 1968 and a new credit of
$4.1 million in 1969 for the purchase of two Boeing 707s. 72
71
.
United Nations, General Assembly, Report of theSpecial Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Imp 1 e
-
mentation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples A/7752, Add. 1, November 25.
1969, p. 43.
72United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the
Special Committee on Situation with Regard to the Implementa -
tion of the Declaration of Granting Independence to Colon i a
1
Countries and Peoples A/6300, Rev. 1 (1966). p. 313.
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All Eximbank loans and programs are available to
Angola and Mozambique. fllthough Angola and ^
possessions of Portugal and are ultimately governed through
Lisbon
, they have the authority to contract external debt.
Under the short- and medium-term programs, the guarantee of
a provincial bank in Angola or a bank in Mozambique may be
requested. Por larger transactions under these programs and
direct credits, the guarantee of a Portuguese bank may be
required. If requests were received for unusually large
credits and guarantees, the Bank might require the government
73of Portugal to act as the borrower.
In her struggle to maintain her empire, Portugal has
had to assign a major role to foreign investors for the future
of her colonies. Her own position has been reduced to that of
junior partner, the giant corporations of Western Europe and
America taking the position of the new senior partners.
By 1972 more than thirty U.S. companies were operating
in Mozambique and Angola. Among these are three companies
with diamond prospecting concessions. Diversal Inc. of
Dallas, in May 1969, was granted prospecting rights over more
than 10,000 square miles for 35 years. The Portuguese govern-
ment is entitled to a 10 percent ownership, without cost, in
the company. Diamond Distributors of New York was also
73Hearings
,
op. cit
., June 3, 1971, p. 167.Piano de Lisboa
, January 6, 1971, p. 11.
See also.
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at the same time, a vast diamond prospecting
__
cession, extending down to the bonder of South West Africa.
Diamond Distributors holds a 73 percent interest in the
prospecting company called Oestdiam; the Portuguese govern-
ment has 10 percent free equity. Portuguese partners hold
the rest. The company is required to spend more than 52 mil-
lion on-shore and Sr million off-shore in initial explora-
tion. The third diamond prospecting company, Diamul, com-
bines U.S. and other capital.
^
Several major oil companies are prospecting, of
these. Gulf Oil is the most important. The largest single U.S
investor. Gulf oil serves as a good example of the impact of
private American capital upon Portugal's internal war capa-
bilities. The Gulf oil Corporation contends that its in-
vestment of some $150 million in an Angolan (Cabinda) oil
field that is widely considered as "transforming the economic
outlook in Angola" constitutes a "politically neutral act." 75
At the same time, the corporation explains its motivation on
the basis of a need to find more oil for what it terms the
free world" and states that it seeks "to do business only
74 See a study prepared on U.S. corporatein Angola and Mozambique by the Africa Fund (164Avenue, New York) and published in May 1970.
investment
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Public Documents, Department of Commerce, U.S.
ttie Portuguese African Territories. June 1971,(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971)
.
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with those nations whose governments our government recog-
nizes. " Moreover, it brings to its foreign undertakings
"those attitudes" ref lec-H nrr a ^ti g a preference for the American
"form of government." Gulf further judges .. in its view
apoiitically that "the people of a nation always profit
from their oil" and that "invariably, because a foreign com-
pany is doing business in a developing nation, the citizens
of that nation are better off than before. which citizens
unspecified. The question is not posed. But what
are the consequences of Gulf's "politically neutral act"? 77
One of the stated goals of the Southern Africa Task
Force, United Presbyterian Church, 78 has been to address it-
self to examining the impact of U.S. companies that are in-
volved in support of Portuguese colonialism. Specifically,
the Task Force believes that the presence of the Gulf Oil
Corporation as the largest U.S. investor, although not the
7
rr
'Gulf Statement to Trustees, Ohio Conference The
r
h
u
rC
S
° f C
^
rist '" Columbus, Ohio, September 10,' 1970.In the Cabinda enclave of Angola, the U.S. Gulf Oil Co haqinvested $142 million in oil exploration ^nd the G„' steel
See™ Times'
1
^
th® potential *Y rich Cassinga mines., (London), December 4, 1970, p. 34.
Q . .p n .
77s
f
e U,S * Congress, House, Statement of Josiah Beeman,
rh„rrh
Dl
fi
efar ' ?°U ahe£n Africa Task Force, United PresbyterianC u c , U.S. A., U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa,"Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa
,
op. cit.
, pp. 111-
i
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i
lltarily Gulf 0il is an ^dispensable strategic materialto the Portuguese Army, whose 130,000 troops forcibly preserve
colonialism in Portuguese Africa."
78 Ibid
.
, pp. 111-112.
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only international oil company, in Portugal , s African^
163
* to the suppression of the aspirations
g vernment of the more than 13 million people in these
territories
.
79
Gulf replies that it is required by law to be, and ism fact, neutral with respect to all foreign governments,
including Portugal.
-Governments often change. Gulf states,
but contractual agreements like its concession in Cabinda
remain in force. Gulf insists that its position is neither
favorable nor unfavorable to Portugal. 80
Critics charge that Gulfs payments to the Angolan
government represent a significant source of revenue that
permits the continuation of the colonial war. Payments by
Gulf, and to a lesser degree by other foreign concessionaries,
are central to the financing of the war on the Portuguese
side
.
81
79
, .
—
ld
' PP* 113-114. Josiah Beeman contends: "Gulf'sclose business relationship with the Portuguese governmenthas
policy
d,,a natUral vested interest in Portugal's colonial
8 0Portugal does reserve the right to buy the totality0 oil production. The Governor-General of Angola, Rebocho
vaz, has stated: "... in the mechanized wars of our times,1 s (oil) principal derivative
—
petrol
—
plays such a prepon-derant part that without reserves of this fuel it is not pos-
sible to give the Army sufficient means of movement. The
machine is the infra-structure of modern war, and machines
cannot move without fuel. ..." Cited in "U.S. Business In-
volvement in Southern Africa," Hearings
, op. cit.
,
p. 114.
8
1
In August 1971 PALC (Pan African Liberation Commit-
tee) and AFRO (Harvard-Radclif fe Association of African and
Afro-American Students) submitted a detailed report to the
65
Gulf responds that its parents to date have not infact been significant and that they do ^ themselves ^
vade the financial foundation for Portuguese policy, its
annual parents allegedly represent a small fraction of the
total Portuguese defense cost and its payments go to the
general treasury, not to the war effort alone, and therefore
support programs of social and economic development as well. 82
Gulf's total payments to the Angolan government from
1967 to 1972 were $35.6 million. The firstn t sizable payments
were made during the last three years; prior to 1969 Gulfs
annual payments to the government were just over $160,000,
with the exception of 1966 (about $860,000) and 1968 (about
$300, 000). 83 Following the pacesetting Gulf move into the
Angolan economy, new American investments in the exploita-
'on of diamonds, sulphur and phosphates, according to critics,
promise additional support for Portuguese colonial rule. 84
stock
d
£°rP°ration recommending that Harvard sell its Gulf. They argued that the operations of Gulf oil in Angolaend considerable financial and moral support to the Portu-guese colonial regime.
82
. .
See Gulfs position statement on "A Proposed Resnln-tion on Southern Africa before the Delegates to ?he EighthGenera! Synod of the United Church of Christ," presented by
r. Edward B. Walker, Vice President, Gulf Oil Co., GrandRapids, Michigan, June 24, 1971.
8 3See Stephen B. Farber, "Gulf and Angola," Issue,
vol . II, no. 3 (Fall 1972), p. 23.
84 Ibid., p. 23.
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m response to critics who demand that Gulf „ithdraw
rom Angola, Gulf states that withdrawal from its contract
would simply leave the government with all the revenue from
a well established oil field, which the government itself
3 °Perate or contract to another oil company, m either
event, says Gulf, the government would not be deprived of
revenue but could, in fact, realize a considerable increase.
Now, after sixteen years, substantial oil production at
Cabinda is a reality, and Gulf's withdrawal cannot change
this fact. 85
indeed, if Gulf were in fact to leave, its concession
would quickly be farmed out to one of several oil companies
that already operate in Angola. Petrangol
,
a Belgian-Portu-
guese company, has long experience in production and refining
in Angola, and several other European and American companies
have staked out concession areas along virtually the entire
length of the Angolan coast. It is probable that any of these
companies would welcome the opportunity to take over the Cabinda
operation even on terms that would provide the government with
still larger payments. 86
8 5
r 7 - „
Ibid., p. 27. See also, "Remarks by Paul Sheldonice President of Gulf Oil to the Eastern/Southeastern
litv^qonJh
1 In
^
stors
n
Study Group on Corporate Responsibi-
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12? 1972)!'
^
86 Ibid
.
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The Kansas_City_star, a disinterested observer, has
summed up this writer’s opinion of the controversy surrounding
Gulf s Cabinda operations:
poorest'of
5
the WesHurooe
““ been
.
that
’ in time, the
cost-in money anfmanner ^TlhTt ^ ° f theonly if the price of ho“ i 0 L ?hesls 13 Enablegreater than the returns. The prospect t®^ritorles . isrevenues from Anqola aHpv-c of major oil
radically. The M rt V 3 cost -benefit equation
their cause will now hav^r i^a^^08' Wh° supPortomics to hang their hopes on. 87 another Pe9 than econ-
Texaco too, among major American oil companies, is
oil prospecting and was granted its first concession in 1968.
It has a joint agreement with Angola (a Portuguese and South
African controlled company) for oil prospecting in the Congo
area of Angola, on- and off-shore. Initial minimum invest-
ments will total $15.5 million. Essex Corporation and Union
Carbide are also in the oil race; and again there are several
oil industry servicing firms, subsidiaries of U.S. firms,
such as Tidewater Marine of New Orleans, Schlumberger Ltd.,
Halliburton Company, now active in the busy oil prospecting
boom in Angola. 88
Tenneco was granted a concession for sulphur, gypsum
and anhydrite prospecting and mining near Benguela in Decem-
87Kansas City Star
, May 1, 1970, p. 7.
8 8United Nations Document A/AC 109/L62S. Add. l
May 8, 1970^para. 94."
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ber 1968. By May 1969, there were reports of rioh sulphur
deposits and Portuguese officials reported that Tenneco in-
tended to spend $50 million developing the deposit. Tenneco
has a contract fairly typical of all current mining contracts
in the Portuguese territories, making provision for set min-
imum expenditure by the company, giving the Portuguese govern-
ment a 50 percent share of profits and a direito de concessSo
(right to a share of the production or its value.) Tenneco
has also been seeking oil rights in its sulphur prospecting
areas
.
As is the case in Angola, most U.S. investment in
Mozambique is currently concentrated in resource exploration
and development, with a heavy emphasis on oil prospecting.
In October 1967, a consortium formed by Clark Oil,
Skelly Oil and Sunray (the operating partner) was granted a
three-year on- and off-shore oil concession. In January 1970,
after two years of exploration the drilling ship Glomar Con-
ception began work on the first of six projected exploratory
wells off-shore. Work is simultaneously being conducted on-
shore in the 15-million-acre concession. The consortium,
optimistic about its prospects, estimated the current drilling
90program would cost $6 to $7 million.
89 Ibid
.
compiled from Notes on the Economy of Angola andUnited Nations A/AC 109/L6 25
,
Ads'. 2
,
Part II May 15 T9Topara. 86, '
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Gulf OH and the Pan American Oil Company have a joint
concession and have been prospecting since 19 58; expenditure
to date has been some $22 million, when the contract was
renewed recently, the companies agreed to invest a further
S9 million by 1970, making them the largest individual parti-
cipants in the Mozambique oil drive. This group has found
natural gas at Pande,- near Beira, and has recently commis-
sioned a giant drilling platform for off-shore work. Hunt
international (a Placid Oil subsidiary) and Texaco are other
active oil concessionaries in Mozambique. Texaco has pros-
pecting rights in the north, along the Tanzanian border. 91
All the oil concessions are very recent—many contracts
post-dating the inception of the liberation movements' armed
struggle; several promising areas lie in ground now being
hotly contested. All oil contracts contain standard clauses
in which the Portuguese government undertakes to ensure the
security of the company and its operations against any "third
parties." Other clauses cover payments to be made to the
government in the form of taxes, shared profits, defense pay-
ments, Mining Fund contributions and royalties. 92
91 u-jIbid. The major portion of this area is now insidethe zone controlled by FRELIMO
,
the Mozambique Liberation
Front.
92
Ibid. Ingersoll Rand, S.A., another American sub-
sidiary, is reported to be supplying material for the con-
struction of the Cabora Bassa Dam.
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Finally, it is interesting to note that several u s
corporations have played an active role in Angola and Mozam-
bique indirectly, through subsidiaries operating in the
Republic of South Africa. Kaiser Jeep S.A., a subsidiary of
Kaiser Jeep International, has been selling jeeps to the
Portuguese army in Mozambique for several years, despite the
U.S. official prohibition on the supply of arms to Portuguese
Africa. Chase Manhattan has an interest in the Standard Bank
of South Africa, which in turn, in collaboration with the
Banco Totta Alianca of Portugal, has established banks in
Angola and Mozambique under the title Banco Standard Totta. 93
In assessing the total impact of private sector in-
vestment, one must also consider trade. The U.S. is not the
largest trading partner for either Angola or Mozambique, but
it plays a very special role in relation to Angola. Americans
are the largest outside buyers of Angolan coffee (over 50 per-
cent of the exports) at some $60 million annually. 94 The
major U.S. purchase in Mozambique is shelled cashew nuts; more
than 80 percent of the total available in 1970, worth $10 mil-
lion, was sold to U.S. buyers. 95 The government has fixed
9 3 ii
"Supplement on Mozambique," Standard Bank Review,
1970, pp. 8-10.
94
Statistical Abstract of the United States
,
1971,
92nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: u7s~i Government Printing Office,
1971)
,
pp. 769-770.
95United Nations Document A/AC 109/L625, Add. 2,(Part kk)
,
~
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. 90
.
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minlmUm ^
-
id
- for cashews purchased
fro, the traditional (i.e., African, sector, but most of the
trading is in non-African hands and African income from the
-op is very low. The Industrial Association of Mozambique,
^ 3 rSCent SUrVSy
' “ the average income for the
800,000 persons who collected the 120,000 tons produced out-
side the plantation sector was only 375 escudos a year
($13.20)
.
96
Add to this an annual expenditure of over $80 million
by American tourists in Portugal, 97 some $15 million spent by
Americans connected with the Azores installations and the total
input of American money (excluding the operations of Gulf)
comes to something in excess of $275 million. A question is
raised: Without this inflow of American money, could or would
Portugal bear the cost of protracted colonial war? 98
In conclusion, other categories of less pecunious pri-
vate American organizations have become involved in the support
of African insurgency. Humanitarian aid, medical, educational
and the like, from church, relief and liberal or radical
groups, of course, constitutes political intervention in inter-
nal war just as much as the investments of Gulf Oil. Such aid
9
6
Ibid.
,
para. 90.
—
,
, . . ,
7
ffle Europa Yearbook 1971, vol. I (London: EuropaPublishers, 1971), p. 1053. In 1970, 304,000 Americantourists visited Portugal.
98New York Times
, December 19, 1965, p. 5
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' °n thS °thSr hand
' *itatively far less significant
That the corporate may predominate over the non-corporate in
a conflict between such private interests is suggested by the
case of the Ford Foundation, which withdrew its support from
the Mozambique Institute (FRELIMO-related) in 1964 following
strenuous objections to such support from the Ford Motor
Company of Portugal, as well as the Portuguese government.
Conclusion
The absolute size of U.S. investment in the Portuguese
territories (principally Angola and Mozambique) is, as yet,
fairly moderate; but its impact is great because the economies
of the two largest Portuguese provinces, Angola and Mozambique,
are small and undeveloped. Both are still primarily agri-
cultural subsistence economies with small, highly organized
export sectors in the hands of the white settlers.
It is clear then, that the Portuguese government be-
comes the prime beneficiary of the growing foreign participa-
tion in the economy of the territories. Vast new revenues
still flow into Portugal's coffers from income tax, profit
sharing, special defense taxes and other payments. These
revenues are needed and have been used to strengthen Portu-
guese resolve in the colonial wars.
Capital is consistently being drained out of the Por-
tuguese economy for military use in the territories. Premier
Caetano described the process himself: "all the military
73
effort overseas has been and will go on being supported by
resources coming from the ordinary income, which before was
largely used to cover development expenses ." 99
The gain for the people of Angola and Mozambique is
much less certain. Nothing in the process win ensure them
future control over the resources of their own country.
Much has been- made by the Portuguese and by corpora-
tions such as Gulf of the fact that Africans will be trained
in new skills, and that new jobs will be created. That appears
to be true in a few cases, though the pattern of differential
opportunity and differential wages is well established in
both Angola and Mozambique. The central issue remains that
of colonialism; no people can share equally in the wealth of
their country while it is a colony. Even so conservative a
commentator as the London Financial Times saw little hope of
a true sharing of the benefits of the new wealth:
For the time being—and probably for the next five vears—Angola s boom will prove of major benefit to a primarilyropean elite in Angola and in Portugal itself.
p
00
In attempting to sort out that elusive sense of the
"national interest," Professor Samuel Huntington, who has
studied problems of national security as they relate to the
"united Nations Document A/7621. Add. 1, September 25,
100The Financial Times (London), July 23, 1969, p. 11.
1969
.
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process of policy-making. finds that there is differentiation
in the 'political process"^^
programs I have defined above
III and IV of this study will
with respect to interests and
as "strategic. "102 As chapters
show, the principal groups
concerned with the determination of strategic program deci-
sions are the State Department, the Secretary of Defense,
the Armed Services, the Treasury Department, the Budget
Bureau, plus a few other governmental departments. Similarly,
Congress as a whole. Appropriations Committees, Finance, Ways
and Means, Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Space and
Atomic Energy Committees are all part of the political process
which makes decisions about strategic programs.
101Samuel Huntington, The Common Defense:
,
NatiDna_l_Pgiitics
P
u f K
19 61)
,
p. 80: Huntington describes quite specificallywhat he means by the "political process": A policy-makingprocess is Legislative in character to the extent that (1) theunits participating in the process are relatively equal inpower and consequently must bargain with each other, (2) im-
^
sa9reements exist concerning the goals of policy,
ll
there are many possible alternatives. A process, on
/if ?f
her hai
?
d
'
is executive in character to the extent that(1) the participating units differ in power (i.e., are hier-
archically arranged)
, (2) fundamental goals and values are not
at issue, and (3) the range of possible choice is limited.
102 T ,
. .
ibid
.
,
p. 80. By "strategic" Huntington meansdecisions on the overall size of the military effort, the
scope and character of military programs . . . the composition
of the military forces (force levels)
,
and the number and
nature of their weapons." See Samuel Huntington, "Strategic
Planning and the Political Process," Foreign Affairs, vol. 38(January 1960)
,
p. 286.
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CHAPTER III
POLICY MAKING: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
In his study of the Kennedy Administration's handling
of foreign policy problems, Roger Hilsman, who was at that
time both a scholar and policy-maker, bluntly assessed the
process of foreign policy by stating, "The process of policy-
making is politics." 1 By this statement, Hilsman would seem
to say that the process is "uncomplicated," but that is far
from the picture he gives
:
Rather than through grand decisions on grand alternat-i ^<=changes seem to come through a series of slicrhtmodifications of existing policy, with the new policy
tativl
n
st
SlOWlY 3nd haltin9 1Y bY small and usually ten-
zigs and zaci
3 PrOCess of trial and error in which policy
1
1
r f ^
g
f'
reverses itself, and then moves forward ina se ies of incremental steps. Sometimes oolicies areduly ratified only to be skewed to an
them out ^
rection and Purpose by those carrying
nothina at ^
sometimes issues are endlessly debated with
Shoi K l al l being resolved until both the problem and
of events
6
^
dlsaPPear under the relentless pyramiding
Certainly the process described above seems unsystema-
tic to the point of confusion. This state of affairs, Hilsman
believes, is created by the powerful conflicts of special
interests in the government among the "relevant decision-makers"
1Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation (Garden Citv. New
York: Doubleday, 1967), p. TT.
2 Ibid
.
,
p. 5 .
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from the President's Office to +-h^ p
.
' 0 the Executrve Departments
,
“-> i-
..... „ *. wi„,“ *
't-
m“" *11=
"
. Mio;process unawed by forma
l
l structures and functions which may
stand rn the way." And, even though we ^
nature of policy-making as "unrational procedures such as bar-gainmg and power, it is equally true that we can understand
better than we now do how a nation is moved" and that better
understanding of the process of policy-formulation could lead
to more effective decisions
.
3
To the extent that national security planning ever has
a beginning, it starts when the President, or his Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs, issues a National
Security study Memorandum (NSSM)
. These memoranda are num-
bered, and more than 130 of them have been issued since Jan-
uary 1969. Each NSSM directs its recipients-normally the
Secretaries of State and Defense and the heads of other agen-
cies involved to study a particular problem and to respond
by a set date. The response to the NSSM is usually prepared
by the Interdepartmental Group (IG) for the region concerned.
In the case of Africa, 4 the Interdepartmental Group for Africa
3 Ibid
.
,
p. 13.
A More Act?,1
R
?
SS K ' Baker
-
.
"Towards a New Constitutency forive American Foreign Policy for Africa," pacer nre-sented at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the African StudiesAssociation, November 3-6, 1971, p. 14. "The NSC in its for-mu ation of policy, usually deals with a series of optionst reduces the optional range to two or three and presents this
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is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of state. A working
group of the IG drafts the response, which must always be fQr.
mulated in options. The significance of the options formula-
txon lies in forcing representatives of various departments
and agencies to agree upon reasonable and feasible courses of
action, regardless of their departmental or personal prefer-
ences. This approach apparently contrasts with that used in
the Eisenhower Administration, the last previous one to make
systematic use of the National Security Council, when the
State and Defense Departments often confronted each other as
straight adversaries across the National Security Council table.
The current procedure is designed to put all the options before
the President. 5
After the IG agrees on the response to the NSSM, it is
sent to the White House. Where appropriate, a meeting on the
NSSM is scheduled for one of several committees operating
within the NSC system— in the case of African problems, nor-
mally the Senior Review Group. SRG meetings on African prob-
lems are normally attended by the Under-Secretary of State,
the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and their
to the President for his final decision." Mr. Baker contends
that "National Security Advisers must have sensitive antennae
to what is salable advice and what is not. National Security
managers, in defending their recommendations or their failure
to speak up, talk about preserving their 'credit points' with
the President. You cannot propose too many ideas that are un-familiar or incompatible with presidential beliefs."
^Herbert J. Spiro, World Politics: The Global System
(Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1966), Chapter 3.
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counterparts from the other agencies involved. The discus .
sron usually explores the various options contained in the
response to the NSSM and the consequences likely to flow from
each option. Sometimes the consensus reached at an SRG meetinq
rs communicated to the President for his approval, and then
the policy is turned over to the Under-Secretary's committee.
chaired by the Under-.Secretarv *sec y of State, for implementation
and follow-up. On some occasions, the NSSM response will be
discussed at a meeting of the National Security Council itself,
presided over by the President.^
All members of the IG have access to the same informa-
tion and they all operate within the framework of the highly
regularized, by now almost routinized, NSC process. This
makes it very difficult, and very probably counterproductive,
for any one agency or its head to try to influence the NSC
staff or the President with claims of special expertise, par-
ticularly when such boasts are made in the absence of repre-
sentatives of the other agencies involved. 7
A large proportion of NSC staff members are career
Foreign Service officers on temporary duty in the White House.
They bring with them to the White House the working habits and
operating procedures which they applied within the State De-
partment, and not by accident—these procedures are highly
^ Ibid
. ,
Chapter 3.
7 Ibid
. ,
Chapter 3.
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congruent with the NSC process. The two stand to each other
ln thS relati°n ° f mlcroco
->3 macrocosm. The state Depart-
ment's internal procedures also discourage intrigue, and
encourage horizontal and vertical openness. 8 These procedures
are of particular importance to the Bureau of African Affairs,
which does not always find itself in full substantive agree-
’
ment with, for example, the Bureau of European Affairs or the
Bureau of Economic Affairs .
^
In the many Executive Office recommendations for
internal reform currently in the process of implementation,
there are several suggestions to formalize the adversary
process within the Department of State. To the extent that
adversary procedures are in use within the Department, ver-
tically between levels, horizontally within bureaus and offices
and between the Department and embassies abroad, this method
(adversary) is admirably suited to bring out the advantages and
disadvantages of proposed policies in a fashion which gives the
8 Ibid.
,
Chapter 3, p. 11.
n c , f P-
12. See also John Seiler, "The Context ofU.S. African Policy, a paper presented at the Fourteenth
.q™al Me®ting of the African Studies Association, November 3-6,±y/l, p, 18. Professor Seiler contends that: "While it is agood beginning to hypothesize a very low priority for Africanpolicy issues, a determination of the causes of that status is
more difficuit. Does low priority mean that only a few lower-
echelon bureaucrats take a sustained, knowledgeable interestin the area and give it high priority? Or conversely, is aninformed consensus about the low priority of African problems
shared widely by participants in the policy-making system? If
the former is true a strong case can be made for supporting
prospective Presidential nominees whose own scale of priorities
puts Africa relatively high. The consensus assessment would
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participants equal opportunities to persuade
selves, and their superiors.^
Professor Charles Lerche
,
Jr., in his
coordination in the Executive Branch defines
of coordination as follows:
each other, them-
discussion of
the basic forms
Since policy-making is so extensively decentra 1 i -7apparatus for coordination becomes necessity This
'tlThas dimensions both horizontal and vertical h • skthere must be agreemSK t at any SvePsSS^he a11^'
e!e?ted
S
to
ak 9 P° liCy
,
S° that their cumulative effort is
fa l
common end; this basic harmony must be both
nn^
departmental and interdepartmental. Verticallvits lower m the hierarchy must coordinate with those
if *
U
h
(ren thOUgh in a different department) . OnL
t
e d°ne successful lY can excessive confusion con-
a siiaw' frustration be avoided and something ' likeingle American foreign policy be forged.n 9
Lerche then goes on to specify several forms of coor-
dination among decisional units. (1) Vertical Coordination :
This form involves those units of coordination which are
responsive to the Executive Office of the White House and
peak to a pervasive view about objective international realitybut it would also reflect system processes by which informationis absorbed, sorted out, transmitted, and used to support
operational and policy decisions."
10 Ibid
.
,
p. 18
.
11Charles Lerche, Jr., The Foreign Policy of the Amer-
_can People (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960),
P
’ 7^1 Professor Huntington suggests in The Common Defense,
p. 147; "To the extent that there is interaction between a
Department and the Executive Office of the President to agree
on priority programs and synchronize political strategies, the
process is characterized by the term, ’Vertical Bargaining.
’
Horizontal Bargaining,’" in Huntington's terms, "is even more
widespread and important in the sense that there is an attempt
to balance the interests of two very powerful constituencies
—
the Joint Chiefs and the National Security Council often in-
cluding interested Departments and Agencies. The chief
difference between these two processes seems to be that in
81
through it to the President, such as the National Security
Councrl or the Bureau of the Budget. (2) .Single Departs,
in this for, the President often gives to one Executive agency
central direction over a broad sector of foreign policy activ-
ity; for example, he may give the State Department direct con-
trol over the development and monitoring of foreign trade
Policy. (3)
; Thls closely
resembles the horizontal form in that for numerous special
interests throughout the Executive Branch there are various
decisional units which use the "special interest" as an organ-
izmg principle. (4) Super-board Concept : This high-level
form of coordination is meant to coordinate the coordinators,
that is, to bring key problem areas under the close control of
the President and his advisors through a high-level group of
representatives (reminiscent of the horizontal structure) from
the various decisional units. An example of this process would
be the Senior Inter-Departmental Group, chaired by the Under-
' Vertical Bargaining' there is more of a tendency for theprocess to be rooted m the Presidency and to emanate downward
rf^hlcal Jy thrQugh the departmental chain of command, whilethe horizontal process is more 'democratic.'" Huntington'sdevelopment of these terms appears to be connected to its usein an earlier article when he described the constitutional
relationship between the President as Commander in Chief andthe military as a "vertical pattern." See Samuel Huntington,
^Civilian Control and the Constitution," American PoliticalScience Review
,
vol. L, no. 3 (September 1956)
,
p. 697
.
82
Secretary of State with representation from the Assistant
Secretary level of various Executive Departments concerned
with foreign affairs
.
12
There is a central focus, as to what all of the fore-
going authors are saying concerning the decision-making
process. Why are certain decisions made? How do these deci-
sions effect other decisions? The raising of these questions
brings into focus certain concepts which have either been
neglected in the past or not thought to apply. Por example,
the concept of
-feedback-” from one system to another as a
result of action initiated by the first system. Further, by
treating decision-making as a process rather than as a static
phenomenon "the path of action" concept is brought into play.
Many researchers have been deceived by looking at the inter-
national field as fixed
,
seeing final results and objectives,
then correlating them in a cause and effect pattern. By
recognizing the concept of "path of action" the observer might
find that original objectives had been dropped by policy-
makers and new objectives defined either as a result of "feed-
back' or on the basis of new information. 14 These, then, are
a few of the concepts which the analytical scheme has made
useful
.
12 lbid . f pp. 75 - 76 .
13Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin,
"Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International
Politics," Foreign Policy Decision Making
,
edited by Richard C
Snyder (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 15-186
14 Ibid.
,
p. 165
.
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It appears that what is most lacking in these models
is usable typologies of variables. The above schemes, as
presented, can distinguish the relative importance of such
variables as the value orientation of society vs. the opera-
tion of groups within society and their effect upon the
decision-making process. For example, before appraising the
impact of external variables on the decision-maker it is,
first, necessary to have a fairly comprehensive understanding
Of the internal setting of the external state under considera-
tion. Further, because of the fact that no two states inter-
in a void, it is necessary to have a thorough knowledge
of all states operating within any given system which might
have an effect upon the decision-maker in operation.
Another problem arises from the fact that, in order
to arrive at a theory, a solid mass of data will have to be
collected concerning each state within the international
setting and then some kind of typology so constructed that the
data can be effectively used. Further, within each state data
must be amassed concerning the relative significance of vari-
ables operating on different levels of decision-making and on
different types of decisions. All this will then have to be
correlated with the relevant typology. Finally, in order to
make all of this independent work relevant to each other, it
will he necessary to make sure that exact rules of methodology
are utilized by all those concerned with research. If there
is deviation from these general rules, the chances of ultimate
success will be that much diminished. The point is that this
84
project for one or a group of scholars, but something
which would necessitate a large research organization and the
use of high-speed computers. In fact, one would end up con-
structing a decision-making structure in order to analyze
decision-making
.
In describing their approach the authors state that
one of their prime research objectives "
. . . is to recreate
the world of the decision-maker as the latter views it." This,
they feel, is a much more valid objective than to view the
world objectively and then attempt to explain decisions. While
admitting the general validity of this proposition it would
seem that the authors have interjected a near-impossibility.
The observer has a difficult enough time in the reconstruction
of the objective world let alone trying to recreate an objec-
tive world as seen through the eyes of the decision-maker.
This analytical objective seems impossible to achieve, not
only from the observer's position, but also from the point of
view of the decision-maker himself. Anybody would be hard-
pressed to describe in an analytically useful manner his per-
ception of an event which took place a number of days ago. 15
A further problem in decision-making analysis is that
it presupposes a highly institutionalized governmental struc-
ture such as is found mainly in the developed nations of the
15Charles Hermann, "International Crisis as a Situa-
tional Variable," International Politics and Foreign Policy
,
ed. James Rosenau , 2nd ed. (New York: Collier-MacMillan
, 1969)
,
p. 411.
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world. There is a real question
underdeveloped or semi-primitive
as to its applicability to an
situation where formal insti-
tutional behavior gives way to informal decision-making. ln
any event a distinction must be made between formal and actual
decision-makers
.
For example. if the actual decision in a
foreign policy matter were taken outside the formal govern-
mental structures and- then "rubber stamped" by the relevant
official, this scheme would only be able to inform the observer
as to why the official acceded to the policy, but not of the
reason why the policy was decided upon. Thus, by concentrating
completely upon the official process the actual point at issue
might be either overlooked or improperly treated. This con-
centration upon the official structure has a further dis-
advantage in that the international system as a system with
its own dynamic, is not taken into consideration. 16
The planning of United States policy toward Africa is
no different from the planning of United States policy toward
the other major areas of the world, for which the five regional
bureaus of the Department of State have responsibility. Africa
competes with Europe, East Asia, Latin America, the Near East
16 Professor David Wilkinson suggests that, "Foreignpolicy decision-making may be, rather than one overt process,
a set of several overt processes. One must ask, therefore,
if there are not different policy-making styles and processes
for global, regional, and country policies? These may be made
at different levels or in different places, and consequently
display a multitude of forms." Wilkinson goes on to say that
for national security, foreign aid, warfare, information, and
diplomacy, there are different styles. See David Wilkinson,
Comparative Foreign Relation s: Framework and Methods (Los
Angeles, California: Dickenson Company, 1969)
,
pp." 117-118.
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and South Asia, for personnel, for
attention and energies of those who
resources, and for the
are involved in the
policy flow.
The chain of events which led to the establishment of
the Bureau of African Affairs in the Department of State was
set in motion in 1956 by a recommendation to the Secretary of
State from the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South
Asian and African Affairs to make a detailed study of its
administration of African affairs. The administrative changes
based on the study resulted in the establishment of a quasi-
mdependent, skeletal staff responsible for Africa which
reported directly to the Secretary of State. 17 The intention
to establish a separate Department, made known on October 11,
1956, was officially realized in January 1957 when the State
Department submitted a budget for Fiscal Year 1958 containing
a request for funds for a separate Bureau for Africa. In its
Budget Report to the Congress on April 12, the House Committee
on Appropriations recommended the necessary funds for the
establishment of the new Bureau of African Affairs. 18
Meanwhile, on March 12, 1957, Senator Theodore Green
(D-R.I.) introduced a bill (S-1832) which would authorize an
additional Assistant Secretary to be designated for African
1
7
Chronology—Bureau of African Affairs
,
State Depart-
ment, January 5, 1968, p. 1 ~.
1
8
House Committee on Appropriations, Report No. 351,
April 12, 1957, p. 3.
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Affaxrs. The bill passed both houses Qf Congress ^ ^ ^
1958, and was signed into law by the President on July 18
The new Bureau had all of Africa in its jurisdiction except
Algeria, which remained in the Bureau of European Affairs,
and Egypt and Sudan which remained in the Bureau of Near East
Asian Affairs. By the time John P. Kennedy became President,
therefore, the State Department had acquired the institutional
structure which would be invaluable to him in the formulation
of policy.
Within the Department of State, the responsibility for
initiating action on most African problems rests with the
Bureau of African Affairs, where the country "desk officer"
is the main point of contact with the African country or
countries within his competency. He also maintains close
relations with their embassies in Washington. He is primarily
an operations officer who makes decisions on routine matters.
He also participates in policy-making by drafting proposals
for approval by the office director and the Assistant Secre-
tary . -*-9
The distribution pattern for field reports (from
State, CIA, and Defense) makes clear that at least a small
proportion of the daily "traffic" goes directly to higher-
level staff in State and in the National Security Council.
The traditional hierarchical information flow from country desk
to area director to assistant secretary and higher up still
19Walter Goldschmidt, The United States and Africa
(New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 276.
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goes on, but it has significantly less effect. While desk
Officers in the African Bureau and inr still receive much
the total flow and still exercise considerable judg-
ment about which items to pass on to their superiors, they no
longer have the potential for control that they once had. 20
The formal system of information distribution succeeds
in its purpose of minimizing policy disputes based on a
hoarding of information (this is generally true within State,
but less true in some aspects of State-Defense relations)
.
Its thrust is augmented by the pervasive pattern of informal
lateral contacts, usually below the assistant secretary level
(there are many contacts at that level, but they tend to
involve more formal resolution of conflicts left unresolved
by lower-level informal contacts), which cut across the formal
bureau and departmental lines within the overall foreign
policy system, but most especially in the case of State and
Defense. Individuals within this network are quick to pass
on incoming information which they feel is relevant to common
concerns
.
2 0 Seiler, op. cit
., p. 2. The Assistant Secretary had
an enormous responsibility for developing a corps of capable
officers m the area of African affairs since little had beendone before him (G. Mennen Williams appointed Assistant Secre-tary of State for African Affairs by John Kennedy) in this re-gard. Under Williams' control the whole African area was made
more attractive, especially from the standpoint of career pos-
sibilities. Therefore, some Consulates had to be raised toEmbassy status, additional jobs had to be created where there
were already Embassies functioning, and the language and area
training of officers in the African service had to be vastly
improved
.
21 Ibid
. ,
p . 3
.
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For Southern African policy in general, these links
have been re-established substantially since the departure of
Mennen Williams from the African Bureau
.
23
Ties between ^
Bureau and Defense's Office of International Security Affairs
(ISA, had been especially weakened, because of the animosity
incurred within Defense by State's victories in the three
disputes over carrier use of South African facilities. Men
unhappy with the Williams-Bowles-Fredericks style and values
have felt increasingly comfortable with subsequent Bureau
direction
.
23
The informal network has been reinforced by an active
policy of cross-assignment: the present Portuguese desk officer
of Michigiffo^twkve'ySrs aLTfl^ed
he
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b?ouaht
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the federal level of government! Thoughr g he job a great deal of political ability he hadfew political contacts in Washington, for which he initial lv
instSfacc^^17 * ^ style ^ SL'SSS*
sate for h?^
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e
r°m African ieaders and helped to compen-is lack of personal expertise on African questions
l
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ne
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A
?
S
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ta
2
t Secretary generated considerable activity.A c eck of the State Department Public Affairs Press Releaseflle
?
ln
,
a two-year period (February 1961 - February1963) reveals that Williams gave fifty-seven reported speechesbetween trips to the African continent. He also adopted anopen door policy, receiving even such dissident African repre-
sentatives as the leaders of revolutionary movements in Mozam-bique, Spanish Guinea, Algeria, and others.
23On
t
the advice of Chester Bowles, J. Wayne Fredericks
was brought in as Deputy Assistant Secretary to help Williams.
Fredericks was a knowledgeable assistant whose first-hand
awareness of Africa dated back to 1948, when he first served
in a managerial capacity for the overseas operations division
of the Kellogg Company in Battle Creek, Michigan.
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was once a consular officer in m , .
that „ „
“ Mozamblt3u© and then handled
country and Angola for INR; 1SA , s Soiuthern African deskofficer served a frustrate
, .
strating two-year assignment in theA ncan Bureau during Will iams tenure. 2 4
This informal network thrives in the presence of
nominal consensus about Southern African prospects. It doesnot depend on universal sharing of deeper attit ay udes or values,
' r«
^ ^
„f
ence
.
The Eisenhower Administration
President Eisenhower took office early in i 953 in an
international atmosphere dominated by confrontation with the
Soviet union. By the beginning of his second term, however.
Profound changes had begun to take place within the Soviet
Onion and the Communist world and throughout less developed
areas, which led to the emergence of a new and more intricate
world balance and, in the case of Africa, called for far-
reaching revisions of American policy.
Faced with challenges abroad and division at home,
the new administration essentially continued the Truman policy
of containment, changing only some details of substance. 2 5
2 4seiler, op. cit
.
,
p. 4 .
25
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could be found, conflict could be mitigated. Merlo Pusey^for
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But the style and emphasis with which its approach was pre-
sented by the incoming Secretary of statej jQhn poster
Produced great misunderstanding. His references to '.libera-
tion and "rolling back communism" in Eastern Europe stirred
disguiet abroad as did his declaration of the doctrine of
"massive retaliation" and his avowal of the practice of
"bnnksmanship.
" To the less developed countries, it appeared
United States had become even more obsessed with the
Communist threat and less responsive to their particular needs
and outlook than it had been during the terms of President
Truman. Dulles repeatedly indicated his intolerance of
neutralism and "nonalignment," tendencies then increasingly
favored by nationalist leaders and the heads of the various
Afro-Asian states as they attempted to insulate themselves
from—and take advantage of—the competition of the cold war.
From the beginning, therefore, Afro-Asian leaders felt little
^pen^^s'Lchniquf^^an^iJg ist0n9lY
V^n
” ln
f?
lre
^
his ass°ciates by his owi example if
.
In hi
f State of the Union address, January, 1958
"Cold Sar
r
"
S
"with
h
r
thS United States was certainly at war,
DOS sih?p Ir, ™ ^
vicious, godless enemy, but that it was
ounter the strength of Communism and work forpeace on the globe by the vitality of the U.S." The PublicggEg£S_of_t^e Presidents of the United States
. Dwight DEifen^w^Twasnrngton, D. C . : u.S. Government Printing Office,
2 6Waldemar A. Nielsen
(New York: Praeger, 1969), p .
The Great Powers and Africa
260^ ~
92
warmth or sympathy toward the new group in WashingtQn
the tact that in earlier times both Eisenhower and^ hafl
expressed themselves clearlv ir, -fy rn favor of eventual independence
for the colonial areas. 27
At the same time, however, the Republican Administra-
tion proved highly sensitive about neutralists, whom it judged
anti-Western in orientation. The most open demonstration
occurred after President Nkrumah's address to the General
Assembly on September 23, 1960. Nkrumah's deep anticolonialism
had prompted him to denounce Western policy in the Congo as
"imperialist intrigue stark and naked/' a "policy of divide
and rule," a "desperate attempt to create confusion," and a
"concealed intention" of setting up
"clientele-sovereignty,
or fake independence" in the Congo. When questioned about
these remarks at a press conference the same day. Secretary
of State Christian Herter responded that Nkrumah had "marked
himself as very definitely leaning toward the Soviet bloc."
Nkrumah promptly expressed surprise, saying that "Mr. Herter
was, in fact, the last person from whom I would expect such a
27ibid
.
^Despite his background in an action-oriented
Tn'hifLprSach'tf
Ei-nh°W6r S-”s t0^^ ^pttienthis a pro h to problems; it could further be observed thata philosophy of restraint and a political strategy of patience
d
a
"L?omP,
atlble "ttribUteS * Eisenhower said about the Snder-PGd
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ountries
' they have to learn that the "process of
See Thp
m
p
n
hr
S gradual and laborious rather than revolutionary.
- ? ^Pahl,j^_Papers of the Presidents of the United States,gwight D. Eisenhower (Washington
. D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1960), p. 7.
28New York Times
,
September 24, 1960.
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The incident indicated that the Eisenhower Mm . n _istration tolerance of African neutralism was not unlisted.
To the general contains policy „hich it inherited
the Eisenhower Administration added certain new subsidiary
themes which, as far as Africa was concerned, were not help-
ful. These included an attitude of stern moralistic disap-
proval of neutralism; strong, ideological emphasis on free
enterprise and a corresponding disapproval of socialistic
tendencies; and a pious detachment from such matters as racial
discrimination in Southern Africa. But in the course of Pres-
ident Eisenhower’s second term, after sweeping political
changes had already begun to occur in Africa, basic altera-
tions in African policy were introduced. Machinery was estab-
lished for the first time in the Executive Branch to deal
specifically and consistently with African questions
.
30
„
Vernon McKay, Africa In World Politico (wpw vnr-u.Harper & Row, 1965), p . 345-;
—
—
—
York
-
3 0Nielsen, op
. cit
.
,
p. 278. Deputy Assistant Secrp-
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' Special Assis^nt torn s t y f Stat , were responsible for African affairsfrom mid-1956 to mid-1958. Both men stuck closely to theconservative line, echoing the theme of the dangers of "pre-mature independence" and the need for "orderly transitions"
1
° “dependence s° that "moderate forces would emerge" “ con-trast to negative, disruptive nationalism." (Such ‘'remarkswere made at the time the Congress was considering the formation
sePa
^
ate Bureau of African Affairs, yet the flexibilitywhich a newly-mdependent Bureau would need required a change
rom this ideology and its implications for decision-making)
.
See Speech, State Department Press Release
,
October 16, 1957.
94
In the final months of Presidpnf ureside t Eisenhower's secondterm, interest in Afrir-pirica shot upward under the impact of
political events both in Africa and = . K
.
1C at hoi"e- Policy toward
Africa for the first time commanded the attention of the
highest level of American leadership and was stated in an
unequivocal voice, most notably in President Eisenhower’s
statement to the United Nations in September 1960 on the
Congo problem, the dangers of great power confrontation in
Africa, and the peace-keeping and developmental role of the
world organization. 31
The deathbed conversion of the Eisenhower admin-
istration did not greatly alter its overall African record,
which was one of passivity, caution, and hesitant reaction to
events which had already occurred. African matters remained
to the end systematically subordinated to the interests of
the European partners in the Western alliance. The policy
was not adventuresome; and though it honored in studiously
modulated language the principles of self-determination and
racial jus tice, it excluded the taking of any significant risks
3
1
•Nielsen, op. cit
., p. 279.
32
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Ub in January' seL to indicate. He said it was his basic idea that only in a coalitionof strong governments or at least an association through co-operation with strong governments can we make certain that
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main ^ United States did little during theE senhower vparc 4-~Ye s to press the European metropoles to accel-
erate decolonization
_ ,
-
°ntend
' however, that such efforts
would have made any real difference in the generai course
~
events is grossly to overstate the actual significance of
^ MriCan “«“ « th. time, and egua lly to
underestimate the powerful historical forces, both in Europe
and in Africa, which were impellina
-t-hog the process of decoloni-
zation then under way. It would be naive to think that the
United States could have persuaded the European powers to
alter their basic approach. In any event, since almost all
of the colonial structure in most of North and Tropical Africa
collapsed within the space of less than five years, such
small alterations in European programs and policies for the
colonies as might have resulted from greater American efforts
of persuasion would only have been lost in the onrush. 34
The Kennedy Administration
Beginning with President Kennedy's Inaugural Address,
the new administration attempted a dramatic shift in vocabulary
33New York Times, March 18 lQ^n ^ -> a
ceritv
a
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.
34Nielsen, op. cit
.
,
p. 284.
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and the abandonment of some characteristic themes of the
Exsenhower Administration.
„any Africans had come tQ vlew
American policy as a kind of pathological anti-communism and
to interpret the professed interest in Africa not as an
inherent purpose but only as a counter-move in the cold war 35
in his Inaugural Address, the President took pains to dis-
sociate himself from this approach. "To those people in the
huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the
bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them
help themselves, for whatever period is required-not because
the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their
votes, but because it is right." 36
3 5 Ibid
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33 reflected in the tone of his Jan-y, 1961, State of the Union Address. He said, "Our greatestc allenge is still the world that lies beyond the cold war and
’rff‘ °n StnCi?- iS Sti11 the Soviet Union and Communist
•
T
S®e ffle Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
gtates, John F. Kennedy (Washington. D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1961), p. 23.
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Eschewing the moralistic disapproval of neutralism,
ennedy was careful to say to the new states, "We shall not
always expect to find them supporting our view
.
.
...37
Kennedy came to believe not only in the value of gen-
uine neutralism among underdeveloped countries, but also in
the principle of self-determination, and supported these con-
cepts as viable cornerstones of United states foreign policy
toward Africa. He repudiated apartheid and the vestiges of
colonialism in Southern Africa in favor of the black majorities,
also, for the first time. He developed an "open door" policy
toward African leaders and dignitaries at the highest levels
of government, and in lengthy conversations with them dis-
played knowledge of theiry countries and sympathy with their
problems
.
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Foreirm Li-f ' „ 3 '. U ‘ S * Congress, Senate, Committee ongn Relati°ns, Nomination of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State-Designate, Hearings
, January 21, 1961, pp. 30-32.
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,
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,
Vernon McKay says that President Kennedy's youthfulvigor and the image of progressiveness which he brought to
estah^h^w ”ere PesP°nsible for the new rapport which wasstablished between the United States Government and variousAfrican countries. See, McKay, op. cit
.
,
p. 348.
98
Kennedy^ appoints to key foreign policy posts
a so seemed to reflect a shift in approach to Africa. The
new secretary of state, Bean Kusk, was an articulatg^lectuai who had some acquaintance with the problems of new
natrons, srnce he served the Ford Foundation as supervisor ofprograms on health j
' ed“Catlon and technical assistance in
underdeveloped countries. Chester Bowles, appointed Under-
secretary of state, was outspoken in his friendly attitude
toward the underdeveloped areas, Africa included. 39 Adlai
Stevenson, named to head the U.S. delegation to the United
Natrons, was regarded as more liberal in attitude than his
predecessor, Henry Cabot Lodge. As Assistant Secretary of state
for Afrrcan Affairs, Kennedy turned to G. Mennen Williams.
Early in 1961 Williams visited sixteen nations in Africa.
After his return he analysed the diversity which he had wit-
nessed in many countries and among the peoples of Africa and
he drew some general conclusions about United States relations
with African countries. The important change in his report
was that the old cautiousness was gone.
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Williams observed that African nations would get aid
from whatever source they could and that they did not come
xnto the world seeing the struggle between the United states
and Russia in myopic one-sided terms. He did not mean, how-
ever, What John Roster Dulles implied in hinting that there
was almost a natural relationship between nationalism and
Communism. Speaking in Cleveland in November of 1958
Dulles had said: "Americans should recognize that under present
conditions newly-created nations face a formidable task.
They are marked out by international communism as special
prey
. .
."42
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For a fuller development of Dulles's speech, seeHouse
' "Briefing on Africa," Hearings Beforethe Subcommittee on Africa
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Williams recognized that the new nations of Africa
understood that they were subiectY j to competitive forces andm his own words, "they see it whole. -« That iSj ^
realize the implications of competition from both the East
and the West; this was the key to their stance on "positive
neutralism.
"
Nevertheless, the leadership on African problems in
the State Department was not naive about communist influence
in Africa and soon confronted it directly in relation to the
United Nations operation in the Congo.
In March of 1961 the first opportunity arose for the
new administration to support its statements about African
independence with specific action. In the preceding weeks
the Angolan nationalist uprising and India's seizure of the
Portuguese enclave of Goa precipitated a crisis in United
States-Portuguese relations. During the spring of 1961
, in
the wake of brutal repression by Lisbon of Angolan uprisings,
the Kennedy Administration voted for United Nations Security
Council and General Assembly resolutions calling upon Portu-
gal to prepare Angola for independence. 44 At the same time,
3Speech at Lake Arrowhead, California, State Depart-||nt_P£fssRelease, October 9, 1958; also, analy^ cf hisspeeches from 1958 to 1960. Y
John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomv
u
\ C 6
2
,
Vol . I TciHbHdii^Mi^ii^H^itts
nstitute of Technology, 1969) is the most authoritative
account of the revolt. On December 18, 1961 Indian troopsinvaded Goa, Damao and Diu. Foreign Minister (Portugal)Alberto F. Nogueira flew from Lisbon to put Portugal's case
101
it sought unofficial ways of helplng african nationaiists
and refugees. In December 1961, the United States voted for
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions calling
upon Portugal to comply with United Nations policy against
colonialism, and proposed a United Nations inquiry into the
situation in Angola.
In public statements throughout the country. Secretary
Williams repeatedly called for Portugal to make step-by-step
preparations for self-determination in its African territories.
The American position was welcomed enthusiastically by Afro-
Asian diplomats and was considered significant and appreciated
the more fully because it involved a risk of rupture in the
impending negotiations with Portugal for continued rights of
U.S. access to the strategic facilities of the Azores, which
were due to expire in 1962.^6
In a more private way, the new administration moved
simultaneously to open lines of communication with the
nationalist movements of the Portuguese territories. Rebel
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leaders were not formally received In the State Ueparfmenf,
Ut, nevertheless, they were regularly consulted on an
informal basis by high government figures, including the
resident s brother, then Attorney General. 47
Lisbon’s accumulated grievances over Kennedy’s policy
finally erupted in early 1 962
. The Portuguese Ambassador to
the united Nations declared in February:
"Ever since the
United States began voting against Portugal in the United Na-
tions, there has been a strong feeling among certain elements
in Portugal against renewal of concessions granted
. . . in
the Azores .
"
48
By mid-1962 the Kennedy Administration drew back some-
what from its role as a United Nations critic of Portuguese
colonialism and refused to support escalating Afro-Asian
demands for an arms embargo or other sanctions against Portugal
The accord under which the United States enjoyed the use of
air and naval facilities in the Azores was to expire on Decem-
ber 31 that year. And given both the strategic importance of
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the Azores in the eventual
-i +-w ~-flity of a new Berlin Crisis and
a*'1“ ™
“PUi““”‘ -h°-* “• ”•«•« «0, senate t.ttfie.t.en
United States-Soviet nuclear test ban treaty, the White
House was eager to renew the Azores leased* The Pentagon
and Dean Acheson counselled rapprochement with Portugal 59
And from the Senate, came unsolicited advice from Senator Allen
Ellender of Louisiana, who argued that the United states should
ard, not condemn, Portuguese efforts to bring "progress" to
its African provinces. After ail ol l , the Senator commented, the
Governor General of Angola was correct in observing that the
natives were "shiftless" and "incapable of self-government." 51
But the President refused to swing policy around to a position
of full support for Portugal's "civilizing mission." The
Administration maintained a limited embargo on the sale of arms
for use in Portuguese Africa and financed a scholarship program
for African students who had fled Portugal or its African ter-
4
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" including use of tbe expiring Axores base con-
tract "as a wedge" to force change in American policy. But
“ thS final C°Unt
’ “>*
—ident "felt that, if necessary,
he was prepared to forego the base entirely rather than permit
Portugal to dictate. his African policy." 52
In the end, the Portuguese chose not to sign a new
contract but rather to permit continued American use of
Azores facilities on an ad hoc basis in ^
•
— —
D
- I this manner, Lisbon
retained a strong leverage. It could threaten to give six
months
' notice anytime that Washington's anti-colonial ten-
dencies should again give rise to serious concern. 53
In conclusion, the Kennedy Administration responded
to the Angolan situation with a complex mixture of rhetoric
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and diplomacy. At the United Nations it supported the prin-
ciple of self-determination for Africans but defended the
legal authority of the Portuguese government to implement
this principle or not, when and as it saw fit. As insurgency
persisted, Washington essayed the role of conciliator: it
lobbied vainly for the injection of a moderating international
presence" into Angola and Mozambique in the form of a United
Nations visiting mission: it labored to help arrange a "dia-
logue" between Portuguese and African diplomats; and it sent
a presidential envoy, George Ball, to Lisbon to persuade Dr.
Salazar of the need for a "reasonable time schedule" for the
implementation of self-determination. 54 But all of its
attempts at mediation proved futile.
Throughout, Portugal was not prepared to make the
slightest concession to African nationalism. Precisely be-
cause it was a small, pre-industrial state, too weak to exit
politically and yet remain in a privileged position econ-
omically, it was not willing to bow like the British and
French to the dictates of short term cost-benefit logic. The
54George ^W. Ball, The Discipline of Power: Essentialsofa>^ern WorM Structure (Boston: Little-Brown and m
. ,1968)
, pp. 245-252
.
55Nielsen, op. cit
.
,
p. 303. "If any specific failures
of policy could be attributed to the Kennedy Administration—
that is, failure to take feasible action on problems which it
might have significantly influenced— these would probably relateto the Portuguese territories and to (Rhodesia).
. . . Particu-larly in 1961, more determined action by the United States couldhave been taken to try to get Portugal to budge. It might nothave succeeded, but an opportunity to try harder was lost."
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government of the fate Premier Antonio Salazar was neither
accountable to an informed electorate nor prepared to tol-
erate public criticism of its colonial policies. It was
therefore immune to the sort of domestic political pressure
that Played so central a role in inducing Prance’s departure
from Algeria. And above all, Portugal, through its ruling
elite, was committed to the pursuit of a Eurafrican mission
which alone gave it the status of something more than a minor
Iberian power.
Over time Washington became convinced of Portuguese
resolve and concomitantly revised downward its initial assess
ment of African strength. Following the first months of
fierce but chaotic upheaval in Angola it became evident to
outside observers that African nationalists had found it
nearly impossible to organize, recruit and politicize under
the constraints of policed colonial rule. Because Portugal
had not permitted, let alone encouraged, the development of
mass education or the pursuit of collective political and cul-
tural activity in its African territories, social mobilization
and cohesion in all of them was low. This, of course, handi-
capped and enfeebled nationalist efforts to mount an immediate
and potent military challenge to Portuguese rule. Neverthe-
less, it remained the judgment of key American officials such
as Under-Secretary of State George Ball that Portugal was
pursuing an ultimately "dead end" course in Africa, one which
would lead to "continued disorder and disturbance, noisy
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disruption in the United Nations
ness in the Western alliance ." 56
and an embarrassing awkward-
As 1962 drew to a close, it became evident that any
active support for self-determination in the Portuguese col-
onies had to be weighed against the strategic importance of
Azores base and u.s. commitments to NATO. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff considered the base essential to American
security; the U.S. delegation to the United Nations argued
that the political costs of concessions to Portugal because
of the base were excessive and might cost equally important
military rights in other parts of Africa. The Africa Bureau
within the State Department was locked in a prolonged wrangle
with the European Bureau on the same issue.
During the Kennedy Administration the Bureau of
African Affairs within the Department exhibited a level of
vitality which became an exception to the seeming lethargy of
the State Department. But the African Bureau was in no way
exempt from the competition of other African issues. The
evidence in the Congo and Algerian cases, and to a lesser
extent Portuguese Africa and South Africa, confirms such
competition between these issues, both within and without the
5 6 See BaH' op. cit
.
, pp. 245-252. Professor Nielsenm The Great Powers, p. 302, states: "Thus the United States
returned essentially to the line of policy followed in thelatter months of the Eisenhower Administration--namely
,
to
court the favor of the newly independent states, but not tothe point of endangering existing security commitments and
European relationships."
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Department. Time and experience brought about an increased
" thS MriCan— - °ther agencies such as the
Africa Desk of the Bureau of International Organizational
Affairs, and so on, to manipulate the policy process, but it
was in no way immune to the currents of world events which
also influenced the place of African issues on ^ scale Qf
governmental priorities facing the Kennedy Administration
.
57
The Johnson Administration
Lyndon
November 1963,
periods in U.S.
B. Johnson assumed the American presidency in
and held power during one of the most troubled
history. His five years in the White House
were a time of increasing racial strain and violence in Amer-
ican cities, mounting economic problems of domestic inflation
and, above all, deepening division and dissent caused by the
war in Viet Nam.
Only in relation to these overpowering trends can the
evolution of U.S. policy toward Africa during the period from
late 1963 onward be understood. Although Johnson's immediate
predecessors had not found it easy to give attention to African
needs in the face of competing foreign policy demands, his
administration found itself mired in a set of crises of such
intractability that they threatened to absorb virtually all
57 See Spiro, op. cit
.
, pp. 8-10.
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, "His predecessor had been a man of grace
and glowing style, which had produced much good win and
expectations in Africa-and had also ^^ ^Which his major pledges had gone unfulfilled. He had died at
a moment when African disenchantment with American policy hadlust begun to crystallise and when a wave of grave political
and economic difficulties had i nc +- k9 st begun to sweep across the
newly independent African states. m the circumstances it was
virtually inevitable that the policies of President Johnson
suffer by comparison and seem disappointing." 59
Initially, Johnson's course was to leave intact the
Kennedy team, the Kennedy programs, and the elements of what
was probably the essential Kennedy strategy, namely, to keep
~tments on the issues of Southern Africa (especially Por-
5 8See Nielsen, op. cit
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guose Africa, to a minimum, to try to maintain rapport^the
-dependent African states by utiu2ing ^ instrument ^
economic assistance, and otherwise to deal with problems as
they arose pragmatically rather than on the basis of broad
concepts or rigid principle. 60
Thus, on November 30, 1963, as one of his first acts
as President, Johnson, in a message to President Nkrumah of
Ghana, stated that his administration would continue active
efforts in behalf of African independence
.
61
Iater
,
on
September 7, 1964, Johnson's Under-Secretary of State Harriman
stated that "the Johnson Administration intended to seek good
relations with the African nations in the very same manner as
we seek to maintain them with Asian and European nations and
with our neighboring American Republics." 62
Expressing an attitude of cautious approach to African
problems, Harriman went on to state that: "The African nations,
60 Ibid
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as the youngest members of the international community are
confrontea with some special problems. A natural guality of
youth is impatience, a quality which we ourselves still
founded in revolt against colonialism. American
sympathies have consistently been with the desire of people
to throw off similar bonds.
"On the other hand, our successful experience in
granting independence to the Philippines has led us to under-
stand the time and sound planning that is needed to achieve a
viable political and economic life."* 4 Under the Johnson
Administration,
"we are embarking on a bold new program for
making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial
progress available for the improvement and growth of under-
developed areas.
. .
."65
A month after Harriman issued his statement, Holden
Roberto 66 announced that he had abandoned hope that Western
countries would press Portugal to negotiate with him. "while
paying lip service to self-determination," he said, "the
63 Ibid
.
, p. 331.
64 Ibid
.
, p. 332.
6
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6 See Holden Roberto
Populacoes de Angola (UPA)
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People's Congress in Accra,
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in an address to the All-African
October 17, 1974, pp. 1-20.
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, ^ ^ ^
e ha, reluctantly conclude, that Africa's newly independent
states were incapable of providing arms an, finance sufficient
to hasten victory in a war that might otherwise last twenty
years and decimate the country. 69 m an action that he de-
scribed as a "radical change in policy," he declared his
readiness to accept aid from Communist countries and disclosed
plans to send an Angolan delegation to Peking. 69
African attitudes toward the United states took a sud-
den and palpable change for the worse following United states
67 Ibid
.
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loned. Most of all, Africans sensed that a chill of indif-
erence had begun to settle over African Policy
. wherever
ey looked they began to find evidence to support their
suspicions that, at the moment when their problem were
growing more disquieting, the United states was pulling back
and, in many cases, out.
Especially, signs seemed tQ point discQurag . ngly
toward an immobilisation of American policy on the key pol-
itical issues of Southern Africa
. Portuguese repression of
black rebellions in Angola and Mozambique was becoming more
effective, but American pressures on Lisbon for political
advancement in the colonies had apparently diminished, not
increased . ^0
American foreign policy toward Southern Africa under
the Johnson Administration could then be described as a con-
tradictory tandem of lamentation and laissez-faire. The
Administration officially proclaimed American support for the
principles of self-determination, including the right of
Africans to govern themselves through institutions of their
own choice. Johnson, therefore, lamented apartheid as a
denial of the principle of government by the consent of the
governed. He lamented the refusal of Portugal to admit the
principle of self-determination for the same reason, with
70 Ibid
.
, p. 18.
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regard to the Portugese Monies, the then Assistant Secre .
State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams said
that our policy seeks "to impose no special formula" hut at
the same time contemplated
"an immediate recognition of the
People's timely right to choose independence or other forms
of association or dissociation" and recognises the neces-
sity of "steps being taken to prepare the people for self-
government as rapidly as possible " 71 c. Concerning Portuguese
Africa, Governor Williams said that U.s. policy recognises
the necessity of convincing Portugal that suppression of
colonial aims contained "the seeds of destruction for Portu-
gal, as well as trouble for the rest of Africa and the world.
Acting upon these basic assumptions, the American government
had sought to persuade Lisbon "by every diplomatic means" to
engage in a "dialogue" with the Africans concerned. 72
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What was the resuit of the Johnson Administration's
importuning? Our advice was ignored. Our diplomatic pressure
Proved almost totally ineffectual. Yet we chose to ignore
the forum of the United Nations we declared our
abhorrence of apartheid and colonialism but then justified
inaction by asserting that these blights constituted no threat
to peace. We expressed earnest hope that conditions would
improve while almost all indicators pointed to further dete-
rioration. state Department spokesmen argued against a ces-
sation of American investment in Portuguese Africa because it
"could seriously handicap our ability to carry on a dialogue
with Portugal" yet admitted that Portugal's suppression of
rebellions in Angola and Mozambique "have worsened despite
the efforts of the outside world, whether of persuasion, con-
demnation, or pressure. "73 0ur highest officials admitted
that African nationalists in fact "feel increasingly frustrated
in their efforts to achieve political expression;" 74 yet with
the notable exception of an arms embargo on Portugal we
remained content to lament injustice and colonialism and
label as extremist those who advocate that we face up to the
implications of the failure of moral suasion.
73
,
Statement of Hon. G. Mennen Williams, Fourth AnnualLeadership Institute, Collegiate Council for the United Na-tions, Chicago, April 18, 1966.
74 Ibid
.
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As if all this did not suffice the Pn
' n Portuguese For-
ergn Minister, Alberto Franco Nogueira illustrated the con-
tradictory and self-defeating duality of the Johnson admin _
istration foreign policy when he described the American
doctrine of legitimate retaliation in Viet Nam" as a justi-
fication Of Portuguese retaliation against
"dangerous com-
munist elements in Angola and Mozambique.
"
7 5 " By choosing
a NATO special meeting as the occasion for this veiled threat
to bomb north of the Ruvuma, by drawing a parallel with the
Vietnamese war in which African sympathies lie overwhelmingly
with the Viet Cong, and by defining the threat to Angola and
Mozambique as communist, not nationalist, Nogueira has neatly
spun a web in which Portuguese and American policy would
appear identical. He has made certain that if his country
should ever make good on its threat, all Africa would assume
it was with American permission
.
75Washington Post
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nal bour?eoisie of an oppressed nationg e e oppressing nation, we are on its side.
:
* * As
,
lon9 as the bourgeoisie of an oppressed nation favorsourgeois nationalism, we are against it. We fightagainst the privileges and violence of the oppressing nation-we have no tolerance for a war of privilege on the pLt of theoppressed nation. See Lenin, "Du droit des nations adisposer d elles-memes .
" From Oeuvres Choisie s I, 2nd part(Moscow, n.p., 1953). Moreira continues: "As clearly fore-shadowed by Lenin, the
_ encouragement of a revolutionary nation-ality as a disintegrating process in an enemy state is a pre-liminary Soviet step in all territories allied with the West,
o the Soviets, nationalism in these territories is the
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Washington has never publiclv Hiopi iy disassociated itself
from such embraces. In fact, it sent Ambassador Admiral
George Anderson on a well advertised trip to Angola and
Mozambique in March, 1964. The Ambassador reported how
"tremendously impressed” he was by the progress and well-
being that he found in those territories, which served to
identify us solidly behind the Portuguese military campaign.
All this irritated African nationalist leaders. Dr
. Eduardo
Mondlane
,
president of the Mozambique Liberation Front, con-
cluded that Admiral Anderson's statements were evidence that
the United States of America cannot identify itself with our
ideals for self-determination and independence.” Noting that
the American diplomat's visit was followed shortly by that
of a South African military diplomat. Dr. Mondlane said he
expected that the United States "like the Republic of South
Africa will intervene against us in the forthcoming conflict
with Portugal.
Dr. Mondlane, a native of the south of Mozambique,
was dedicated to the overthrow of Portuguese rule up to the
year of his death in 1971. While directing the guerrilla war
from Dar-es
-Salaam, Tanzania, Mondlane had often boasted that
he could get all the weapons he needed from the Communist
vanguard of revolution, because then, in internal affairs,the opportunity to seize power will come to the Communistparty. See Moreira, Portugal's Stand
, p. 7.
77Mozambican Revolution
, p. 30.
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countries. Mondlane had stated that he received adequatefunds from the Organization of African Unit ,
to remove the last
..vest-
private '
1963 ° f "hlte rUle ln Africa and from
organizations in Britain, the United States, Sweden
and the Netherlands «
-ri
. Mondlane pledged to finhe .y u r t:Lgnt a guerrilla
war or twenty years, if he had to
, tQ force ^ 78m a veiled
-condemnation of the United States, Mond-
lane once said:
"Obviously, our struggle against Portuguese
colonialism is also directed against the imperialist forces
that support it. This also applies to our international posi-
tion, where we stand shoulder to shoulder with all peoples
fighting for freedom and independence ." 79
Together the Kennedy and Johnson administrations
largely spanned the post-independence era in Africa. The
contrasts of manner and political fortune of the two Presi-
dents are of course many and obvious: Kennedy reached office
by a razor-thin majority, having been the object of much sus-
picion and prejudice as a candidate. His successor was swept
into office by a massive majority in 1964 in a political
atmosphere of national consensus. Four years later the coun-
try had been torn into more dangerous division than at any
time in a century, and unlike his predecessor, Johnson had
become the least revered President in generations.
78New York Times, November 21, 1966, pp. 52-54
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Even When regarded fro, the special angle of Africa
and African policy, their contrasting fortunes are apparent-
With his inaugural Address, Kennedy launched a courtship of
the Third world, and the affection thereby aroused in Africa
survived all subseguent disappointments with his perforce,
resident Johnson’s first major decision on Africa after his
election in 1964, the Stanleyville airdrop, backfired exces-
sively, and the doubts and resentments it produced in Africa
persisted for years. 80 The Administration (Johnson) seemed
to have accepted as applicable to Africa the Kennan-Lippmann
thesis on the limitations of U.S. capacity to influence the
direction of affairs in distant areas of the world. Yet, with
the exception of the Congo crisis, and, remote as it is from
Communist China and the Soviet Union, Africa did not, and does
not now, present the geopolitical difficulties we find in
dealing with crises in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and
Eastern Europe. We are not limited by regional (and related
teral) military alliances comparable to NATO, CENTO, SEATO,
ANZUS and the O.A.S. defense systems. In Africa, also, we
should be comparatively free from pressures arising out of
commercial interests; Africa accounts for less than six percent
of our total foreign trade and investment.
80_
,
. .
Nl(plsen, op. cit
.
, p. 331. in the spring of 1964
established
1
^?
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^
U
?
d
f
r the leadership of Christopher GbenyePopular Liberation Front in Stanleyville (Conqo)
the
en
nni^%r USed t0 release American and Belgian hostages,United States prepared to execute "Operation Dragon Rouge,"
a drop from U.S. transport planes of 545 Belgian paratroopersto rescue the white civilians. Although U.S. officials siught
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Lastly, United States policy under the Johnson Admin-istration offers a clear example of allowing African policy-
makmg to be shaped and controlled by events outside of
Africa, including developments within the United States,
rather than the creation of policy tailored to events within
tself
. in the late 1940s and early 195Qs such little
interest as Washington displayed in Africa arose largely out
of cold-war anxieties, and American policy was strictly guided
by the requirement not to undermine the Atlantic Alliance.
From 1958 to 1961 the dramatic surge of independence in Africa
made the continent the object of serious policy interest
partly because of continuing preoccupation with the Communist
confrontation. In more recent years and particularly since
1965, urban and social troubles at home, a continuing trade
deficit, and above all, Viet Nam, with all its repercussions,
not only pushed Africa once again into the shadows but brought
about a new atmosphere of hesitancy and reluctance in facing
African problems.
The Nixon Administration
A tentative assessment of United States policy toward
Africa during President Richard Nixon’s Administration may be
to justify the operation not only on the United Nations man-
of Kata
anY Africans who had approved of the suppressionnga were outraged at Operation Dragon Rouge
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hazarded on the basis
paper accounts. Its s
the initial, tentative
of public government documents and news-
ingle feature appears to be a shift from
inclination to continue policies defined
by preceding administrations
realism ii 81 Some of the more
to a subtle but unmistakable
significant events included
"New
Mrs
.
Richard Nixon’s symbolic visit to four West African states in
January 1972, the award of nearly half a billion dollars in
economic assistance to Portugal, the breach of the United
Nations embargo against Rhodesia, the increasing American de-
pendence on Africa—illustrated by the need for Nigerian oil,
and by agreements between Ford and General Motors and South
African companies for the purchase of platinum to be used in
pollution-control devices—and the rising concern of black
Americans for this country's Africa policy.
The Nixon Doctrine summarized United States objectives
in Africa as follows:
(a) Peace—To keep Africa free of great power rivalries
and conflict as well as to respect their nationalintegrity and to support the inviolability of Africanborders
.
(b) Economic Development—To assist Africans in the develop-
ment of their human resources through education, and
to assist them in dealing with their agricultural,health and population problems.
8
1
The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States, Richard M« Nixon (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1971), p. 280.
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(c) Justice To assist Africans in their search for
United Sat^sha ^thern^rica
.
The
of arms for tf?n Po^ugueL^LSan^errUorLsts"
Additionally, Assistant Secretary of state David New-
som articulated Nixon's orientation in a speech delivered in
Altanta in October 1971, but aimed, he said, "at a wider
audience in Africa." Secretary Newsom expressed the belief
that change will come in Southern Africa. "Economic and
demographic pressures make this inevitable. In South Africa
itself there is a lessening of rigidity. Change is a central
theme of discussion; there is psychological and intellectual
ferment within the Afrikaner community
. . . there is a growing
realism among businessmen that Africans are important to them
.
Ibid., pp. 282 283. See U.S. Government: White Houseand State Department Press Release titled "U.S. and~Africa in
"P5™' aa earlier poiliy statfmen?signed by both^Secretary of State Rogers and President Nixonstating that: As for the Portuguese territories, we shall
continue to believe that their peoples should have the rightof self-determination. We will encourage peaceful progresstoward that goal ..." For comment on this policy statement
see The Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), April 4, 1970, p 20which states: "President Nixon's declaration ... of a prag-
'
matic and peaceful American policy is, in particular, a diplo-
matic victory for Lisbon, which has for nine years beenfighting not only African rebels but international censure forholding on to these territories. The benign tone of the Nixon
statement is not new. It echoes a constant U.S. theme of the
last fifteen years that the Portuguese are making progress,
however slow, toward fundamental and peaceful change in
Africa. See Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique
(Baltimore: Penguin African Library, 1968), pp . 117-118. ^In
fact the myth of Portuguese non-racism and reasonableness had
been clearly shattered a decade ago when the peaceful demands
of the people for basic economic and political rights—the
vote, the right to form trade unions, more education—were met
with bloody repression while most of Africa moved toward poli-
tical independence.
. . . In Mozambique more than five hundred
unarmed people were mowed down as they demonstrated for more
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as skilled workers and as a market
.
. . „e cannot expect
change to cone quickly or easily. 0ur hope is that it will
come peacefully." 83
However, a series of agreements reached with Portugal
in December 1971 provided an example of an aapparent wholesale
American insensitivity to a world commitment for self-
determination. The Azores agreements provided for continued
use by American forces of the Lajes Air Base in the Azores in
exchange for an unprecedented American economic aid package of
nearly half a billion dollars. The package included: (1) the
free loan of an oceanographic ship worth $8 million; (2) a
$l-million grant for educational projects in metropolitan
Portugal to be financed by the Defense Department; (3) another
grant of a minimum $5 million representing "initial acquisi-
tion cost, not current value," which the Defense Department says
includes "road building machinery, cranes, hospitals, port and
harbor equipment, soil testing equipment
. .
.
,
" in other
words, precisely the kind of material needed to build hydro-
?
nd “ore pay at Mueda in 1960 •" m Guinea-Bissau in
fmrkerS at Pld919uiti "began a strike for higher
broken " cLT w®re ®hot bY the police before the strike was. See Manchester Guardian
, March 14, 1959, p. 18. Inthe face of thirreaTHyT "U . S . insistence in peaceful change
mh n c
Ry lnnocence and acquires sinister implications
. . .e * * aPPears to be shaping its policy primarily in responseto a concern for stability. A stable Portugal in Europe, whereas part of NATO it is seen as part of the so-called 'free world'alliance against Communism ..." See Jennifer Davis, "U.S.-
-|
(
?l!j
hern African Relations: Some Strategic Considerations," for14 th annual meeting, African Studies Association, DenverColorado, November 3-6, 1971, p. 10
Affairs
1971.
83David Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Speech, State Department Press Release
,
October 15,
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electric dams in Angola and Mozambique;
( 4 ) access to a $ 15 -
million loan to purchase surplus United States agricultural
commodities; and
, 5 , access to Export-Import Bant loans
totaling 5400 million to buy American goods for development
projects in Portugal
.
84
The new American-Portuguese Azores agreement became
an unexpected element in Lisbon's favor. Prior to this
executive agreement the United States operated air and naval
facilities on the mid-Atlantic islands for a nine-year period
on an ad hoc basis without a lease. Unlike the previous
arrangement. President Nixon's accord renders substantial
development aid to Portugal for only a 25-month lease. 85
grams," with the money to come^rom the U^S^n
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reform pro "
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.
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- Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Com-Relations
, 92nd CongTT^nd sess.
, February 1-3
n 49
3
p
° ’ C ’ : U ' S * Govemment Printing Office, 1972),
held before^he
1
?
151^ Caetano (in a press interview in Lisbonore
. th Agreement on March 30, 1971) stated: "that theU.S must sign a new formal agreement on the use of the Lajes
the renewal'of Ih ^
Az°res -"
,
He added
' "that in exchange for
a3l
1
?
f t e Azores Pact (which expired in 1962), Portu-
fL q
a laterest loan to develop education. The lateDr. Salazar balked at renewing the agreement on the base . .
^-|Teg^tar anno^ance at u - s - unwillingness to support Portu-
L;!n
o
f
^
1C
5
n p°llcles against colonialist charges at the UnitedNations. Manchester Guardian
,
March 31, 1971, pp . 34 - 35 .
85The new five-year agreement was made retroactive toJanuary, 1969, when Lisbon requested the opening of negotiations,
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Washington official professed ^ ^ _
agreement represente, change" in and had „ no
to the longstanding American policy of support fQr ,elf_
determination in the Portuguese colonies. B6 Neither the
Azores summitry nor base agreement was accompanied by refer-
ence to any understanding over the colonial i ssue let alone by
any pro forma reaffirmation of Americarican adherence to the prin-
ciple of self-determination. 87
There seems little doubt that in addition to bailing
Portugal out of war-born financial distress-apparently with-
out
-en^n effort to extract promises of political reform and
lorh°?fmes
S
:
r
jSy T See the New
ide-Ht-S^TFo Agnew, on the'last W States Viceworld tour visited Portuaal a country diplomatic
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zores contract had been impossible in 1962o tuguese dissatisfaction with U.S. policies
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:uguese Africa,' from which one could only infer thatbon no longer had any grounds for dissatisfaction." Premier
chanae°- f
At quite clear that he ^ least perceived a
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ier ^dord." See Tad Szulc of tee New York
_imes writing m the New Yorker, January 1. 1977
r Prcited m issues, IbidTT p. 13. Szulc states that: ?in 1962
126
self-government f°r MriCanS <3S dlStinCt
— settlers,6 AmeriCan g°Vernment
' ‘he sheer magnitude of this
new agreement, has gone far toward assuaging ^
Pressures that had been building up in Portugal ^
tinuation of the colonial wars. According to one writer
The manner in which Washington's assistance was welcomedm Lisbon is revealing. m a fireside chat on December 18
Prime Minister Marcello Caetano told his domestic audience:
The treaty is a political act in which the solidarity of
interests between the two countries is recognised and it is
in the name of that solidarity that we put an instrument of
action at the disposal of our American friends, who are also
now allies . '
"
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Caetano declared that "internal difficulties in North
American politics" had obstructed an earlier accord: the Por-
tuguese government leader said that American aid in the
resolution of Portugal's economic and social problems consti-
tuted not "payment" for the Azores bases but rather "reciproc-
ity . "
^
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^Gil Fernandes
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89Noticias de Portugal (Lisbon)
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December 18, 1971,
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P°rtU9al ' S PrSSent and fUture
-lue to the defense of
experts; even granting that it would be worth this invests
r
thS P°int ^
consideration, there regains
the not inconsiderable guestion of the wisdom of suddenly
showering such wealth on Portugal, given the political contexts
of her colonial wars in Africa."
Whether the Azores were worth even the operational
$20 million a year was a notion that was being chal-
lenged throughout the 1960 =; 91m s. Long range aircraft reduced
the value of Laies Fielri «+.J id as a stagmg-refueling base. The
United States airbase at Rota, Spain, developed as a more
effectively located installation for monitoring the passage of
submarines through the Straits of Gibraltar. And space
satellites with comprehensive range could do much of the
to"the United°Nations s^res^din 1966 that when Britain nnH +h
1
?
t
^
Sr t0 the New York Times
»considered
r
it conve
' 1^' 5 ^ Second^orirwar^o^ 3'6
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eorge Kennan, "Hazardous Courses in Southern
PP 236- 2|gTg-9n AffairS - Vo1 ’ 49 ' no. 2 (January 1971),
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on '"Nixon Underwrites Portugal's Empire,"tgtesman
,
vol. 83, no. 2132 (January 28, 1972), p. 103.
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T^Hnntic wide
.
. trafH• cking previously assigned to aircraft. 92
es Reston concluded that the base was no longer needed93
and a Rational Policy Panel of the United Nations Association
of the USA found it to b^ " 4.Q„ttechnologically dispensable and
politically costly." 94 Sen^-t-or- p h . ,nat r Fulbright asked why Portugal,
as a member of NATO non i a • i_, c uld not itself assume responsibility
for the "very minor, activity ' conducted from it. 95
Even accepting the contention that the base had
residual importance within the framework of NATO defense, was
there no alternative to this totally unexpected American
largesse to the Portuguese? In late March 1971, Premier
caetano delivered what the press described as an "ultimatum."
"American use of the Azores base in the absence of a formal
agreement," he declared, "cannot continue. Either the agree-
ment will be renewed or the base at Lajes will be restricted
to the objectives of the alliance and to nothing else." 96 m
9 2
Bahrain,"
3
fasess.
, February 17 1972 n 9 Cong., 2nd
, _
_
,
y
• P* 2. See testimony of ProfessorHard R. Johnson of Massachusetts Institute of Technoloav inSSnate ggMl^before the Committee on Foreign Rel^ions?^. ^
9 3New York Times
, March 5, 1969, pp. 23-25.
n-ji-.j .. Africa: Proposals for Americans (New York:United Nations Association of USA, 1971), p. 22.
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S * Congress
' Senate, Hearings
,
op. cit
, February 1-
6Davidson
,
op. cit.,
Thomason, President of United
(Manchester, U.K.), March 31,
p. 103. See statement to Mims
Press International, The Guardian
1971, p. 7.
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fact, the original agreement of 1951 provided for American use
of facilities in the Azores "in case of war in which they are
involved during the life of the North Atlantic Treaty pursuant
to technical arrangements concluded between American and Por-
tuguese defense ministers: and the use of the base facilities
was at all times placed officially within the framework of the
Atlantic Treaty .
"
97
Commenting on the contrast between Lisbon's past
criticism of American "decadence" and "democracy" and its post-
agreement praise for America's
"greatness," Basil Davidson
wrote: "There's nothing like a sack of dollars, apparently,
for giving one confidence in 'America's moral strength. '"98
How then does one explain the quantum leap into Por-
tugal's arms? The Azores fit nicely in the Nixon Doctrine,"
a policy of strategic retrenchment into detached or insular
bases that still preserves a potent military outreach. And by
shoring up Portuguese financial and military capacity the Admin-
istration may hope to help Portugal cope with African guerrilla
movements that are perceived in Washington as dependent upon
Soviet assistance and therefore as Soviet "Stooges"— the old
anti-communist fixation of Dulles days. 100 Given the fact that
Department of State, Defense : Use of Facilities inthe Azores. Agreement between the United States of America
and Portugal (September 6, 1950), Publication 5716 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), p 1
article 1.
98Davidson, op. cit
., p. 104.
99 See Presidential Papers
,
Nixon, op. cit
., pp. 280-281.
100Marcum, Issue
,
op. cit
., p. 15.
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over time the nationalist movements of Portuguese Africa, with
a disenchanted eye upon American assistance to Portugal, have
increasingly committed themselves to working for post-
independence structural change along socialist lines, the fol-
wing warning by Henry Kissinger may offer some relevant in-
sight into American motivation. "a national Communist regime
in Eastern Europe," he has written, "is an improvement over
the previous condition of absolute Soviet control. A similar
regime in Latin America or Africa would inevitably become a
center of anti-Western policy." 101 UnleS s the Administration
did make a simplistic and negative assessment of the nationalist
alternative as "communist" oriented, it is difficult to under-
stand why it made no apparent effort during the Azores nego-
tiations to pressure Portugal to reform its colonial rule so as
to bring about meaningful African participation in the politi-
cal, educational and economic life of Angola, Mozambique and
Guinea (Bissau)
. Discussions with the National Security Coun-
cil m late 1969, in fact, concluded that only such participa-
_
bld
•
'
P* 15. See Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled
h Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York:McGraw Hill, 1965)
,
p^ 20 5
T
See Boubaker Adjali, "An Inter-
view with Marcelino dos Santos," Frelimo's Vice President, who
spoke at the International Conference of Solidarity with thePeople of the Portuguese Colonies, (Rome, June 1970). In thisinterview Santos responded to one of Adjali's questions in thefollowing manner: "But let me repeat, what is essential in all
this (Frelimo's struggle) is that Frelimo has always taken the
correct position, basing its decisions on the genuine interests
of the whole Mozambican people. Our goal from the beginning
has been to achieve victory in the struggle for national libera-
tion
. . . this means that we have to fight against Portuguese
capitalist exploitation and imperialism, but that we also have
to fight those Mozambicans who want to maintain the same system
based on man’s exploitation of man. ..."
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tion might prevent increase(J autQnomy ^ ^ ^
resulting in the solidification of white settler rule 102
But as Portugal moved to delegate more self-government to
er controlled governments in Luanda and Lourenco Marques 103
Washington chose to pretend that the Azores accord had no
bearing on Portugal's capacity for colonial "mission." 104
It should come as no surprise that these agreements
were interpreted as a "rescue operation" for economically
underdeveloped Portugal and as indirect support for her
anachronistic Africa policy. The agreements tended to make
a hollow mockery of President Nixon's lofty statement that
"I share the conviction that the United States cannot be in-
different to racial policies which violate our national ideals
and constitute a direct affront to American citizens." 105
Dean Acheson, an outspoken partisan of white rule throughout
Southern Africa, 106 was a major influence on White House
thinking until his death in October, 1971. vice President
Spiro Agnew has also contributed a significant pro-Portuguese
input. In mid-1971 shortly after the Vice President, on a
102Discussed in Marcum, Issues, p. 15 .
103
_
,
_
Ibid
.
,
p. 15 . see also United Nations General
Add
Sm
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eg__on_Decolonization
, Document A/8423,. 4, September 28, 1971, pp. 23-24 and 57-58.
104 See Marcum, op. cit
., p. 16.
105presidential Papers
, Nixon, op. cit
., p. 16.
Davis uT-Snnthe* ' Apr/ 21 ' 1971 ' P- 37 • See, Jennifer
tn g .
Relations
, pp. 14-15. "In contrasto South Africa, racial discrimination is not enforced by law
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world tour of
"conservative'' states, conferred with Premier
Caetano on the progress of the Azores negotiations , 107 Rent
Bruce Krane, one of AgneWs principal advisors, visited Mozam-bique and issued enthusiaqf^ .n siastic statements about the Cabora
Bassa hydroelectric proiect I°B tkj . The anti-communism of Acheson
and Agnew blended nicelv wii-hy t the pro-colonialism of southern
senators such as Thurmond and Byrd. 109
It is plausible to suggest that the United States
government does not intentionally contribute to continued
minority rule by foreigners in Africa. The fact remains, how-
ever, that an indirect connection between American security
and economic interests and Portuguese rule in Africa is being
perceived in this country as well as in Africa.
In conclusion, American presidents have had great dif-
ficulty^ the formulation of policy toward Portuguese Africa.
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107New York Times
, July 27, 1971, p. 10.
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ugal was the only NATO country visited by the Vice Presi-
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,
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Port.9uese African area, presidents have been
“ 3 dlfflCUlt
— -e facts amid a wetter
Of co„flicting claims and assertionSi ciarifying the iegai
tssoes involved
, responding to new world conditions and pol-ecat trends, fulfilling, as they see it, their (U.S., obli-
gations to an allied country, and at the same time serving
the United states' own short- and long-term national interests.
This has not been an easy combination of requirements to satis-
fy simultaneously. For example, in our concern^
States foreign policy toward Africa, OUr policy actions are
mainly concerned with the interests of the colonial power and
not the colonized at all. For instance, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization plays no small part in the interests of
the United States as well as the colonial powers in seeing to
it that there were favorable outcomes for their mutual policies
toward Africa because of a perceived necessity to outflank the
Communist powers strategically
.
110
Also, the real dynamics of
the politics of international relations between the United
States and Portugal over Portuguese Africa may be seen in the
need for strategic outposts, NATO solidarity, and markets for
no,
the realities
r
of
U
^he
eL lnf0rI"?ti0n °n policy formulation and
"United States Policy Toward thrLwirindlp^den^Itatef'' (ed-)African_lndependence (New York: Dell, 1964 )
,
pp 451-453Always an excellent source for gaining insight into the "deci-
So°“i2gLPrOCeSS\ See James led.). Domesticources of Foreign Policy
,
cited earlier in this^Tii^Ftation.
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American investment 3 i 1
tj „
' 311 aSSUmed to b* critical to the con-prosperity of developed countries
.
HI
But there is a profound inconsistency in an fl •
r -——
l
<•«.—«.. poi-
SS1°nS “ Ang° la and Moza"*ique, and at the sametime allows Portugal the benefit of , h „
a„ . ,
subs tantial American fin -ncral and military aid enabling her tom' *g n o aintain physical
control of those areas. Unless and until eff f
can u a ective measuresbe devised to prevent any further „« K
.
y use by Portugal of NATOand American arms in Africa, all u s dinU.S. diplomatic efforts ofpersuasion will be deeply undercut.
As to the facts pertaining to the situation in Portu-guese Angola and Mozambique, American presidents appear tohave accepted the findings of a number of u.N. reports and
independent investigations indicating that Portuguese admin-
istration of the territories has been a clear failure in human
Despite Portuguese aims and contentions, the people in
the colonies are notably backward, ignorant, and oppressed.
Similarly, on the legal issues which Portugal has
raised, the United States seems to concur with the United
Nations that developments within the areas are not purely a
6r domestic jurisdiction and that Portugal's inter-
111 *
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national responsibilities include an obligation not only toreport on conditions in the territories but also to grant self-determination
, which in the course of time probably means
independence
.
Despite the fact that the struggle has now become
primarily a test of strength between the antagonists, the
United states should, first of all continue to attempt to in-
fluence both Portugal and the nationalist movements toward
change through persuasion and communication, refraining
from direct economic or military help to either side. Also,
as part of the effort to exercise its influence, the United
States should eliminate certain inconsistencies which now
becloud its position and which weaken and confuse its efforts.
The statements of American diplomatic representatives in
Lisbon, for example, have sometimes served to disquiet and
dismay the African states as well as some Europeans. Similarly,
programs relating to Angola or Mozambique have sometimes been
undertaken by one arm of the U.S. government only to be
countermanded by another. An excellent illustration of the
confusion and inaction within the Executive Department is
evidenced by the fact that the National Security Council
African staff takes its essential role to be one of keeping
African issues from reaching the President's desk rather than
to pose them with alternative perspectives clearly presented.
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Alexander L. George suggests~»this is a crucial measure of
the low priority given the area.” 112
For Southern African policy, there appear to have been
only two basic NSC reviews since the early 1960s. The first
began in 1962, after the brief flurry of n q .j-iur U.S. activity in that
area, and continued until the end of the Johnson Administration.
While its basic argument was for disengagement from both Por-
tugal and South Africa, it was never generally accepted within
the National Security Council. Even with a Democratic victory
in the 1968 Presidential election, the National Security Coun-
cil recommendation would have been set aside. But with Nixon's
victory, the traditional instinct to begin policy appraisals
from scratch took hold. A new policy review was begun in
early 1969 and completed bv the enri o-f 4-w a+ .^ cci uy rn d f that year. NSC Study
Memorandum (NSSM) 39^3 was the initiating document fQr ^
review. It has been argued that the Bureau resisted the under-
lying thrust of NSSM 39: a key example cited is Assistant
Secretary Newsom's South African visit at the end of 1970 with
a black deputy and his subsequent testimony in December of 1970
to Congressman Diggs' subcommittee that the appointment of a
112
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s Washington Bureau has covered
w oSil especially Ken Owen’s "Nixon Plumped
faenciis hJ A Feb^ry 15, 1971. Under this Memorandum variousag e ad opportunities to present their preferences for
t in^yf°Ptl0?S ' ThlS lnltiative, perhaps more for its implica-ons for policy control than for its substance, engenderedconsiderable ill will within the African Bureau.
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Black Foreign Service Officer to tho d +.e Pretoria embassy was
being given serious attention. The Department has since
backed away from this position, which was taken without prior
consultation with tho c nil 4-u A4:South African Government-in contradiction
of a key aspect of the dialogue approach.
this point, the National Policy Panel of the United
Nations Association114 recommended creation of an Inter-
departmental Task Force on Southern Africa '.which would include
representatives of the Departments of state. Defense, Conferee,
Labor, Treasury and the White House." Such a task force could
assume responsibility for an "on-going and comprehensive anal-
ysis of U.S. involvement in, and relations with. Southern
Africa (including Portuguese territories) with a view toward
recommending and coordinating U.S. policy." 115
114 _See, Southern Africa:
York : United Nations Association
ll5 Ibid. / p. 79.
Proposals for Americans (New
ox USA, 1971)
,
p7 22, 79.
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CHAPTER iv
POLICY MAKING: THE CONGRESS
Before 1958, African problems were generally called
attention of Congress by an enterprising member who
felt strongly enough about an issue to bring it to the floor. 1
in 1958, however. Congress felt that, with the impending addi-
tion of the new Bureau of African Affairs to the State Depart-
ment with its own Assistant Secretary, African problems war-
ranted the creation of special subcommittees both in the House
and Senate under the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations
Committee respectively.
Actually, the establishment of the two Subcommittees
on Africa in 1958 was the fruition of a movement which had
been a focal point of concern on the part of some Congressmen
since 1955. Active in the effort to secure special policy-
formulating bodies, both in the Congress and in the State
Department, were Senators Theodore Green (D-R.I.) and Mike
Mansfield (D-Mont.), and Congresswoman Frances Bolton (R-Ohio). 2
KennedVs
A
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°u
this policy was demonstrated by John F.
ifs?
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floor
.
sPe®ch and resolution on the African War in
Is^esf^fpHo^! ReC°— V01 ' 103 ' n°‘ 28 ' 85th Co^--
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he Committee on Foreign Affairs
, 84th Cong., 2nd sess.,996
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S earlY as 1955 when Congresswoman Boltonreturned from her trip to Africa, her report of the Study Mis-
headed
n
hv
U
?^
d ^
»
h°Ught that there be a '’Division for Africa"by its own Assistant Secretary in the State Department.
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Senate Subcommittee on Africa
the Senate, the Subcommittee on Africa is a con-
sultative ad hoc bodY that has no reai identity apart from
that of the full committee on Foreign Relations. 3 The chair
- “ “•*—* - *— - ». ....
responsible to it until iacc1965, the Subcommittee had two
Chairmen who were not very active in developing the Subcom-
mittee into a forceful instrument. The Senate Subcommittee on
African Affairs generated a good deal of publicity during the
four years that its Chairman was Senator John F. Kennedy
especially in the last two years when Kennedy was a candidate
for President. Although the Subcommittee met infrequently in
1959 and 1960, Kennedy repeatedly stressed his Chairmanship
and his interest in Africa. While on the rear platform of a
train in Tulare, California, on September 9, 1960, for example,
he told a crowd: "I am the chairman of the Subcommittee on
Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I can tell
you that in Africa, leaders twenty years ago quoted Jefferson
and Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. Today
m many cases those leaders look east to Peking and Moscow.
They have lost their confidence in us. They don't see the
United States as a great revolutionary country which is on
the move
.
3 Ibid.
, p. 16.
4 See Africa Report, vol
. 9, no. 9 (August 1964), p. 4.
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Immediately after President Kennedy election, threeSenators embarked on a st„a„ *udy tour of Africa. Only oneSenator Prank Church, Democrat from Idaho
' was a member ofhe committee on Poreign Relations;
, his two companions were
enators Gale W. McGee, Democrat of Wyoming, and Frank MossDemocrat of Utah. x» little more than a month, they visited
sixteen African countries, joined halfway through their triphy Edward Kennedy, the President-elect
• s brother and the futureDemocratic Senator from Massachusetts. When they returned
the Senators issued a fifty-five page report on the trip.®
The Congressmen were not of a single mind to develop a policy
prescription or any overall U.S. strategy, but the Study Mis-
express the feeling that the consequences of "extreme"
African nationalism contained many negative implications for
United States objectives. First, its members were concerned
with the possibility that if nationalist sentiment took the
form of "a plague on both your houses" (East and West), re-
sulting in rigid forms of neutralism and non-alignment, Afri-
can countries would avoid the kinds of value judgments on the
Cold War" which the Senators thought were necessary. Second,
the Study Mission observed that "extreme nationalism" could
Africa
' COng
S
e
?
S/ Senate
' "United States Foreign Policv—
Office, I960), p. 38.
9 ' D ' C *' U ' S * Government Printing
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itS6lf ^ Pr°liferati^ self-determination among
T
U
:
0litiC
r
and~^ *** would have no hope
of viability.
What had become clear by the start of the 19 60 s wasthat those African nations acquiring their independence in
the space of a relatively short time would embrace various
types of nationalism, some of which could be offensive to the
United States.
Under Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee, the Subcom-
held an active lif7^ y_ o .S
- In Member 1961, he led a month
long Study tour of sixteen African countries. Once again the
mission included only one member of the Foreign Halations Com-
mittee; senator Gore was accompanied by Senators Philip a. Hart
of Michigan and Maureen B. Newberger of Oregon. Upon their
return, they issued a seventeen page report.
The substance of Senator Gore's report reflected a
concern among the group that the Communists, both European
and Asian, were making inroads into Africa. Because of its
own strategic concerns, therefore, the United States was in-
in keeping African states free of Communist influence
as was suggested by Senator Gore who saw the following indica-
tions
:
(a)
tion
e
sclnfat^h
mac*ines dominating the construe-no ene the Aswan Dam in Egypt;
Philip ^Hart^an^Maureen
3
^?' Newberger'^on^hehst^^kr
1
'^
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G°re
'
to^frica.^Hearings^e^ the Subconmuttee og
142
<b)
“2*™ on
administrators numbe^'in^^nSK^.
<C)
~ffiSga&SaS.d|Si^iS9 . th- Ghana airwaysSoviet propaganda, and^re^JechnicLns?^ b°°kS '
<d)
coverage"^than £ £& '3?™-^ -tter
(e)
atXfirbtraU?: bS ^ati^H '"plo“^: missionsAfrican leaders, many of whom h^°h aS Somalla ' andforeign travel 3poPnf . . ave a penchant for
Peiping;
' n<
^ lnvitations to Moscow and
’
sSSa^'hfpslo'cL^a^nd^oSow;
and"
9
(9>
industry and science by the Communists?*
levement rn
Far from keeping the "cold war" out of Africa, then, the United
States and the Communists, from the perception of these Sen-
ators, found themselves locked in an increasingly volatile
struggle for the favor of the newly-independent African coun-
tries
.
Where economic and technical assistance was concerned,
the earlier Church study mission of I960 noted the imbalance
between the aid given to north Africa and to "black" Africa,
and recommended balancing the amounts. The Congressmen dis-
covered the ineptness of Public Law 480, Surplus Food Program
in sub-Saharan Africa, because Africa did not have the neces-
sary materials for economic development, which was the real aim
of the food program. But the most important long-range problem
7Ibid
. ,
p. 15 .
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was the question of multil 1
Sena ,
^ ateral versus bilateral assistance.
ors connected wrth both study missions generally feltthat both approaches should be maintained, that the UnitedStates should give aid in order to bolster the viability of
regional financial agencies +. 4_ u, and, at the same time, should
continue to use bilai-pr^iate al assistance as a weapon against Com-
mumst expansion.
It is important to recognise that such debates over
the technical and economic assistance extended to Africa were
going on in Congress at this early date in the development of
United States foreign policy options toward Africa. This has
been one of the continuing issues through the decade and ex-
tending into the seventies. It is also important to notice
that even in the 1950s Congressmen had ideas concerning the
strategy of aid-giving, since obviously they would be faced
with some legislative responsibility in this regard.
In 1962, Gore's Subcommittee met regularly with state
Department offacials for six months to receive information
about the Congo crisis. These closed hearings, which were
extremely detailed, have never been published. The Subcommit-
tee did perform an important service in this delicate period
of U.S. policy; it kept the full Committee informed about
the events and the United States' role in them. 9
8 Study Mission to Africa, op. cit
., I960, p. 9.
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Peri°d the Subcommittee had exclusiveD dic-ti for Africa, paralleling the creation of the Bureau
Staff^t Affa*Js . in thS State apartment. Correspondence
affairs,
m
july' 26 ,“ 972 !
UbCOmmlttee
' Committee on Foreign
144
By 1963 no Senator wanted to assume the chairmanship
of the Subcommittee following Albert Gore's resignation. Bythxs time. Church had risen to chairman of the Subco^ittee on
International Organization Affairs anH „r d was content with that
post. Senator Mike Mansfield nlan t
, the Democratic leader of the
Senate was finally persuaded to accent th u •° P e chairmanship of
the subcommittee on
.African Affairs. But he did so merely to
avoid the diplomatic embarrassment of having no one head the
Subcommittee. While Mansf > oia -x ield s name seemed to lend prestige
to the chairmanship, his appointment actually left the Sub-
committee ineffective;
Mansfield did not have
mittee
.
as leader of the majority party,
the spare time to work on the Subcom-
It wasn't until 1971 that the Senate Subcommittee on
Africa, under its new energetic chairman. Gale McGee, began
onductmg hearings on questions dealing with U.S. relations
with Southern Africa.
Southern African concerns were raised over the enact-
ment of the Azores Agreement without its submission to the
Senate for its advice and consent. In objecting to this action
conservative and liberal support coalesced. Senate Resolution
214, the Case Resolution, called for this agreement to be sub-
10 -
.
Roger Hilsman in his book. The Politics of Policv
^^
ng in Defense and Foreign Affairs
~lNew York: hTt^t-
'
n * <H' PoTnts out: "Any discussion of the role of Congress
, ,
r<~ 19n affairs must begin with an acknowledgement of theload of work carried by most Congressmen, and their business .
"
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tted to the Senate for approval as a treaty, since it pro-
7s f°r a military base ' ** —io„ing of .... troops
measure
, the Senate Foreign Aid Bill, „hich did not pass
would have prohibited assistance to Portugal if the Admin-
lstratxon did not comply with the Case Resolution. 11
Perhaps the most important action by the Senate Sub-
committee, at this time, with respect to Southern Africa, in-
volved the heated debate and eventual passage of the Byrd
Amendment, Section 503 of the Military Procurement Act of l97 i.
Under this Act the Nixon Administration has acted to resume
mportation of chrome and certain other materials from
Southern Rhodesia, an action which some critics have charged
ds direct "violation" nf tt q i i v n •° U,S * le9al obligations under the
United Nations Charter.
up to this point, the policy of the U.S. on the issues
of Rhodesian independence has been one of following the lead
of Great Britain and the U.N. in their policies of sanctions
The Case
1
Resoiution
raS
n'
Senate
'
" The u
- s
- Azores Agreement-
Relations
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
resolution by the method of cutting of? ?pprop??atio??
*
desia—Chro^',,
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- Sanctions Against Rho-
t i on q
-^a
^
ln<3B_ before the Committee on Foreign Rela-S
' y2nd Jong., 1st sess., July 7 and 8, 1971; ThiCongressional Record, September 23, 1971, Doc. 81493^814947
.
See also. New York Times
, October 7, 1971, p. l
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and embargo against the ..illegal regime „ whUe ^ the sametlmS SUPPOrtin9 BritiSh
- settle the dispute through
negotiation. The U.S. supported the United Nafcions^
Councii Resolution of November 12, 1965, condemning the lan
Smith government. In December, 1966, the United states voted
for a second Security Council Resolution enjoining selective
mandatory sanctions and the 1968 resolution making these sanc-
tions comprehensive. The votes on these resolutions were
reinforced by two executive orders by President Johnson in
1967 and 1968. 13 On Mar-r-h n r.rc 17, the Department of state ordered
the U.S. Consulate in Salisbury, Rhodesia closed.
At the time the ban was instituted and despite the
government's policy of disposal of excess stocks, two Amer-
ican corporations. Union Carbide and Foote Mineral Company,
had made sizable purchases of Rhodesian chrome. The two com-
panies asked for a variance from the ban in order to import
the chrome that they had already purchased. This issue was
debated for some time until early 1971, when the Nixon Admin-
istration permitted Union Carbide and Foote Mineral to import
the chrome which had been paid for before the U.N. sanctions
(to which the U.S. had adhered) went into effect.^" 4
3 Ross K. Baker
, "Towards A New Constituency for aMore Active American Foreign Policy for Africa " Pacer ore-
AssoM t*
the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studiesociation, Denver, November 3-6, 1971, pp. 19-20.
14 Ibid
.
, p. 20
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Having won this skirmi Qh
.
s , however, powerful interests(private and public) favorable to the qm i ev,S th regime then
shifted the focus of their infi
„ ,
influence in order to further widenthe hole in the embargo. This was accomplished through alegislative operation involving an amendment to the defense
procurement bill which called for *t an amendment of the United
Nations Participation Act of 1945 a ^^ . A companion bill was intro-duced on the subject—caliinrr -fllmg for an exemption for Rhodesian
chrome from the U.N. boycott. This House version was appended
to H.H. 8637 by Congressman Collins from Texas. Hearings on
the amendment were held on July 7 and 8, 1971, in the Subcom-
mittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. These public hearings served to highlight what was
clearly an area of intense interest for kt the business community
and the "friends of Rhodesia" as their "big guns" were wheeled
in to do battle. Speaking for the Byrd Amendment were Senator
Byrd himself, 15 Dean Acheson, E.F. Andrews, Chairman of the
tical Minerals Committee of the American Iron and Steel
Institute, L.G. Bliss, Chairman of the Board of Foote Mineral
Company, Richard S. Warren, general counsel of the "right-wing"
Liberty Lobby, and F.F. Andrews, vice president-purchases,
prominent among those profoundly 'opposId^United State^andUnited Nations policy toward Southern Rhodesia
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Allegheny Ludlum Industries Tn~
, Inc. Arrayed against this con-
stituency were David 0. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of statefor African Affairs, and Congressman Charles c. Diggs Jr
of Michigan. The subcommittee chairman. Senator Sale McGee
of Wyoming and a majority of the subcommittee were in opposi-
the Byrd Amendment- t-»-dment. it was not reported out of sub-
committee and the Foreinn pQ i ,4.g Relations Committee seemed inclined
to defer action. 16
On August 6, the day before Congress adjourned, Harry
Byrd circumvented both the Subcommittee on African Affairs and
the Foreign Relations Committee by going to the Senate Armed
Services Committee and adding the amendment to the Military
Procurement Bill as section 503 of that bill, thereby removing
it from the purview of the Foreign Relations Committee. It
was reported out and got to the floor of the Senate.
The ensuing fight on the question of striking section
503 from the bill was a bitter one. "Uncharacteristic rancor
clouded the more normal senatorial civility." 17 when the final
vote was tallied those voting to retain 503 triumphed by a
vote of 46 to 36. There were two subsequent reconsiderations
of the controversial section. In both cases the vote was to
retain the provision. The final vote occurred on Wednesday,
October 6, 1971, with the final consideration of the Military
Procurement Bill. The result was favorable for the Byrd amend-
1
6
See New York Times
,
op. cit
.
,
p. 1
17Baker, op. cit
.. p. 21.
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ment on the final vote and the bill was sent to conference. 18
The House Subcommittee
other side of the Capitol, the House Subcom-
mittee on Africa has shown far more interest ^ ^
The Senate Foreign Relations Conrtittee has long savored a repu-
tatron for knowledge, sensitivity, and influence concerning
ergn affairs and, for this reason, has attracted the most
intelligent and influential Senators. The House Committee
has traditionally had less influence; thus attracting mainly
Representatives unable to acquire their first choice of com-
mittee assignments. This situation has prevailed from earlier
days when foreign policy was the sole province of the Senate.
In the last two decades, however, foreign policy has
become so enmeshed in all other aspects of government policy
and so dependent on heavy appropriations that the House has
found itself increasingly involved in foreign affairs. Through-
out the 1960s the House discovered that it could make a greater
impact on foreign policy by slashing the foreign aid bill than
' 19the Senate can by ratifying a treaty
18., U.S Sanctions Against Rhodesia—Chrome , " Hearings,op- cit
., p. 14.
olavPd in ^
lsman
'
.
, p. 78. "The role that Congress
HIV l T forei 9n Policy was almost never direct or initiativetaking. It is certainly true of the continuing problems oforeign policy. it is very rare that Congress takes the
^i^atlVe
,
ln foreign aid, for example. Usually congressionalaction is to cut, not add."
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been
^^
°» Africa has
more ac tive than its counterpart in the genate isbecause of the interest-^ nf
(DM' h
rS SUCh aS Charles
D Mic .), Frances Bolton (v> nv, \(R-ohio)
, Barrett O'Hara ( D-ni > a
others, and partly because of th
of the f,, •
e money-appropriating function
Sub .
Committee
. Some of the testimony before the House
uting the appropriation hearing which occur annually. Thus,
COmmittee ^ lnTOlVed Wi th Africa
, and that involve-
ment often triggers some action on the part of th c ke Subcommittee.
other times the Subcommittee may schedule meetings at the
request of its Chairman exercising his own initiative or upon
the request of the Chairman of the full Committee.
The impression one may quickly gain from a perusal of
the record of the infrequent meetings held by both the Senate
and House Subcommittees
, the few Congressmen or Senators who
have participated in study missions to Africa, and the small
number of reports issued by the Subcommittees relative to the
impact of Africa on the international system at the time, is
one of ineffectiveness of formal agencies of Congress on the
20
active policy formulation process during the period 1958-64.
20
the United States (August 15, 1972)!
Udent Programs in
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one
During the early period of Congressional
_way that Congressmen learned about Africa was through various
subcommittees that held hearingS rings on special projects or
received briefings by governmental officials whouinciai might deliver
general status reports to info™ or relate specific reports on
a specific problem. For example, ln 1959 ^ 196o
hearings, held under the title "Rrn- 0f. , B ie ings on Africa," were
concerned with the nolitn^i „P l ical and economic aspects of United
States relations with Africa, sponsored by the House Conunit-
tee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa. Also, in 1960,
a hearing sponsored by the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions was held pursuant to the publication of the Northwestern
University study on Africa. The Northwestern group published
a pamphlet in February 1960 entitled, "A New Policy Toward
Africa," which suggested that policy for Africa be formulated
in the light of African interest and in concert with United
States democratic values. Beyond that is urged: "support for
non-self-governing nations in the United Nations: support for
regional and continental African unity; opposition to all
forms of racial discrimination: support for bilateral and multi-
lateral assistance programs; and support for programs aimed at
improving health, education and welfare in Africa ." 21
It is possible, of course, for members of Congress to
use other committees than Foreign Affairs (House) and Foreign
•
Frederick Wickert, "American Universities and Africa "M^£^L-^.pdies_Bulletin (December 1960), p. 25. See also TheNorthwestern University Study, United States Foreign PolicyTowards Africa (June 18, 1964), pp. 1-15 Y
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(Senate) as a base to explore Africa. in 19 63
,senator Dodd, the lowest ranking Democrat on the SubcoJttae
on African Affairs, used his vice chairmanship of the Senateinternal Security Subcommittee to spread his view that -Ghanahas become the first Soviet satellite in Africa... senator
Mien d. Enender of Louisiana made hi£ famou£ thro^h
1962 as a member of the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee. At the same time. Senator Vance Hartke of Indiana
was making an extensive trip for +.
22
P th Senate Commerce Commit-
tee
.
There are not many organised pressure groups that
attempt to influence Congress about Africa. The American Com-
mittee on Africa, the most articulate and informed champion of
African freedom from colonial rule, regularly brings matters-
of-conscience, especially relating to U.S. policy toward
Southern Africa, to the attention of the African Subcommittee.
At the other end of the spectrum, Katangan, South African, and
Portuguese interests, both governmental and private, have
mounted spot campaigns in efforts to weaken Congressional
sympathy for Congo unity and to build up sympathy for continued
Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique. 24
23
22 •Hilsman, op. cit
., p. 80.
23 Ibid
.
,
p. 80.
24Wickert, op. cit
., p. 25.
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The Portuguese campaign has been fully documented in
continuous sessions of both the Senate and House African Com-
mittees. Selvage & Lee, a public relations firm serving as
the foreign agent for some Portuguese business interests since
1962 visited many Congressmen, leaving most of them under the
impression that the firm was representing a constituent group
of Portuguese Americans and not a pressure group of Portuguese
business interests. As a result, several Congressmen have
responded by delivering speeches in the House defending Portu-
guese policy in Africa.
Senator Carl Mundt 's speech on the Senate floor on
April 24, 1964 chided the United Nations for constantly crit-
icizing Portuguese policies in Angola and Mozambique. Senator
Mundt stated the processes of independence in underdeveloped
countries are usually much slower than desired and often new
countries fail to improve conditions for their citizens or to
operate democratic procedures appropriately because they are
"put on their own before they are duly prepared for self-
government and independence."^^
Mundt criticized the United States for supporting
United Nations resolutions which have interfered with the
relationship between Portugal and Angola and Mozambique.
U. S . Congress
,
Senate, 88th Cong., 1st sess.
,
April 24,1964, Congressional Record 108:8933. Senator Mundt concludedhis remarks by stating: ^Tn the highly significant business of
making freedom function for the people generally that the educa-tional processes of 'learning to do by doing' have great and
enduring values. This is what it appears is now taking placela an<3 Mozambique. I join many other Americans in wishingthe best for the continued development of these procedures
. . .
"
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"Since the Portuguese are old and honored friends of the
United states and have been of great assistance in our defense
effort, the United States should refrain from supporting
abortive United Nations resolutions.'' 26
Congressman John Rarick (D-La.) delivered a speech in
the House of Representatives on May 15, 1965, in which he
emphasized that the Cape of Good Hope, ''the one great strategic
gate of our enemies," still remains "in our hands." "Without
the Cape," the Congressman continued, "the United States can-
not survive." If the United States were to oppose all who
would destroy the peace of Southern Africa, "whether by war,
sanctions, or other moves to overthrow the governments of those
countries of Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa,
we could not survive. Militarily these countries are essential
to us. Financially they are important to us.
On March 22, 1967, Congressman John Ashbrook (D-Minn.)
inserted into the Congressional Record a special dispatch to
the New York Times by correspondent Drew Middleton which stated
in part: "The Portuguese believe that the rebellion in Angola
can be ended it is very near defeat now, according to foreign
diplomats--and that Angola can move forward economically and
26 Ibid.
,
p. 8933
.
27 U.S. Congress, House, 88th Cong., 1st sess., May 15,
1965, Congressional Record 108:12674.
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socially if only the rest of the world will k
, ,,28
a Wl11 eep its hands
, f
'
BY the ° f thS W°rld the Portuguese meant Black
““ aCt1 "9 thr°Ugh the U"ited Nations with, at times, the
support of the United States.
Middleton argues that: "The Portuguese continue to
maintain that the situation in Angola is a domestic matter
because the overseas territor-iocitones are considered under Portu-
9uese law an integral part of the nation.-” According to
Middleton,
"Let it be remembered that the citizens of Mozam-
bxque, as much a part of Portugal as Alaska and Hawaii are of
the united States, are under attack by Communist terrorists
using the similar weapons and strategy employed by the Viet-
cong in South Vietnam.
Once again Congressman John R. Rarick in a speech
before the House of Representatives on March 14, 1968, took
up the cudgel for the Portuguese government when he stated
2 8
1967, Congressional^e^rf^^vg^11 Ts%LllT sess., March 22,constantly the object of PorhmaTc'n A Salazar has maintained
creation of a mul^irac^^^ii^r^ci^r " ^ ^
2 9
imply thatTEf ‘ insurrIcIion
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d
AngolI
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Seeme<\ t0presented a military danger to Portugal? n° l0nger
Mini s ter'saXa^ar Lllvertd on^vlmb^O Tst?
attitudes
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that: The integrate remarks of vice President
served only to undermine moderate stable African leaders
seeking reconciliation with Southern Africa. -31 Rarick
accused Humphrey of unwittingly assisting such Communist
nationalists as Eduardo Mondlane, and Holden Roberto who
according to the Congressman,
..are set on overthrowing ail
responsible government in Africa. So instead of helping
Africa toward stability,. said Rarick, The vice President’s
policy pronouncements have contributed to perpetuating the
turmoil in Africa while throwing U.S. prestige behind the
terrorists—terrorists of the same Communist school and opera-
tion as the Vietcong tearing out the hearts of American boys
in South Vietnam.
Rarick- s argument that the Portuguese colonies were
being threatened by Communist-led insurgents has been a con-
sistent belief of some Congressmen from the time of his first
speech on the floor of the House in 1965
. In his speeches be-
fore the House, Rarick expressed what also were to be recurrent
aspects of his and others' opinions that the Portuguese govern-
ment is fighting Communist-led rebellions in Angola, Mozambique,
1 Q 6 H
U -S. Congress, House, 90th Cong., 2nd sess.
,
March 14,
promptirBplT^I1^2^ 114 : 6873-6876 . These remarks werepted by Vice President Humphrey's attack on the white-dominated governments of Rhodesia and South Africa.
32
Ibid., p. 6621. Rarick maintained that Rhodesia.South Africa
,
and the Portuguese provinces are daily threatened
„l h eriSt? ; Communists trained in "Moscow, Havana, and Pekingwit the implied approval of our U.S. foreign policy." SeeCongressional Record
,
House, March 14, 1968, p. 6621.
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Portugal. There were thoqp
9
se who supported and continue to sup-port Rarick's position both in the ReHouse in the Senate
such as Senators Richard Russell (D-Ga ) p' * ^ Roman Hruska (R-Neb )Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), Karl Mundt (R s n ,i H .-S.D.), John ShermanCP.. (H-Ky
... iB
... „„„„ >r> ^
...... (D-1.X,
.... JoBn ^
(R Calif.), and Frances Bolton (R-ohio)
.
S t cl 1 W3. IT t" ^ o F +* l-i it l • iaiwar s f the "liberal establishment" as
Senator Edward Brooke <R-Mass.) have lent support to theories
of "communist conspiracies." Senator Brooke remarked that in
conversations with the leaders of the "freedom movements" in
Angola, Mozambique
, and Guinea, they admitted receiving weapons
and other support for their liberation organizations from Com-
munist sources. Senator Brooke was careful to point out, how-
ever, that these leaders do not expect that they or their
people will turn to communism as a way of life. " They do not
use the rhetoric of communism, and they do not view the con-
flict with Portugal in Marxist terms. But they are using
Communist weapons, and have Communist advisors. Some of their
officers are being trained in Communist countries, and many
of their students are studying there. In the long run, while
Southern Africa may not go Communist, it may turn out to be
very pro-Communist .
”
33
sess. ADrii
S
;c,
C
°?Q^SSA Senate : S - Res - H8, 90th Cong., 2nd' ^
' 1^68, Congressional Record 114:10839-10852.
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As further evidence o-f
. .
Congressional dependence onother sources for their- •information about Africa
Par . , .
Si
, Congressman
introduced the following remarks by one Lord KilbrackenWrit1"9 f°r the (London)
, Rarick quotea
Kilbracken as saying: "a cmerri 1 1 =gu lla operation, smaller and
younger than that of the Viet Cong but operating on the samegeneral principles, has established a firm base in the Portu-
guese East African colony of Mozambique. it is being led by
a Mozambican professor on leave from New York's Syracuse Oni-
versity." Rarick
' s source of i n fninformation maintained that
Mondlane spent his time in the United States seeking backing
P licity for his cause
,
but encountered general apathy.
Mondlane was supposed to have made a trip to Peking seeking
aid from the Chinese-and it was only then that his true
motives were revealed. ^5
On another occasion Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.c.)
introduced into the CorHressi^nal_Je^ an article on Spain
and Portugal written by Mr. Thomas Waring, editor of the News
2£id_Courier, Charleston, S.c. Mr. Waring had recently returned
from a visit to Spain and Portugal where, he claimed, he ob-
tained first-hand knowledge "for in-depth reporting."
34,
lq . Q _
U.S. Congress, House, 91st Cong.
“ y69. Congressional Record 115:7536-7544.bracken who said that while in Mozambique-
equipment—mortars, grenades, machine-guns
and^mmes certainly identified as Chinese
1st sess., March 25
Rarick quoted Kil-
"I saw much captured
high explosives
and Russian-made.
.
/
35
Ibid
. , p. 7537.
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Senator Thurmond read portions of the article that
maintained there has been much improvement in the Portuguese
African provinces.
"The terrorists have no hope of success..' 36
according to Portuguese Foreign Minister Dr. Franco Nogueira
"They lack support of the masses and some have joined the
Portuguese authorities in Mozambique and Angola." it was Dr.
Nogueira' s feeling that many of the terrorists now realize that
Portuguese policies in Africa are more realistic, and thay they
can meet the problems of their people. 37
The foreign minister was asked to comment on his coun-
try's relations with the United states after his return from
a trip to Washington. He declined to elaborate on expectations
from the Nixon Administration for the future of Portuguese-
American relations. He did state, however, "that there has
been strain and many difficulties in past years. We believe,
with a change in views toward Africa and the reasons behind
Portuguese policies which are in the long-range interest of
the West, we can expect better understanding from U.S. public
opinion . " °
3 6U.S. Congress, Senate, S. Res. 114, 91st Conasess., May 20, 1969, Congressional Record 115:13211-13213.
37 Ibid
.
,
p. 13211.
38 Ibid
.
, p. 13211.
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Some members of Congress opposed the pro-Portugal
P0S
;
ti0n
- SPeakin9
.
f°r ^
—— American dipiomatioPS ure toward the independence movements in Angola and Mozam-
Congressman Abner d. Mikva (D.111
. ) submitted ^^tlQn int° ^e
^n2£^^i^^al__Record an article by John A.
Marcum on Eduardo Mondlane from the March/Aori 1 ind n p l issue of Africa
—
port : Mr
- Marcum maintains that in the he •ma m beginning, Eduardo
Mondlane was regarded by the Portuguese as non-Communist and
pro-west, but since 1965, he was slowly drifting toward com-
munist control. The Portuguese have charged his second in
command, the Reverend Uriah Simango and his third-ranking aide,
Marcelmos dos Santos, with influencing Mondlane in this direc-
tion
.
In response to one of Marcum's questions, Mondlane
responded by saying that: "Everytime I go to the United States,
I m asked again and again whether FRELIMO is 'pro-East' or 'pro-
West',
'pro-communist' or 'pro-capitalist'. My answer as
president of FRELIMO is that FRELIMO is 'pro-Mozambican, prin-
cipally, primarily, and finally.'" 39 Mondlane went on to chide
the Western powers, including the United States, for equivo-
cating on support for the liberation movements in Portuguese
Africa
.
40
1 qcq ^
39U.S. Congress, House, 91st Cong., 1st sess. Julv a1969, Congressional Record 115:54327 ' ^ ’
40
that if
P
:.
54327
- Mr
- Mondlane assured Mr. Marcum
bp p
th liberation struggle is successful Mozambique "wille a democratic, modern, unitary, single-party state."
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As indicated earlier, one way that Congressmen learned
about Africa was through various subcommittee hearings hela on
special subjects concerned with the political and economic
United States relations with Africa. Organizations
and individuals interested in Africa are called upon to testify“ COT9reSSi°- 1 hearings periodical!,
. x„ the 1970 hearings
before the House of Representatives, the participants included
Mr. Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of the African Party for
the independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, and
Prime Minister Marcello Caetano of Port.mai , hug l, whose statements
were submitted for inclusion in the Record
.
Mr. Cabral was questioned by Congressman Charles Diggs,
Jr., (D-Mich
. ) , Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives.
Mr. Cabral was asked to respond to a portion of a speech
by the Prime Minister of Portugal Marcello Caetano in which the
Prime Minister boasted that the great majority of the popula-
tion of Guinea was fighting side by side with the regular Portu-
guese forces against the terrorists. "Yet, in this province,
the terrorist movement appears to be far more extensively and
effectively supported by the socialist powers, especially the
U.S.S.R.
,
than in the other provinces." 4 ! "The reason for this
special Soviet interest," Caetano continued, "is not hard to
U.S. Congress, House, "Portuguese Guinea and TheLiberation Movement," Hearings before the Subcommittee on
—
nca
,
91st Cong., 1st sess.
,
February 26, 1970, p. 19.
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fmd. No one hldes the fact that Portuguese Gu . nea . s a
necessary base for an attack on the Cape Verde archipelago. "43
The impression that the Prime Minister makes is a
portentous one especially at a time when the Soviet fleet grows
from day to day in the Mediterranean; and while Russia seeks to
set up military bases and firm alliances in the Middle East
and North Africa, the great importance of the Cape Verde Islands
is evident. 4
Mr. Cabral exclaimed that for the Portuguese govern-
ment "we are all Communists. All people supporting the
liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies are Communists.” 45
Mr. Cabral accused the Portuguese of using scare tactics in
order to get more support from the NATO powers, "because of
the situation they have in Guinea, and they tell if we take
Guinea, we will assault Cape Verde Islands and make the islands
a base for the Communists." 46 The Guinea rebel leader assured
Congressman Diggs that the condition for the help they received
from any nation is that there must be no conditions at all.
And we have a fundamental principle: people fighting for inde-
pendence, must be independent in the mind and in the action." 47
42 Ibid
.
,
P- 19.
42 Ibid
. P- 19.
44 Ibid
. P- 19.
45 Ibid
.
,
P. 19.
46 Ibid. P- 19.
4
^Ibid
. , P- 19.
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„ h
In anSWer t0 a query by^ Diggs as to the role
at the United States should play with regard to the libera-ion movement in Portuguese Guinea, Mr Cabral v «. a' u.
.
c n stated that "it
would be a very good idea if the U.S. discontinued military
r
" POrtU9al Unt11 ****** to respect international
law, and if they declined to respect the peoples, rights to
self-determination and independence in the Portuguese colo-
nies
.
"
The rebel leader was certain that: "day by day the
majority, the large majority of the American nation, according
the principles, the fundamental principles of this coun-
try, are with us in our fight. Morally they support us." 49
Mr. Cabral went on to express regret that the weapons received
by Portugal in the framework of NATO are used by Portugal
against the insurgents in the Portuguese colonies. 50
The "special study mission" and its reports to the
subcommittee on Africa both in the Senate and in the House have
served to provide useful information to the committees in
their deliberations on legislation and policy considerations
4 8
source s°be sides"Sf ^ £herD the communist countries."
49
inincHrp — ' P * 20 *
" If y°u are against-opposed-to
and tyranny
tyranny
'
we are als° fighting against injustice
50 Ibid
.
, p. 20
.
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as they relate to the Afri^n«-ne rnca area. One of0:t the critical
problem areas served through these
'.reports'. includes the
need for decolonisation in the minority-ruled areas of Africa
The report of the special study missions to Africa
conducted on February 7 to March 7, 1971, and to West, South
and North Africa, August 5 to September 8, 1871 and danuary i-
25, 1972, discovered that nn =, „ ..
.
o a continent where all but Liberia
were at ons time rul pa Kt, <-><-,1 • ned by colonial powers, there then were
forty-three independent countries Trsdit; n• a ionally
, American
foreign policy toward colonial Afrirn v™ k1 t ca has been stated to be in
support of anticolonialism. However, at times a wide gulf has
ked our actions from our verbal pronouncements. At
present, a conscientious effort to deal with the problem of
continued colonial rule in the Portuguese territories of Angola,
Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau demands that policy pronounce-
ments be supported by firm actions. In the past U.S. statements
on Portuguese colonial rule in Africa have revealed a policy
which is essentially supportive of the status quo. For exam-
ple, Secretary of state William Rogers declared in 1971 in
his message on Africa that:
bllieve
t
that°the
<?UeSe t®rrit°ries, we shall continue toir people should have the right of self-
that goal ?he T '" 11 .encourage peaceful progress towardi. T declared Portuguese policy of racial tol-
th^Tna 5 ^ lmP°rtant ^ctor in this equation? We thinkhis holds genuine hope for the future.
* 5
1
51U.S. Congress, House, "Report of Special Studv Miq-sions^to Africa," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa.
P 3, Ma^h 7-March 7, 197ir^ItSd^-'
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Chairman Charles Diggs of the House Subcommittee on
Afrrca finds the above position to be unacceptable to the peo-
Pl6S ° f thSSe
their "brothers in the indepen-
dent natrons of Africa." Although the United States has sup-
ported some United Nations resolutions which urge the Portu-
guese to grant self-determination to the people of her African
colonies, the United States has continued economic and military
support of Portugal. 52 Congressman Diggs feels that American
military and economic assistance has acted as a psychological
lf n0t 3 PhYSiCal Ufe
- economy weighed down by the
expenditure of approximately one-half of its national budget
on defense. Portugal's major military expenditures relate to
the defense of its African territories. Under the U.S. arms
embargo policy, Portugal is required to give assurance that
American equipment transferred to Portugal through NATO
rangements or the military assistance program or sold to Por-
tuguese buyers will not be used in Africa. However, reports
persist that liberation groups are being suppressed by weapons
of American origin found in Portuguese Africa. Congressman
Diggs notes that the Canadian government (also a NATO ally of
Portugal) has been unwilling to take the chance that the Portu-
guese might violate their pledge not to use NATO supplied equip-
ment in Africa and consequently has terminated military assis-
tance to Portugal. 53
52 Ibid
.
,
p. 5
.
53 Ibid.
, p. 5. Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr.,
,
chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa hasled the fight m Congress to support the decolonization of theAfrican Continent.
166
Diggs argued that there was little on the public
record which indicated that the United States has ever made
conscientious use of its power and influence to bring an end
to the colonial era in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.
During the Subcommittee's hearings on "U.S. Policy Toward
Africa in the 1970s," a number of witnesses made worthwhile
proposals for new policy positions toward Portugal and its
African territories. Diggs felt that the adoption of any one
of the following policy options would add credibility to the
U.S. claim to support of anti-colonism:
(1) Develop a program of educational assistance toAfricans in the Portuguese territories in order toincrease their readiness for independence.
<2)
ot
P°S ?-
®
tricter
.controls over the export to Portugalf military equipment or equipment which could beused for military purposes.
(3) Encourage the United Nations Secretary-General andhigh administration officials to visit the Portu-guese African territories as part of a campaign toincrease international pressure of Portugal to
relinquish its colonies...
D 4
Diggs' report concluded by casting out the challenge
that if the American policy in Africa truly is supportive of
the final eradication of colonialism from that continent, the
United States, then, cannot "engage in the wishful thinking
that independence will eventually come to the Portuguese ter-
ritories via the slow passage of time."~*~’
As a sequel to the earlier trip, and again in his
capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Congress-
54 Ibid
.
,
p. 6
.
55 Ibid.
,
p. 6
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1,130 Di" S C°ndUCted * Mission during the perio<J Qf
August 5 to September 8, 1971 to South Africa, Guinea-Bissau
Cape Verde, Mauritania, the Gambia, Algeria and to several
European countries (L i sbon
, Paris
, the Hague> ^
to discuss their African policy, with particular emphasis on
policy towards South Africa. 56
The basic fact found by this study mission-especially
ismg out of its visit to Lisbon, to Guinea-Bissau, Cape
Verde, South Africa, and the conversations with the President
of the Organization of African Unity-is that the territories
in Africa which still remain under colonial and minority con-
trol are not isolated from the forces of self-determination
and majority rule which have revolutionized the world in the
middle half of this century, and which have made self-
determination and human rights the legal obligations of all
members of the United Nations.
Prior to Congressman Diggs' visit to Guinea-Bissau and
Cape Verde the Congressional delegation stopped in Lisbon,
where the Portuguese Overseas Minister discussed with them the
policies of the Portuguese government toward the territories.
Diggs commented that the minister emphasized that the last
fifty years have been an evolution toward increased local
autonomy in the Overseas Territories
.
5 ^
sions
92nd
U.S. Congress, House, "Report of Special Study Mis-
„
to Africa," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa.Cong.
,
2nd sess
. ,
August 5
-September T9 7 1
.
5 7 Ibid., p. 66. The Portuguese Minister stressed thatthe autonomy of the Overseas Provinces will not affect the
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The delegation report founrf ud it nearly impossible to
IT
1" thS SXtent ° f MrlCan
—nation in the government
Guinea-Bissau. The report went on ^ say ^^ ^over twenty-one years of age who could read and write Pottu-guese
, or non-literates who are heads of * •
•
d n families under Portu-guese civil law, have the ricrhf fng t to vote
- The vast majority ofAfrican adults are Uliter.te, and a large portion of them lie
under customary rather than Portuguese civil law, so it appears
that most Africans do not even participate in the election of
the three Legislative Council members who are chosen by direct
election. since Africans hold few administrative posts, and
few are wealthy, they do not participate substantially in the
"organic vote" either. 59
While visiting Guinea-Bissau Congressman Diggs' delega-
tion was told by Portuguese officials that they were making
considerable progress in providing education for the people of
Guinea-Bissau. They emphasized particularly that enrollment in
natiVor^L^nteghtfand'so9^^ 311 parts of theintegrity and sovereignty of the State."
5 8
advisory
r
bodies
P01
Gui^ea
r
|
SentatiVeS t0 national Political and
Territories wer^ e
n -Bissau and the other smaller Overseas
cilsin m k f glVSn the Privilege of Legislative Coun-
earlier All Council had ?hem a dlcade
by ih^overseas Mnister
9 Slatl°n mUSt Ultimatel* ** -Proved
59 Ibid., p. 66. The membership of the Council is
and*" "social inter
31?™ °f
?
irect election, local authorities,
of an
ln keeplng with the Portuguese notiont organic, corporate state.
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primary schools had increased greatly i„ recent years .60 ^delegation discovered one secondary school and a technical
school, but no university.
While no accurate literacy figures were made available
to the Congressional delegation, it was clear to them that the
Portuguese have made little procuress ingr m improving education
for the Africans of Guinea-Bissau. Estimates showed that 80
to 90 percent of the Africans in Portuguese Africa are func-
tionally illiterate. 61
( The fact that as much as 40 percent
of the population in Portugal itself may be illiterate should
be taken into account when considering educational figures in
Portuguese territories.)
The delegation found that the army was heavily involved
in the building of new schools and in teaching. Many of the
new schools are called military school posts, which are run by
the military in areas where the resources and teachers are not
available to establish a normal school. According to the
Government's development plan, thirty-one school posts and
fourteen regular primary schools were to be built during 1971. 62
60 Ibid.
,
P. 71
61 Ibid
. , P-
i
—
1
r-
62 Ibid
. , P- 71.
mu r,
neaj
-rn situation due to its climate and terrain
33
e
5
U
ve
te<3 Nation
? estimates life expectancy from birth to be
A r cf tpThVSel0''eSt figures on the continent ofrnca . See United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1971.
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The Congressional Study „ission to Guinea _Bissau cameup with these findings:
(1) The visit confirmed that thprp todirect observation- a whni^ n° substitute forthe rudimentary development of
W Understanding both of
Portuguese and of the extent to 2h
lne
r^SSaU Under theare embattled wL Portuguese
*
(2) As emphasized bv the
graphical and physical facts o? ^
e
f
ninent
' the geo-
the task of defending it mo^t difficult"^ “ke
Guinea-Bissau*!
^ hard "pressed to keep control of
present?
1SSaU 1S a" armed camP wi th the military ever-
<5>
edLa^^irSvelS^nt^L^rr0 ' S°Cia1 ' a"d
( 6 )
clear'that^the poIi^T^ ** briefi "9. it is
African
Pe°P
^t
° f Bissar^ouS?
of seif-determinat ion^e 3
Ve 9r6atly Wlth the attainment
When the NATO Council of Ministers met in Lisbon on
the 3rd and 4th of June, 1971, a major, though "off the record-
discussion was conducted centering on the need to contain the
growing movement for African liberation in Southern Africa and
the future role of Southern Africa within the defense structure
of the Western bloc
.
64 This discussion had to be "off the
record" because the official sphere of operation of the fifteen
63 Ibid.
,
p. 73.
4 U.S. Congress, House, "U.S.
Southern Africa," Hearings before the92nd Cong., 1st seis
. ,
June 2
,
I 9 71
,
Business Involvement in
Subcommittee on Africa,
p ". 286:
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nation alliance extends only as far south as the Tropic of
Cancer, excluding all the Portuguese-controlled territories
f Africa (Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique), Rhodesia and
the Republic of South Africa. 65
The American Conmittee on Africa 66 prepared a fact
sheet for release at the time of the NATO meeting in Europe
m June which dealt in some detail with the two issues of NATO
and U.S. relationships with and support of Portugal in Africa
Subcommittee Chairman Charles Diggs allowed the report to be
inserted m the Record as part of the testimony of Mrs. Jenni-
fer Davis, South African economist representing the American
Committee on Africa .
^
Mrs. Davis' report elaborated on the various pressures
being exerted, in and outside the NATO alliance, to extend the
NATO zone as far south as the Cape of Good Hope. In 1970 Por-
tugal's Defense Minister Rebelo offered NATO defense chiefs the
territories and bases outside the NATO zone" which would help
based in^itSi S^es^lf
™Lng the decolo^i-
6
6
Ibid.
,
p. 286 .
6 7 Ibid.
,
p. 286. Mrs. Davis commented on the qrowina
Afr^c 3
Y
+-
knit
a
a
ii
lanCe ° f Portu9uese Africa, Rhodesia, and Southi a toward the creation of a solid Southern Bloc. Thisinvolves, according to Mrs. Davis, a tremendous economic cooper
even m°r
f .
important
,
a high degree of military cooper
l
accordln
? to Mrs. Davis, top-level security chiefsrom , the three countries are known to meet regularly in planninsessions
•
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control the vast area of the whole Atlantic. 60 The reportfound so. significance in the fact that the new Secretary-
General of NATO, former Dutch Min±ster Qf poreign
Joseph Luns, had always been synthetic to the Portuguese
position in Africa and was reportPd = ce as commenting that in the
colonial wars* "
• • • Portugal sacrifices its blood for our
freedom. The committee views Luns as a strong conservative
force in favor of continuing NATO support to Portugal without
any criticism of the colonial war in Africa. 69
On August 10, 1971, Diggs’ Congressional delegation
visited the Portuguese-administered islands of Cape Verde.
Portuguese officials here often stress the =t „strategic importance
Of the islands as a transportation and communications center.
An air base at Sal provides landing and refueling facilities
for European planes going to and from South Africa, Angola,
and Mozambique.
Europeans have often warned that the most serious
threat to the security of the Cape route lies in the Western
Afncan-Atlantic Ocean area of ’’Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape
Verde Islands. 70 Diggs recalled that in earlier discussions of
6 8 T , . ,Ibid.
,
P* 286 .
Ibid
. P* 286.
70
Ibid.
,
P* 237.
cum cue irencn at the NATO meeting in December iQ 7 n
intensify"the
f
p
nSG *~ed thi- Ume puAs to '
Jhe ? a
Y
o
French presence m the Mozambique channel and
onl of the ?nst?l
T
e
iS nSed t0 defend the Sea rOUtes becamee ju ifications most often heard among French mili-tary circles for hugh French arms sales to Southern Africa. See
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Portugal's membership into NATO that Portugal was originally
admitted, in 1949, at the proposal of the United States; and,
that the motivation was not primarily the geographical posi-
tron of Portugal itself, but Portugal's colonial possessions
such as the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands as well as the
three major African colonies." 7 * chairman Diggs read into the
Record an article in- Pgreign
_Affairs written in 1952 which
stated in part:
emphlsLf^^fcapeTerde^s! 0^'116 ^°res hardlY needs
the southern par?
P
of the A^lanttc'
Whl°h h
?
ld the to
coasf
SeS
' lYr r tha Y d° °ff th4 Wes?
iine oTlZl\tTaJtnT»' blth 1816 kil°™s o?
SSLfto^hfiSand vlltl
™ 1
If the role that NATO will play in the future with
relation to formal alliances involving Southern Africa is still
somewhat speculative, there is no doubt about the invaluable
support that has flowed from individual NATO members to Portu
gal in its fight to hold on to its African Empire in the face
James Hoagland, "White Elite Rules Portuguese Africa « Wash-ington Post
, April 18, 1971, p. 3 . '
7 1 Ibid.
, p. 237.
72
+-nrr3
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, c c f
Ib
p
d
'
•
P * 237 * The article cited was entitled "Por-tugal s Strategic Territories," Foreign Affairs, vol. 34
no. 2 (April 1952), p. 321. —
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Of a decade of determined armed struggle by the people of
Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau
.
73
On December 14, 1971, Chairman Diggs issued the fol-
lowing 'Action Manif 11 • rtesto with recommendations to Secretary of
State Rogers and to Dr. Kissinger for n qob t U.S. government action.
The Manifesto was based, for the most part, on the Subcom-
mittee s fact-finding mission to several African countries,
including Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and South Africa.
According to the chairman of the delegation, the visit
to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde was •'extremely informative,
particularly with respect to the stark racism of the Portu-
guese government and the tenuous position of the Portuguese in
Guinea-Bissau."™ The delegation discovered Guinea-Bissau to
be an "armed camp," and the Portuguese there were beleaguered.
It was evident that a consideration of the effect of the PAIGC
must include not only its military gains and efforts to improve
conditions in the liberated areas, but also the housing, health
and educational programs then operating in the Portuguese-held
areas in Guinea and on Cape Verde. 73
R1 i ~
73u -S. Congress
,
House, "Text of the First Congressionaliaclcjaiicus Press Conference in Africa," Hearings before theSubcommittee on Africa, 92nd Cong., 1st seiFTT January 18
,
19 7 2.
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p. 177.
Study Mission, op. cit
. , August 5 to September 8, 1971,
75ibid.
,
p. 177.
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efforts ly other NATO^ountrieffn
itS obstruction of
to reconsider NATO assistance L pnvi^6 , 0” “e agenda an itemGovernment use every effo^ to £ Portu?al.and that the U.S.
agenda for the next NATO Council meeting.
ltSm placed on the
8. That the United States take whatever steoq 3rpS.S“
iiLau^nfcfpe ^opl^f^inea-
6
.. ,
1 ?* That the united States either bilaterally orthrough the urn ted Nations, give humanitarian aiTto the PAIGCand other liberation movements. (The feasibility of such aidis attested by the program of the Swedish government which hasan on-going assistance program to liberation movements and in
in kindTfo^h
1972
.
Wl11 contribute to the PAIGC 1,750,000 kronerm d or umanitarian or educational purposes.)
i
11 ' 7’hat the United States government welcome theleaders of the PAIGC and other liberation movements for visits
leaders
C°Untry and that United States officials meet with such
That the United States support multilateral and/orbilateral programs of humanitarian support to the liberation
movements, through the provision of educational and reading
materials, as well as medical supplies, to people in theliberated areas and to refugees.
13. That all investment-incentive programs of the Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in, and for, the
Portuguese territories be terminated and that the United States
Government adopt an affirmative policy proscribing OPIC pro-
grams for the minority-ruled areas of Africa.
14. That the United States government must be required
and is herein called upon, to explain the enormous, unprece-
dented and anomalous commitments which the United States is
making to Portugal in connection with the Azores Agreement.
(The Agreement expires on February 3, 1974.
)
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On February 18, 1972, the State Department replied to
the Action Manifesto by first recognizing that Portugal and
76 Ibid., pp. 177-179.
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its African territories represented a classic case of con-
flicting U.S. interests and the problems and limitations
lmposed^on the U.S. government by the policies of another
State. The State Department contended that all military
assistance to Portugal, about $1 million a year, is designed
to enable Portugal to fulfill its responsibilities under NATO.
(Point 1 of the Manifesto)
. "The use of the Azores base is
indispensable to U.S. security interests, not only for anti-
submarine warfare in the North Atlantic, but also to enhance
this Nation's ability to deal with crises in the Mediterranean
and the Near Eastern areas." 78 As to the economic assistance
the United States has provided Portugal, the State Department
did not view this aid to be military in nature. Whatever
little assistance the U.S. has provided is exclusively in
grant money. "The $400 million figure for Ex-Im Bank credits
represents the global value of a number of development projects
the Portuguese government has under consideration for con-
struction of bridges, railroad facilities, roads, schools, et
cetera, in Metropolitan Portugal." 79 The Secretary argued that
RelationI
7D
n
V
g
d
nl
Ab ®hlr®' Assistant Secretary for Congressionals, UJLS ._Pepartment of State
, (February 18, 1972), p. 184
7 8
.
*i?id ' P- 184 - Secretary Abshire's reply carried an
^nc
1
?
lt
4-H
ntentl0n °n the Part of the state Department to study
^ S
lY
-*
he po -lnts ln the Action Manifesto. The Secretary found
,r
e Manifesto to be a comprehensive document which provided
ought-provoking ideas regarding virtually all aspects of U.S.
relations with Southern Africa.
79 Ibid
.
,
p. 184. The State Department claimed there
was no evidence to support allegations that U.S. arms supplied
since 1961 have been used by Portugal in her African territories
The State Department was convinced that suspension of military
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an m-a. Ban* financing is intended to help us
_ ^ and
compete for contracts and as such is designed to
improve the U.S. balance-of-payitlents situation by fostering
U.S. exports. 80 Apparently, a key criteriQn ^
of such export loans involves the ability of the foreign state
to repay. Portugal's credit rating was estimated as good.
The State Department reply ended with the U.S. Govern-
ment's reiteration that with regard to U.S. policy on Portu-
gal's African territories it has been made clear that the time
colonialism is past and that self-determination holds the
only hope for a viable long-range Portuguese relationship
with these territories. "We have repeatedly urged the need
for peaceful negotiations to explore ways in which progress
can be made toward this goal and toward the economic, social,
and political advancement of the peoples of the African ter-
ii 8
1
ritories
.
On March 20, 22, and April 6, 1973, hearings were held
by the House Subcommittee on Africa concerning the "Implemen-
tation of the U.S. Arms Embargo against Portugal and South
Africa." Mr. Bruce J. Oudes, a freelance journalist who has
written extensively and authoritatively on U.S. foreign policy
sales to Portugal would degrade the Portuguese ability to carryinto NATO responsibilities but would have little effect on
1971
U9
p
eS
427°
llCieS ln Africa
’ See Hearings
,
op. cit
. ,
June 2,
80
Ibid .
, p. 184.
81 Ibid.
,
p. 184.
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testimony d,.U
.ttt ». „i„a st„„ —„go^Portugal and South Africa.
It was Mr. Oudes contention that there is not the samepolitical will under the Nixon Administration to enforce these
embargoes as there was under the Kennedy and Johnson Admin-
istrations. Yet, it is also true, according to Mr. Oudes,
that these embargoes have become firmly established in the
Popular mind as the cornerstones of ,s. policy toward Portu-
gal and South Africa. Mr. Oudes expressed his suspicion that
after a long gestation period, ”„e are now getting near the
point where the narrowing of the arms embargoes is reaching
significant dimension. " 83 it was at this point that Mr. Oudes
asked for both Congressional support for and administrative
cooperation in making available to the American public the
guidelines and the precedents that the United States follows
in determining what can and what cannot be exported to South
Africa and to Portugal for use in Africa. 84
Mr. Oudes argued that in numerous policy statements
at the United Nations Security Council, the Nixon administration
8 2u
-
s * Congress, House, "Implementation of the U.S.(A9ainst Portugal and South Africa and Related
^
S
-i i -
eari ni3 s before the Subcommittee on Africa 93rdCong., 1st sess.
, MaTch zu r 22; April 6, '1973, p. 5.
8
3
Ibid
.
,
p. 5.
84 Ibid
.
,
p. 5.
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to define portugai,s
—
-—
- -u ones
th I 960
3,1 ^ COl°nlal ^ natUrS: ^ °PSrative definition of1 s. Portugal remains the Qniy noncontiguQus sQvere
entity in the world which claims fcQ span ^
_if one defines civil confilxct as not constituting war, as the
ministration has done, then one can make statements to the
affect that there ar.e no more wars in the world; which is ju8t
what the Administration has done in the wake of the Vietnam
Once you do that in an era in which the empha-
ses is on exports, you can promote exports to places like Por-
tuguese Africa even though this constitutes what independent
observers would have to call tt cu.S. commercial participation in
the Portuguese pacification program." 86
Mr. Oudes went on to show that in the 1960s, including
the first year of the Nixon Administration, the United States
refused to permit the Export-Import Bank to back the bids of
American firms which sought to participate in the construction
and equipping of the Cabora Bassa Dam. Although American firms
were not denied permission to bid, without the baching of U.S.
Government credit facilities they had no chance of winning,
since firms in several European countries had government
backing for their bids. 87
85 Ibid
. , P. 5.
86 Ibid.
, P- 7.
87 Ibid
. , P- 7 . On
o iT
y ^irican Affairs, testified before the Afri-can Subcommittee that: "The Export-Import Bank advises that a
181
The apparent premise behind U.S. Government policy
that it should not, m any way, assist Portugal to make
internal role in Africa a reality. This situa-
taon, according to Mr. Oudes, soon changed. The state Depart-
ment declassified from its munitions controls two varieties of
herbicides with potential military application, and U.S. her-
exports to South Africa and Portuguese Africa rose
matically. The Cabora Bassa Dam administration was per-
mitted to buy two small U.S. helicoDt^r-Q 4-~ :n i copters to improve transpor-
tation between the dam site and coastal towns. 89
Then in the fall of 1973, through the Portuguese press
and Marches^rropi^, a French publication specialising in
economic questions in Africa, Mr. Oudes discovered that the
United States was permitting the sale of aircraft, (Aero-
Commanders) manufactured by Rockwell International to Portugal
for use in Mozambique. The first sale included three eight-
seaters, called the Shrike-Commander, and one turboprop,
pressurized version capable of easy adaptation to precision
aerial photography. Rockwell officials were quoted as saying
that they are negotiating for the sale of four more. 90
search of its records since 1964 does not reveal
of aircraft sales to Mozambique prior to 1972."
p . 155
.
any support
See Hearings
,
88 Ibid
.
, p. 7.
89 Ibid
.
,
p. 7.
9 0 Ibid., p. 28. Mr. Oudes informed the Committee that
aV^e beginning of 1973, he learned from the same Portugueseand French media of the sale of a dozen Bell helicopters to
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Mr. Oudes then reported about a trip made by Mr. Clark
MacGregor, who headed the President's re-election campaign to
northern Mozambique right after the Presidential election for
What Mr. MacGregor described in a Beira press conference as
an "agreeable and different" holiday. 91 Mr. MacGregor met the
Portuguese commander. General Arriage, and toured, by aircraft
presumably, »me of the Portuguese-held contnunities in northern
Mozambique. Mr. MacGregor, according to Mr. Oudes, had
become a vice president (at this time) of United Aircraft.
"That firm produces Sikorsky helicopters, and it is only natural
to assume United Aircraft has its eyes on doing business in
Portuguese Africa." 93
Basing his information on Pentagon sources, Mr. Oudes
noted that the Pentagon budget for United States training of
Portuguese military personnel had doubled during the Nixon
years. Oudes pointed out that: "Pentagon sources disclosed
Mozambique. Mr. Rauer H. Meyer, Director of the Office of
<
r??
tro1
' Department of Commerce, appearing as a witnessefore this committee stated: "Our licensing policy is toapprove export licenses for aircraft to civil end users forcivii end use in either Portugal or South Africa. Our policyis to deny exports of most U.S. civil aircraft destined to
military consignees for both areas. This applies also to
exports of U.S. components for use in foreign-made aircraftfor military use."
Ibid
.
,
p. 28. Diario de Noticias (Portugal)
,
Novem-ber 10, 1972, p. 10, reported that "Minister Caetano as an
admirer and a friend" congratulated President Nixon on his
re-election and expressed the desire to Mr. MacGregor that the
relations between our two countries remain as cordial as theyhave during the last few years."
92 Ibid
.
,
p. 28.
98° Ibid
.
,
p. 28.
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United States trained a total of eighty-three Por-
tuguese Air Force officers during fiscal years 1971 and i 972
,
a tenfold jump over the average of the previous seven years.
Pentagon sources disclosed that among the training being
offered Portuguese military personnel in the United States was
precision photography. Chairman Diggs raised the question of
"whether these Portuguese personnel received their training in
U.S. Aero-Commanders ’ " Mr-
'
* 0udes responded that "he had no
hard information on that." 95
Mrs. Jennifer Davis, an economist and the research
director of the American Committee on Africa, in a prepared
statement delivered before the committee (subcommittee)
,
stated: "That there are innumerable areas in which the U.S.
supply of equipment might be interpreted as contributing toward
strengthening military capabilities in Portuguese Africa." 96
Mrs. Davis claimed that on the basis of investigative
research conducted by her committee it was discovered that
94 Ibid
.
,
P. 9.
95 Ibid. P. 9.
96 Ibid
.
,
P. 9.
stated -"Our cnmmhi comml«ee and quoting from the same sourceso mittee investigations have revealed some lightaircraft-
-one equipped for photo reconnaissance—and a helicopterwere sold by North American Rockwell to a private airline com-pany based m Northern Mozambique." See Hearings
,
March 29,/3, p. 79. Company representatives, when approached by Mrs.
committee, said that the sale had been to Transportas
? .
C
°^e5
ClaS/ a Mozambican private company. Mrs. Davis
stated: This is a company of which no previous trace can befound, and given the nature of northern Mozambique it is mostlikely that this company's best customer will be the Portuguese
military
•
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various U.S. corporations have been heavily involved in sup-
Plying computers to the minority white regimes of Southern
IBM in particular was cited as being a major contribu-
tor to the military in Portugal. Honeywell has reportedly
equipped the "Portuguese Air Force" and the Portuguese
"General
Aeronautical Workshops" with computers. ITT operating both
in South Africa and in Portuguese controlled Africa as well
as in Portugal has provided both equipment and expert knowledge
for the stabilization of complex and sophisticated communica-
tions systems "which are essential for the maintenance of these
white regimes.
The major thrust of Mrs. Davis- comments centered on
the growing awareness of South Africa and Portugal on the
importance not only of local and regional alliances but of
increasingly close international alliances which, in the end,
will link them to the interests of the Western Powers. Elab-
orating on the already existing relation of Portugal with NATO
Mrs. Davis noted the significance of the links between Portu-
gal and Brazil which have involved incipient steps towards
building a new regional alliance in Southern Africa. 98
97 Ibid.
, p. 83.
98 -i
Nfarpni
' p
:
84 * Expanding on what she considered to beATO s complicity m Portuguese colonialism, Mrs. Davis pointedto an event m the autumn of 1972 in which NATO parliamentarians
meeting m Bonn, Germany approved a report emphasizing the needto protect "the shipping lanes between the Indian Ocean and theSouthern Atlantic, vital to the European NATO countries." The
report stated that: "Portugal, as a member of NATO, should bein a position to make available its facilities on the Azores,the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira and the Cape route, if NATO
should request it."
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Mrs. Davis concluded by calling upon the subcommittee
"to move the Foreign Affairs Committee and Congress to see to
it that the United States Government and its people do not
provide military planes and other military know-how to these
Southern African apartheid nations; that foreign capital which
goes into south Africa or Portuguese Africa's arms industry
should be cut off. " 9 9 a good place for the United States to
start would be: "that special training should not be offered
to military and police officers from Portugal and South Africa;
and that spare parts and repairs should not be supplied to
maintain equipment sent prior to the embargo; all items suit-
able for both military and civilian use should be embargoed,
and rn particular motor vehicles and light aircraft should be
included
.
Mr. Diggs as chairman of the subcommittee summarized
the findings of the committee's hearings by noting, first,
"a great unwillingness on the part of all Government agencies
to admit responsibility for foreign policy." Congressman
Diggs charged each of these agencies with "buck-passing,"
saying, in effect, that: "it is not and should not be necessary
for the committee to emphasize the gravity of what we consider
to be an evasion of responsibility by agencies that are con-
cerned with this issue, especially in the question of the arms
embargo and various military contracts with the minority regimes
"ibid.
,
p. 85 .
100 Ibid
.
,
p. 85
.
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in Southern Africa c ...Secondly, the chairman found what
the committee considers to be a ..D massxve" erosion of the
Principles established during the 1960s, with significant
sales of equipment
, aircraft, herbicides, even crop-spraying
aircraft, "to the South African and/or Portuguese military,
especially in an emergency Pl .v
. Furthermore, the committee
was informed that "the United states is spending no less than
a million dollars every year on training Portuguese military
personnel, and that there iq no+- ^s not even a formal restriction on
these personnel using their training in the African „ars." 10 3
Chairman Diggs explicated on the persistent reports of our
Government "exchanging intelligence information with the
minority regimes in Southern Africa." He spoke of "contacts"
between U.S. counter-insurgency instructors and the Portuguese
-^Hearings
, April 6
, 1973, p. 137 .
1
0
2 . ,
a-f • ^
Ibid
.
, p. 147. Assistant Secretary of stat-pAfrican Affairs, David Newsom expressed his concern beforeis committee, of the tendency throughout the hearinqs to
wi?h
e
respect to^h/ar"9®
5
k”
U ' S ' p°licies have taken placeo t e arms embargo and to suggest a level ofsupport to the military efforts of South Af?!ca and Portugal
by the facts
1
"
"? !^p
News°m 's VleW: " are n0t subatantia?edu n t . I believe," stated the Secretary "it is deerrom the statements of witnesses to date that the'united Statesas not supplied since the imposition of these embargoes anyarms or equipment of a strictly military character 9 i£
Y
isalso pertinent to point out that the arms and mSt^ ^ip-
country w°f th<T depend are suPP lied not from thisbut from Europe ..."
103 Ibid., p. 147.
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ry, calls by U.S. vessels at Mozambique and Angolan
ports, a visit to Mozambique by a group from the U.S. War
College, and numerous official visits of u.s. diplomatic per-
sonnel to the war zones of Mozambique " 104 r n o ay ‘ I order to parry
any criticism of conjecture on his part, the chairman empha-
sised that all of the above
..have been reported officially
whrle many other contacts are alleged to be taking place./
Conclusion
On December 17, 1972, Congressman Diggs resigned
from the United States delegation to the United Nations to
protest the United States policy toward Black Africa. The
Michigan Democrat became the first member of an American dele-
gation ever to resign in such protest and, not surprisingly,
was subject to both rounds of criticism and praise for his
action. Diggs had objected to a series of United Nations
votes in which the United States opposed resolutions critical
of South Africa's apartheid policy, or abstained from the
voting, and to the Nixon Administration's policy decisions
concerning Portuguese Africa. The turning point for Diggs
came when the United States announced some $436 million in
economic credits to Portugal in return for continued use of
bases in the Azores. Diggs felt that this money would be used
by Portugal to wage war against the Black peoples of her
104 Ibid
.
, p. 138.
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colonies
. More than for its dramatic first> ^ Diggs^nation is noteworthy because of his positions as ex-chairman
of the Congressional Black Caucus and of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee's subcommittee on Africa.
But at present there are growing signs in the United
thcit the i"h tii
~
t rust of concerned attention to Africa is about
to take a dramatic upturn in the latter 1970s. Africa's
emergence as an important political issue in the United States,
beyond the superficial manifestation of Afro-hairdos and
dashikis, is already apparent.
One of the most significant indicators of this new
thrust of concern for Africa is in the United States Congress,
where the Black Caucus, comprised of the thirteen Black mem-
bers of the House of Representatives, has begun to move on
African affairs as well as on issues of domestic significance.
When the Caucus met with President Nixon in March 1972 and
presented him with a sixty-point program on behalf of the
nation's twenty-four million Blacks, a vital but generally
less publicized segment of that program dealt with foreign
affairs; and it was Africa that dominated the Caucus' foreign
policy discussions.
Among the Caucus recommendations to President Nixon
were aid programs comparable to the Marshall Plan that provided
massive assistance to Europe following World War II, a review
of all U.S. policies in regard to Africa, and lastly, the
recommendation that the United States direct at least one
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percent of its annual gross national product for international
ard, with priority attention to Black African nations
.
It is Significant that such proposals were made by
Black members of Congress wielding influence among Blacks not
only in their local districts, but throughout the nation as
well. Also, these proposals may possibly reflect the views
Of more than three-hundred million Blacks in Africa north
and south of the Sahara and have the support of others who also
feel strongly that Africa's turn is long overdue.
There is another equally, if not more
, important
factor: for the first time the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee's subcommittee on Africa is chaired by a Black, Represen-
tative Diggs, and has other Blacks among its membership: Ron
Dellums (D-Calif.), Robert Nix (D-Pa.,. However, Diggs is
the key person. At forty-nine, he has been in Congress longer
than any other Black currently serving. Elected in 1954 at
the age of thirty-two, he is dean of the Michigan delegation,
has been a member of the House Foreign Affairs Democratic Com-
mittee since 1959 and chairman of its subcommittee on Africa
since 1970.
Representative Diggs feels that Africa has been at the
bottom of the list with respect to the strategic interests of
the United States. For this reason he finds it difficult to
talk about priorities for Africa in concrete terms. Above all,
he very much wants to see those members of Congress who have
developed reputations for their civil rights activities also
become activists in the area of African interests. Unfortunately,
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past, this interest has not been transferred to African
problems
. one reason may be that the men who respond to domes _
trc crvrl rxghts issues do so beoause they have a large Black
constituency who pressure them in these matters, but not in
respect to Africa.
other hand. Congressional documents do indicate
that Congressmen are attendina. c namg an increasing number of con-
ferences on Africa, and the larger group of Black members are
obviously focusing their attention on African affairs. As an
example. Senator Edward Brooke (R-Mass.) went to Africa
(southern, in 1969, and, on his return, delivered a scathing
attack on racism in Southern Africa. Representatives John
Conyers (D-Mich.) and Louis Stokes (D-Ohio) also went to
Mozambique and Angola and later to Nigeria (at the same time
as Muskie and the late Whitney M. Young, Jr.) to attend the
African-American Dialogues sponsored by the African-American
Institute and the Ford Foundation.
Throughout the 1970s Portugal will be, by any yard-
stick, the keystone in a credible United States policy in
Southern Africa. Chairman Diggs' Black Congressional Caucus
has recommended policies that would in effect impose an
escalating quarantine of Portugal until the time the Lisbon
government negotiates a settlement with the African insurgents.
If need be, the Black Caucus would call for suspension of
Portugal's membership in NATO.
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Less extreme Congressional spokesmen maintain that
indeed the United States has a duty to itself as a nation
committed to the principle of self-determination to make our
views known to the Portuguese government in no uncertain
terms. However, as a friend of African independence and
peaceful development, and as an ally of Portugal, these Con-
gressmen feel that all diplomatic efforts must be made to
persuade Portugal to change her colonial policies.
If Portugal refuses to end her colonial policies in
Africa, the Congress, and especially the Executive Branch,
may be confronted with a hard choice between our treaty with
Portugal and our interests in the peaceful development of
nations bent on self-determination in Africa.
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chapter v
EXTRA-GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS
AFRO-AMERICAN PRESSURES
A definite link exists between domestic and foreign
policies
. Since part of the process of foreign policy formu-
lation is the consideration of the perspectives and interests
of significant groups within American society, the examina-
tion of Afro-American views on United States foreign policy
towards Africa becomes an important area of concern. To
analyze Afro-American perspectives of United States foreign
policy towards Africa, one should examine the realities of
Afro-American existence in the United States.
The question of powerlessness is reflected in the
paucity of Afro-Americans in positions of power and influence
m American society in spite of their large number.
1
A state
of negative racial attitudes exists within interpersonal,
intergroup and interstate relations on the domestic front.
This attitude is reflected in foreign policy; therefore, it
is logical to conclude that Afro-Americans without power to
effect change within race-conscious American society, are
also without power to effect change in international race
relations .
^
_
1Gerald Pomper
, "Afro-American and U.S. Government,"
iif^Piess?^ OTlTlir - 8 Checks^nd^inu^ (Glencoe: The
2 Ibid
• r p. 5
.
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In recent years some Blacks have come to a clear
understanding of the nature of racial politics and its impli-
catrons for domestic and international relationships between
^ ^ s o.ric3. Whit^c; ^ a+- +- i_
.
At ^ lnternational level, the realiza-
tion is only incipient. Until recent] v u,Y ' the role American
Blacks have played, although slight, in the formulation of
American foreign policy, has revealed little appreciation of
the racial factor. Professors Edward Browne and Henry Clarke
have noted that much Black involvement has represented an
unconscious support of continued white dominance at the expense
of black and brown peoples, particularly in Africa and the
Caribbean. In general, "concerned Blacks outside of the for-
mal processes of O.S. foreign policy have had only a slight
awareness of the meaning of U.S. foreign policy for black and
brown peoples of the world."
^
As a result of persistent racial discrimination in
education and housing patterns, Afro-Americans are prevented
from receiving quality education and acquiring skills that
are necessary to success in a modern technological society.
The limited access to education explains, partially, the
(January
3
!^)! Mli^Regort, vol. 14, no. 1
Negro’s
Browne and Henry Clarke, "The American
p_
P ' fnca Today
,
vol. 14, no. 1 (January 1967),
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exclusion of Afro-Americans from sig„i ficant participation
" thS Vari°US in the public and private sectors .5
This fact is important when realizing how influential certain
professions are in government policy-making. i„ particular,
the legal profession has historically provided access to
government leaders and governmental processes. Of the 300,000
lawyers in the United States, only 3,000 are Black.* There_
fore. Blacks lack the experience as lawyers and lobbyists
that is essential in formulating governmental policy. 7 The
few that are employed by the State Department concentrate on
implementation of existing policies in Africa, rather than in
formulation of new ones .
®
How, then, do Black Americans gain access to foreign
policy-making? Black Americans recognize that they cannot
fully entrust their interests to white policy-makers. How-
ever, because the United States operates as a power-broker
system, it is the white affluent broker who is recognized in
circles of power that influence policy decisions. Therefore,
violence and political disruption 9 on the part of the Afro-
5 Ibid.
,
p. 18.
6Ibid
.
,
p. 58 .
9 Ibid.
,
p. 58.
g
^oss Baker, "Toward a New Constituency For A MoreActive American Foreign Policy for Africa," presented at the
ourteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association,Denver, November 3-6, 1971, p. 17. See also Gerald Pomper,
op. cit
.
,
p. 7. ^ '
9There are those who argue that in order to gain accessto domestic policy processes. Black America had to resort to
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American would only alienate non.Black constituencies which
otherwise would support Black participation in foreign policy-
making. Blacks are very much aware that 'white hyphenated
Americans" came to wield great influence with respect to their
mother countries .
"
Another set of factors which must be taken into con-
sideration when discussing Afro-American and United States
foreign policy towards Africa is the historical concern that
Afro-Americans have demonstrated for Africa. To ignore this
interest is to conclude incorrectlv +-uuLui iy that the concern of Afro-
Americans with Africa is rpppnf +.ece t and transitory. The relation-
Ship IS "new" only in the sense that increasing numbers of
Afro-Americans have the opportunity to express their true
feelings to the vast majority of American society. The danger
Of ignoring the historical importance of this concern is that
policy-makers may miscalculate the domestic impact of policies
toward Africa.
A brief overview of the historical interest of Afro-
Americans in Africa includes the following points: (1) The
debates surrounding proposals to colonize parts of Africa
with free men of color during the 19th century represented
one of the first attempts of African slaves to resolve their
open conflict, civil disobedience and street violence
* L<
f
MeHe s article, "Race, International Relations,
oreign p°liCy , and The African Liberation Struggle,"
of Black Studies, vol
. 3, no. 1 (September 1972), pp.deals with this theme. ^
Tilden
U.S
.
Journal
95-98,
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sense of dual identity; (2) Thg doctring ^
design" represents a second aspect of historical concern
This doctrine maintained that God in his wisdom had permitted
a number of Africans to be enslaved so that they might be
brought to the New World to be Christianised and civilised
and once having received the blessings of the New World, these
Africans would then return to redeem Africa, it is important
to note that such a doctrine was one of the pillars upon which
the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, the African
Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Negro Baptist Church built
their missionary movements and activities on the continent.
The founding of schools and churches in Africa were examples
of the implementation of providential design; 10
( 3 ) Paralleling
the concept of providential design was a secular version which
attempted to find a more constructive and pragmatic relation-
ship between Africans and Afro-Americans. The Hampton-Tuskegee
approach, best expressed by Booker T. Washington, provided the
basis for new contacts with Africa. 1 ! The underlying assump-
tions were that a program of practical education, Christian
ethics and accommodative race relations would be the most
.
1
^
S
^* clair Drake, "Negro Americans and the AfricaInterest, The_American Negro Reference Book , ed. John P.
Pp
V1
101-108
eW°°d CllffS
'
New JerseY : Prentice-Hall, 1966),
„ . ,
^August Meier, Negro Thought in America, 1880-191 St
gacial Ideologie s in the^ge of Booker T. Washington (Ann
—
Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1963), p. 38
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ao t
a" eff6CtiVe W
- - civili“ «rica; (4) The
rineS ° f Pan-MriCaniS" emphasizing the solidarity gnd
rr freed°m °f MrlCanS SVeryWhere anothercontact and concern between Africans and Afro-
Americans
. The necessity of Africans ^^ ^ ^
ew World to develop trade and cooperation to fight racialdiscrimination and the denigration of the African heritage
-re the maj or components or ob.ectives of this po i icy during
e atter part of the 19th century and the first part of the
century; (5, The Universal Negro improvement Association
founded by Marcus Garvey during the 19 20s represents perhaps
the most ambitious and expensive effort to connect the
aspirations and future of Afro-Americans with Africans. The
widespread support of the Garvey movement and the call for
immigration indicate the depth nfP ° the c°ncern of Afro-Americans
for Africa during this period. 12
There are, then, sufficient historical data to illus-
trate that substantial common interest has existed for some
time between Afro-Americans and Africa. The following com-
ments made in 1896 by Bishop H. M. Turner of the A.M.E. Church
about the relationships of Blacks in North America to Africa
Sent (California^Ramparts'piefb^ 1°^
.
and The BI,rwV "*™--
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demonstrate the deep feelinoq o-fP - gs f some American Blacks even
at that time:
1 Relieve two or three mi l l i „.c
to the land of our ancestors and eaLblishV^™
^r^rieh^^Xn^L^of6 ^°^her
but build up social conditions peL^f^^
; .13
It was a result of Turner’s interest that contact was
established with South Africa. After maintaining correspon-
dence with members of the Ethiopian Church and facilitating
its incorporation into the A.M.E. Church in 1896, Turner went
to South Africa in 1898 to consummate the union
.
14
Other instances of American Blacks living and working
in Southern Africa during this period could be cited. Even
more significant than the actual presence of Black Americans
in various parts of Southern Africa is the impact which the
existence of Blacks in North America has had on the history of
that area. The presence of a large number of their brothers
in the United States was well-known, even in the rural vil-
lages. Information disseminated was that: "It was popularly
believed at various times and in various places that Blacks in
America were going to organize themselves to come and drive
*-3h. m. Turner
land," Africa and the
(Atlanta': n.p., 18 96),
,
"The American Negro and the Father-
American Negro
, ed. J.W.E. Bowen
p. 10 .
14 Ibid.
,
p. 12.
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out the Europeans. In at least one instance it was even
preached that everybody in America was Black." 15
It must be remembered, however, that Black American
interest and concern with Africa has never been as strong as
that displayed by other American ethnic and racial groups
towards their native countries. Even the nationalist fervor
of American peoples for Black independence after the Second
World War failed to arouse much general sympathy among Black
Americans. Blacks, however, who did express sympathy for
African nationalists became a pivotal group within the African
foreign policy constituency. Prominent in this constituency
were religious groups, which have long maintained an interest
m Africa beyond missionary work and relief. 16 Both the
United Church of Christ and the World Council of Churches
have taken strong stands on African questions generally, but
most notably are those dealing with South Africa and Portu-
guese Africa. Professor Eric Lincoln feels that, "If this
essentially humanitarian concern were politicized even mar-
ginally, a numerical ly-significant group would be created
which might have the power to alter significantly the substance
of American foreign policy toward Africa.
15L. j
- Cappin, Unwritten Historv (New York: Norrr-nUniversity Press, 1968)
, p. 136.
1
6
. .
Eric C. Lincoln, op . cit
.
,
p. 57. These associa-tions contain member churches who have traditionally supported
missionary efforts, medical missions, famine relief, hospitalsand other charitable institutions.
17
.
These sentiments also resulted in the establishment
of organizations such as the American Society for African
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Although the growth potential of m,-F xx-nti i this group of con-
cerned Black Americans is qreat if C ug , its heretofore low level ofinfluence has been linked to its social, economic and politi-
cal exclusiveness. Nowhere can the 1±nk between ^
profile of a domestic groUp and the degree of influence of
policy be seen as clearly as in the case of American Blacks
and the United States, policy toward Africa.
The majority of organisations, schools of thought and
activities focusing on the relationship of Afro-Americans and
Africa and U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, have their roots
in these historical factors. indeed many of the most effective
lobbies trace their activity directly to the positions out-
lined above.
Until 1970, the only organizational effort by Black
Americans to influence U.S. policy toward Africa was evident
in the American Negro Leadership Conference (ANLC) on Africa. 18
A federation of largely Black American civil rights, religious
and fraternal organizations, the Conference never went beyond
two national meetings (1962 and 1964), which produced state-
ments of concern about U.S. policy in Africa. 18 The ANLC
Sack
r
int^?
AC
l
”^
iCh al
i
owed for literary exchange among™ llectua:is in the U.S., Africa, and Europe. See
se, op. cit., for a full treatment of this subject.
„
18Plden J ‘ LeMel le / "Black Americans and ForeignPolicy, Africa Today
,
vol. 18, no. 4 (October 1971), p. 20.
19 Ibid
.
, p. 20.
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attempted to speak for a concerned Blank au c American community
but, according to critics, with the exception of Keverend
'
Martrn L. Krng, its membership was hardly one with which the
masses of Blacks could easily identify.- After the assassi-
natron of President John F. Kennedy, who had established the
organization
, the potential of ANLC faded, becoming merely a
paper organization. As Professor LeMelle writes, "its
failure was grounded in an assumption on the part of
its members that they could wield influence in foreign policy
by virtue of their own national prestige. But they had no
real power in American society." 21
Although the ANLC failed, its critics within the
post-1966 Black Power Movement were not effective in influ-
encing United States policy toward Africa either. To be
sure, the Black Power Movement has created a greater Black
awareness of Africa, but it has yet to mobilize the Black
American masses around foreign policy issues. 22 its greatest
achievement has been to bring some of the old Black leader-
ship and younger Blacks concerned with Africa to a common
understanding that new approaches must be sought to change
the course of U.S. relations with Africa. The Black Power
Movement has united Black citizens of all classes and
20 Ibid
.
,
P- •o(N
21 Ibid
. P. 21.
22 Ibid
.
,
P* 21.
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ideological persuasions in the thought that a now e iy n p erful and
continued endeavor is nni, ^the only solution for involvement of
Black Americans in United States policy towards Africa.
The Washington Task Force on African Affairs, a pre-
dominantly Black organization situated in Washington, o.c.,
essentially a local structure purporting to make South
Africa its primary area of concern. The Task Force, since
its founding in November, 1969, aims to assist in the develop-
ment Of a broadly-based constituency for Africa in the United
States, and to ensure prominent roles for Black leaders in
participating in that organization.
A volunteer group, the Task Force was intended to
function chiefly as a broad-based organization within the
District of Columbia. The Task Force embraced individuals
and groups having an active interest in Africa and U.S.
foreign policy towards Africa.” Prior to the November, 1972
elections, the Task Force worked with Congress and other
organizations to include African issues in respective party
platforms. The first African-American National Conference
on Africa held at Howard University on May 25-26, 1972,
sponsored by the Congressional Black Caucus under the leader-
ship of Representative Charles Diggs, was part of this under-
vol
.
t issue
,
A Quarterly Journal
III, no. 4 (Winter 1973), p. 43
of Africanist Opinion,
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taking. In addition, the Task Force has hbeen conducting
monthly panel discussions with tonic,l n Pl s ranging from the
emergence of Black Studies tn65 o the relevance of mass commun-
ications to African Affairs, 25 aS well as U q e^ n .S. foreign policy
regarding Africa. Although Africa has been
_ ^ ^^ization main focal points, the Task Force has actually
extended beyond Southern African issues. it feels that it is
important in terms of constituency development to broaden out
because if there is going to be any meaningful constituency
developed concerning Southern Africa, it must first be con-
cerned with general interest in Africa.
Another mainly Black American organisation concerned
with U.S. foreign relations with Southern Africa is the
Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa. A number of grad-
uate students and faculty interested in Southern Africa organ-
ized at the University of Wisconsin in 1970. Their first
step was to begin with an attempt to elect political change in
the Wisconsin area, then to gain an impact on the political
processes within the United States and Africa, and finally
center on the politics of Southern Africa. 26
24 Ibid
.
,
P- 44.
25 Ibid
. P- 44.
26 Ibid
.
,
P- 46.
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A basic assumption of Committee members was that to
effect change in Southern Africa, they must rely on the u S
congress because it is the branch of government with the
least amount of pressure from economic interests. 2 ’ They
felt that the Executive departments, especially state and
Commerce, were more receptive to pressure from powerful
economic groups with
, interests in Southern Africa. I„ order
to influence Congress, it was important to focus on community
leaders and congressmen to articulate the desires of the
_
Zogroup
.
The Committee claims that one of its more important
activities is fund-raising. It uses the money mainly to sup-
port liberation movements, and secondly to perpetuate the
organization itself. it boasts of raising considerable sums
for FRELIMO 1 s Mozambique Institute and its educational and
refugee work. The Committee is satisfied that these activities
demonstrate the value and sincerity of the movement. 29
The Committee for a Free Mozambique (CFM) was organ-
ized in 1970 in New York City with the twin goal of providing
material support to FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front)
2
7
Ibid.
,
p. 46.
2 8
nc S'
46 * The anti “corporate and the informationcampaig s of the Committee did not seek to change the policyof corporations but to educate the leaders of the community
who have some influence, some power to exert vis-a-vis theCongress
.
2
9
Ibid.
,
p. 46.
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and opposing u.S. government and corporate backing for „Por_
tuguese colonialism... The Comrnittee has no ^ 8taff and
relies on a volunteer working coaanittee to carry out its
programs. 0
The committee's first priority is to raise funds to
assist the representative of FRELIMO to the United Nations.
In addition, the Committee makes available pamphlets on
FRELIMO and the liberation struggle in Mozambique. Besides
engaging in periodic demonstrations at the Portuguese tourist
office in New York and the U.S. mission to the United Nations,
the Committee's impact on government policies toward Portu-
guese Africa have been negligible.
Perhaps the most vital Afro-American pressure group
operating in the United States today is the Black Radical
Caucus, a spinoff from the highly prestigious, but white
dominated, African Studies Association. The Black Radical
Caucus claims the support of a majority of Black scholars and
other Blacks in openly opposing what they refer to as "U.S.
imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.
"
3 1 The
30 Ibid
.
,
p. 46.
^ in
*
' P* 47. At the 197 0 ASA meeting in Los AncrelesHard R Johnson, a black candidate for a position on the ASA
i?ical°actin
eCt°r
,
S
n
challe^ed the Association to take up pol-on in the struggle to liberate South Africa andPortuguese Africa. Declaring that the ASA record was "dismal
to the realities of imperialism, foreign intrusiond military suppression ..." See an address by Willard R.Johnson before the ASA Convention in Los Angeles, California,
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Radical Caucus also insists on a legitimate study of policy
questions and a firmer stand on South Africa and Portuguese
Africa, which they claim the ASA had neglected in the past.
The argument most loudly propounded against the ASA
by the Black caucus still remains the political one: As an
academic organization, ASA should not take sides on political
issues. The political issues referred to, of course, are the
ones raised at ASA conventions since 1970 relating to D.s.
foreign relations with the "white supremacy regimes in Southern
Africa and to the struggle for independence, on the part of
colonials, in Portuguese Africa." The Black Caucus charges
that "Aside from the fact that some leading members of ASA
(undoubtedly with the knowledge of the ASA leadership) have
contracted with U.S. government agencies to do classified and
publicly restricted research in Africa, the political argument
is refuted by the very nature of ASA. "
^
One does not have to be in total agreement with the
statement above to understand that the ASA is not just a pro-
fessional association. Its leaders perform other functions
that directly or indirectly affect the lives and livelihood of
Africans and Afro-American scholars and students. Its annual
meeting serves to bring together government officials, jour-
nalists, publishers, foundation representatives, businessmen,
32LeMelle
,
op. cit
.
,
p. 20.
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scholars
, students and members of voluntary associatiQns
r
6 DObS
'
-
-Hatton ate reviewed
and exchanged. Its members are scholars v.whose research not
only determines or influences the image of Africa in Americabut also reveals the kind and scope of much of the written
documentation available about the continent. fls Professor
Hercheile Challenor has observed:
"Research completed by the
members of the ASA has provided background material for United
States foreign policy decisions in Africa." 33
One positive result of the controversy concerning the
role of the African Studies Association has been the formation
of the Committee on Current Issues, by the Board of Directors
of the ASA. as an attempt at compromise between the ASA and
the Radical Black Caucus, the Committee decided that its pur-
pose should be to promote public awareness and discussion of
issues that involve the role and responsibilities of the
United States in regard to Africa. In other words, the Com-
mittee hoped to bring scholarship and public opinion on Africa
to bear more directly upon the formation of public policies.
To this end, the Committee created a number of panels
to investigate the role and responsibilities of the United
States in relation to Rhodesia, South Africa and Portuguese
33Herchelle Challenor, "No Longer At Ease," AfricaToda^, vol. 16, nos. 5 and 6
, p. 5.
-
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Africa. At the same time, the Committee would provide for
increased participation of Blacks on each of the panels. 34
in addition to the organization of panels, the Com-
mittee on current Issues decided upon several educational and
informational activities: two in particular . 35 First, the
Committee would establish a program for the
-retrieval and
republication" of materials which involve current issues.
These materials would be inexpensive and available in bulk
for classroom and other public uses. Also, the Committee would
establish a subcommittee to take responsibility for informing
members of the ASA about upcoming governmental activities,
hearings in Congress, hearings at the U.N. and other pertinent
action. 36 The committee worked at establishing a mechanism
for transmitting any information that may affect decisions at
the Congressional level. In 1971, for example, a task force
was set up calling for Congressional investigations of such
matters as the alleged use of American supplied weapons by
Portugal against insurgents in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-
Bissau. 37 Mr. Richard Sklar, Chairman of the Committee,
T
Richard Sklar, Chairman of the Committee on Current
*!' ^-
nu
f l ^
eetlng of the African Studies Association,November 4, 1971, Annual Meeting Papers, pp. 5-8.
35 Ibid
.
,
P. 5.
36 Ibid
. P- 5.
37 Ibid
.
,
P* 8.
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reminded the membership that: "The involvement of a few
Africanists in executive branch deliberations in the past has
not brought about the v-i^a
.
f 3°vernmental policies concerning
rica that an informed public would demand." 38
Professor Goler T. Butcher, a member of the Committee
on Current Issues, expressed his pleasure at being part of a
Committee
"designed to identify current issues retiring pub-
llC n°tlCe • • • and t0 k"ow different approaches to
American policies are being examined publicly and that var-
ious positions are being disseminated." 39
Mr. Butcher alluded to the time he accompanied
Congressman Diggs (identified earlier) on a fact-finding mis-
sion to Portuguese Africa and South Africa: "This trip demon-
strated the need for a complete revamping of the foreign
policy of the United States toward these areas. u.S. policy
pronouncements of abhorrence of apartheid and colonialism are
accompanied by too many actions of complicity with apartheid;
U.S. policy towards the Portuguese areas accepts the myth
that the Portuguese are not racists." 40
Mr. Butcher expressed the hope that through the Com-
mittee "public awareness, and public discussion will eliminate
38 Ibid.
,
p. 8.
3 9
c . , .
Goler T. Butcher, staff consultant of the Africanu les Association to the House Subcommittee on Africa U SHouse of Representatives, statement made to the African SadiesAssociation, November, 1971, ASA papers, pp. 13-17.
^di
4 ° Ibid
.
,
p. 14.
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many ° f the P°UCy contradictions
" outlined above.
..More-
over, informed public opinion can play a determining part in
the shaping of u.S. interests in these areas. This is being
demonstrated by the anxiety with which business and military
interests are reacting to the almost weekly increase in the
number of groups seeking the facts on tt c •y r U.S. involvement in
ortuguese Africa and in Southern Africa."^
There is total agreement among the members of the
Committee with the remarks of one of its members. Professor
C. Sylvester Whitaker, when he stated that: "Underlying the
formation of this Committee is the notion that the Committee
must work with the realisation that of all the potential,
ve, effective, political clienteles within the broad
American spectrum, the Black community represents the greatest
potential interest in U.S. foreign policies as they affect
African affairs and African issues." 42 in order to work
toward this objective. Professor Whitaker suggested that con-
cerned members of the Committee constitute themselves as a
brain trust" and operate closely with the Congressional
- .
Ibid., p. 14. Another good example of the imnart-of enlightened public opinion on American overseas policv
fiaht
W
?
en
ih
en
c
t0r Edward Kennedy led a liberal Democrat Partyg m t e Senate to discourage the adoption of the Bvrd YAmendment to the Military Procurement Bill (October 1971)hich would have lifted the ban on trade with Rhodesia.
Syivester Whitaker, Statement to the AfricanStudies Association, November 1971. See ASA papers, p. 3.
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"Black Caucus, " thus enabling concerned congress.en to relate
to their colleagues the urgency and importance and relevance
of various measures affecting Southern Africa.
«
The 1972 Presidential Election campaign was to serve
as a unique opportunity for discussion of the emerging crisis
in Southern Africa and for the exploration of useful u.S.
responses to that crisis. Richard Sklar, Chairman of the
Committee, was authorised by the Committee to appoint a sub-
committee to plan such an effort for the election campaign.
The work of the subcommittee was to be referred to as
"Politics '72.
"
44
Politics ? 72
" was to be viewed as an educational
effort. The subcommittee did not endorse, promote, or favor
any political party or any candidate for office. Professor
Leo Cefkin spoke for the committee when he said: "The mission
of educating through the provision of information to the
American electorate falls within the purview of the African
Studies Association." 45
In referring to the struggles for national liberation
being waged by Africans in Portuguese Africa, Namibia, and
4
3
Ibid
.
,
p. 3.
44 See statement by J. Leo Cefkin in Issue, vol. II.
no. 1 (Spring 1972)
,
p. 1.
45 Ibid
.
,
p. 1.
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Rhodesia, Cefkin contended that these independent movements
"are justified and merit the understanding and support of u S
foreign policy ,'<6 „ 0ur aim t . tQ
_ parties ^
for national office in that direction
.
.
. we see the „PoU .
tics -72" as a center for harmonising the interests of members
who want and who are opposed to apartheid, minority rule,
colonialism, exploitation and oppression. We would iike
' to
see U.S. foreign policy work in support of-not against-
African liberation .
"
4>7
The failure of the Subcommittee (Politics ’72) to
get a strongly-worded statement in either of the Democratic
or Republican party platforms in 1972 moved many black repre-
sentatives in the House to reveal the almost total American
disinterest in African affairs. One of the Committee's sig-
nificant contributions took place at one of George McGovern's
fund-raising cocktail parties. Members of the Committee asked
McGovern about his policy vis-a-vis the $400-plus million
Export-Import loan to Portugal. On the basis of that con-
frontation, apparently, McGovern produced a position paper
4 6 Ibid., p. 7 . The task of gaining a plank in thenational party platforms presented problems of a specific
an
f
large, party platforms are written in advancethe national convention. They are superficially debatedat the national convention and rarely altered there.
47 See Patricia C. Gloster, "Africans and Black Amer-icans: Dialogue or Monologue," African Progress, vol. I . nn 7(June 1972), pp. 26-27.
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saying that he would withdraw aid to Portugal. 40
The Congressional Black Canon* „ucus, m a statement to the
President of the United States, made the following suggestions
With the purpose of increasing African participation in pro-
grams which would lead to the advancement of both Africa and
Black America. It called for an adjustment of national
priorities away from enormous military expenditures and to-
wards much needed domestic programs, such as "economic secur-
ity and economic development, community and urban development,
j stice and civil rights, and many other unfulfilled inter-
ests of the Black community
.
It was noted that "Europe, Japan, Latin America and
the Middle East have all been the recipients of massive U.S.
aid for building and re-building and stated they felt Africa's
turn is overdue." 50 it was argued that Africa now must be
given priority and attention on an equal basis with other
parts of the world. 51
The Black Congressional Caucus concluded by stipulating
the following demands
:
1. All military aid to
the Nixon $435 million deal
be cancelled.
Portugal should be stopped and
for unneeded Azores bases should
48Cefkin
,
op. cit . f p. 3.
49Gloster
,
op. cit . y p. 26.
50 Ibid.
, p. 26
.
5
1
See J. Leo Cefkin, "Southern Africa and The 1972Election Campaign," Africa Today
,
vol. 19, no. 3 (Summer 1972),
p • o 2 •
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2. U.N. sanctions aqainst t-hp i 1
zlSI
racial totalit^ t0 the
ment should act firmly to press n q k‘ •
Th U * S
!
9overn-
Africa and Portuguese Africa ?n
businesses ln South
fnll „ n , .r, . ^r to take measures for
The“—
5 • No D.S. company or its subsidiary should be oiven
countrie S°of^Africa T** ^ t0 «hite-minority-rulld
With specific respect to Portugal, the open letter
proposed that the United States stop "the military aid which
enables it to suppress its colonies in Africa, and discourage
private U.S. investment in Portugal.
Lastly, the Caucus called for Black Americans to
mobilize support for the Black Caucus in Congress, the Ad
Hoc Committee of Afro-Americans concerned about U.S. policy
in Africa, and the African Studies Association. At the same
time, "we need to know what the thinking of Africans seems to
be on these pronouncements. We should be apprised of their
recommendations to make lobbying for increased international
aid for Africa as effective as possible." 54
52 Ibid
. ,
p. 62
.
53 Ibid
.
,
p. 62
54Gloster, op. cit
.
,
p. 27.
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clear, as this chapter has demonstrated, that
until recently Afro-American interest in, and identification
with, Africa has been limited and isolated. The work of the
Congressional Black Caucus, the African Studies Association,
and a handful of other Black organizations, all made up mainly
of Black intellectuals, have had an important impact on Amer-
ican foreign policy formulation toward Africa; however, they
have had little impact on the mass of American Blacks.
The reality of the matter is that, according to
Philip w. Quigg, there are only five identifiable constituen-
cies in the United States which for better or worse take an
active interest in Africa. Quigg defines them as follows;
"first, the professional Africanists, academic and professional,
they are liberal, well-informed and fairly influential; second,
black Americans whose increasing interest in Africa has tended
to be cultural and tied up in the questions of identity with
a view of the problems of the continent restricted to the
relatively well-educated; third, the humanitarian, missionary-
oriented middle-American who gives money to clothe and cate-
chize native children; fourth, the self-declared apolitical
businessman; and fifth, (presumably the opposite of the first)
are the apartheid enthusiasts, partisans of Rhodesia, old
supporters of Katanga secession, who are as vocal in the ad-
vocacy of white supremacy as the first group is in its support
of independent black status ." 55
55 .Philip W. Quigg, "The Changing American View of
Africa," Africa Report
,
vol. 14, no. 1 (January 1969), pp. 8-9.
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It goes without saying that each of these constituen-ts perceives African affairs in somewhat different ways
and the intensity of their effect varies as does its contin-
uity and duration. Professor Quigg tells us that for each
group a certain set of preferences exist as to the nature and
content of a more dynamic African policy and what the notion
of greater involvement means. 56 The focus within ^
the various groups, moreover, may be found to be quite dis-
parate and the degrees of sophistication reveal considerable
variance. The particular area of investigation varies appre-
ciably from group to group. "it is probably unrealistic to
assume that these groups which constitute Africa's constituency
m the United States could be aggregated for the purpose of
forging a single new dynamic policy for Africa." 57 The
cleavage lines on issues, intensity, geographic focus, and
overall political preferences are such that a policy based on
the combined interests of all five would probably be meaning-
less. " 58
As an illustration of the above. Professor Baker looks
at the question of colonialism and "white supremacy." Accor-
dingly, the professional Africanist and "apartheid enthusiasts"
5
6
Ibid
.
,
p. 8.
57See Ross K. Baker, "Towards A New Constituency ForA More Active American Foreign Policy for Africa," op cit
p. 4 . * '
58 Ibid.
,
p. 4.
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both regard the colonialism issue as having relatively high
importance but each group has a different policy orientation
other, with the former group favoring decolonisation
and the latter being supportive of residual colonial power
or white-ruled regimes. Accordingly,
"the establishment of a
constituency joining these two groups on the issue of colon-
ialism in Southern Africa would be infeasible." 59 Overall
orientation, then, becomes an important element in
"the forging of a constituency and the nature of the consti-
tuency would have to be refined by the addition of an orienta-
tion variable." 66
It is necessary, according to Professor Baker, to pair
the overall orientations of the various groups with "discreet
issues" in order to determine those questions which could draw
together the largest feasible constituency . 61 For example,
"the overall political orientation of all five constituencies
might not induce cleavages in a coalition of these groups
when advocating a program of mass innoculation against small-
pox or a program of water treatment to eliminate schisto-
somiasis." 62 Mr. Baker contends that the sole area in which
^ 6 Ibid.
, p. 5.
60 Ibid.
,
P. 5.
61 Ibid. P* 6.
ueveiupment might also receive the support of fou^or more of the groups. But it can be seen that the areas ofconvergence of let us say, three or more groups on matters
unrelated to health or infra-structure are likely to be
minimal." J
6
2
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,
p. 6.
all groups would
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neutral h
P * 17 h& ln a9reement is the
"politically-
'
-1—fa
-spiritual area
, in „hlch
e™ of black^ who advo.
r r
turai ties with Africa <s—^ numer -US of the constituency groups) would prevail. "63
On an issue such as colonialism. Baker sees the Afri-
can constituency breaking down almost totally. The policy
ferences of individual groups on other
"politica ily-chargedissues" would very likelv rpquHy esult in considerable division of
opinion wh.011 XobbvinrrO ying for government policies in these areas. 64
The points at which AmpriVa'c 7\ ^men e c s African policy can be
influenced by all or part of the constituency are generally
four in number: Congress, the state Department, the Presidency,
and to a lesser extent the National Security Council. To be
sure, those points of influence have within them African con-
stituencies which process, modify, and articulate the demands
of the "pressure group" in a fashion "harmonious with their
own operations and predispositions.
.
."65
President Kennedy was himself a "professional Afri-
CanlSt " bY the stan<Jards Professor Baker establishes. Members
63 Ibid
.
,
p. 6.
were limitlr^an/f
” If th® ran
?e of governmental options
groups it is utJt ^ running high among competinggr^r^d emerg^ SOme P°Ucy Which ^se,3 single
65
Ibid
.
, p. 7.
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of Congress such as Congressmen Brazier, Diggs
, Morse
, an(J
others are also not only recipients of constituent pressures
but originators of policy suggestions. Likewise, "old Africa
hands" at the State Department often have their own well-
developed ideas and policy preferences t-f «F^ibrence . if one accepts the
proposition that it is lik^iw +-k^+. i_uely that the orientation of the
President will cau^p ’nim kse mm to be more attentive to appeals from
some outside constituencies, so a President attuned to cul-
tural or humanitarian appeals might be more inclined to place
policy priority on humanitarian concerns rather than those
of a more controversial political nature.
It then becomes understandable that the most dramatic
upsurge in interest in Africa among black Americans in recent
times has tended to be more cultural than political. Despite
Harold Cruise's admonitions to Blacks to politicize culture,
and Bobby Seals’ stricture in Seize the Time , that "political
power does not grow out of the sleeve of a dashikii," the
prime focus still runs to the cultural. It remains to be seen
whether or not culture can serve as a medium to insure poli-
tical involvement in African affairs. There is evidence that
it can be in the case of the campaign of the black Polaroid
Company workers in Boston and their call for corporate dis-
66
engagement from South Africa, 67
66Cruise, op. cit
.
,
p. 33.
67 ^ ,
.
Robert C. Maynard, "Polaroid's Challenge: Racism
?n-i
J
?
0rall
^
y ' Washington Post
,
Outlook section, January 17,1971, p. 47. J
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Despite the growth potential of black American groupsW1 Str°n9 °UltUral “d Unitarian orientations towards
Africa, the potential for politicizing these groups, and the
enduring qualities of the Professional Africanists, 63 the
tactical advantage still lies clearly with African corporate
interests doing business in Southern Africa, and the supports,
of "white supremacy." i„ Southern Africa. Professor Baker
argues: "They are well-disciplined, well-financed, well-
informed, and disposed to use their influence to shape policy.
In addition, they have the ear and the heart of the Nixon
stration
. In no recent instance has their efficacy beer
as clear as in the joint effort of business interests and
conservative elements to amend the United Nations Participa-
tion Act of 1945 so as to allow the importation of chrome from
Rhodesia in contravention of the U.N. embargo." 69
Conclusion
policies
Any discussion of what would constitute progressive
that the United States ought to adopt towards Africa
68 - .
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ust take into account the traditional or historical split
between Afro-American intellectuals and non-intellectuals
which has been a constant source of conflict and frustration.
that for the moment, those Afro-Americans capable
Of participating in new relationships with Africa are repre-
sentative of the small hut visible number of Afro-Americans
who have benefited from the relaxation of American racial
exclusionary practices in the fields of education and the
professions. Remaining is the vast majority of Afro-Americans
Who have not had the opportunity to take advantage of the
growing contacts between the better educated Afro-Americans
and Africans. The inability to connect the intellectual and
cultural concerns of the "elite" of Afro-Americans with the
aspirations and direction of the majority of Afro-Americans
represents not only the crisis of the Negro intellectual, but
also reflects the frustrations and limitations in developing
3 strong Africa lobby.
Specifically, one might list the following issues as
being components of a forward-looking foreign policy as per-
ceived by Afro-Americans: ( 1 ) The avoidance of outmoded cold
war assumptions. The "logic" of the cold war which has domi-
nated the formulation of American foreign policy at least
since the end of World War II is now irrelevant in the minds
of most Afro-Americans as they do not perceive Communism as
the threat it supposedly offers to the "free world." Poli-
cies towards Africa which are based upon great power rivalry
222
r other forms of the cold war are viewed by Afro-Americans
to be detrimental to Africans who are capable of determining
err own needs and policies;
,2, The second component would
be the economic and social development of African people as
designed by African people. The objective of u.s. poiicy
towards Africa should be one in which the benefits of util-
izing African markets and resources would be shared on an
equitable basis and would be geared as much as possible to-
wards the economic development and self-sufficiency of
Africa.
Another aspect of a favorable foreign policy would
be increased participation of Afro-Americans in the formula-
tion and implementation of American foreign policy. This
would involve increased recruitment of Afro-Americans for
foreign policy positions and improving and upgrading proced
ures within those agencies that are primarily responsible
for American foreign policy towards Africa. In addition,
a task force created in the executive branch comprising the
ranking members of the Departments of state. Commerce, Defense
and other agencies would be created to review in a compre-
hensive manner American foreign policy. Added to such a task
force would be Afro-Americans of recognized expertise on
Africa who are employed in the private sector. It would be
clear that no important policy would be formulated without
continual input from Afro-Americans. Finally, in terms of
participation, ideally there would exist an "African lobby"
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as effective in its work as the "Israeli lobby" in its abil-
ity to influence policy concerning Israel and the Middle East.
Clearly, abstract appeals to right, reason and justice
are not enough. Preferential status for any state or group
of states arises from the articulation of demands by an
authentic interest group. Powerful constituencies both within
government and outside have successfully fostered a "forward
strategy" toward China and the Soviet Union. A "NATO lobby"
sustains and nurtures what is now a largely symbolic mili-
tary alliance. And even the Iron Curtain is not an impedi-
ment to Polish-American groups in their campaign to obtain
favorable trade concessions for Poland. The question, then,
is what are the chances of moving America's Africa policy
off dead-center through the development of a vocal consti-
tuency?
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CHAPTER VI
THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS,
AND PORTUGUESE AFRICA
The United Nations as an outside force, in which the
nations of the world attempt to work out their own individual
and collective foreign policies, has not been a convenient
tool of united States foreign policy. Nevertheless, because
the United States is the most powerful nation in the United
Nations, it has often used that body to multilaterize its own
policies, especially where less-developed countries were con-
cerned. Julius Holmes stated that the United Nations con-
stituted a "stabilizing force" for African nationalism. In
his words:
naPinnSi'
ter
l
* * Provides opportunities for Africantionalism to appeal to world opinion; stabilizina
crea?Is
t
a°framewo
d
k
Na
f
i°nS membershiP uP°n independencete r o responsibility and securitv fornew regimes. Mso it provides the means for peaclfu?olution of disputes, dangers of external attack upon
build-UD for
d
?
rS
’
n
nd a counterweigh t to internal pressureup launching unprofitable projects^
Holmes stated further that the United States was
willing to assist the stabilizing process through financial
support of the United States Export-Import Bank Development
Loan Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance in Africa
. ^ .
lsee Julius Holmes’ speech entitled "The United Statesand Africa: An Official Viewpoint," quoted in the Department
of State Bulletin
,
Vol
. 38, May 26, 1958, p. 859.
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°uth °f thS Sahara
- At leaSt
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-e reasons why the
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States consiaered the
-tions so critical in
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e
t
"
inde“-~ were (1) the possibiUty
rampant nationalism could lead to •ia violence and (2) manv
ZZ T
StatSS WOUld COme tG independencs grossly unpre-
lie slrvi
eXamPle
' ^ 1953
' ”allaCe IrWln
'
- **-
in a
1C
l
at ^ Unlte<3 StatSS M1SSion to the united Nations,
speech at Elmhurst College, referred to Woodrow Wilson'sletum that the fight for liberty must be more than "an insur-gent madness in blood. And. in his discussion Qf ^^lution of emergent nations, he suggested that the word "revo-lution" could mean violence and destruction, and that it was
up to the United States "to see that explosive political
forces of our time are directed into peaceful, constructive
channels. In that effort the United Nations is a real asset. "3
Frederick w. Jandrey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs, contributed to the implication that the
Africa Bureau took much of its early policy direction from the
European Bureau. In a speech at Georgetown University in
March, 1958, he distinguished between United States support
for
''self-determinism" and United States support for national-
ity. Jandrey stated that some dependent territories should
2 Ibid
.
,
P* 878.
3 Ibid
. P- 878.
4 Ibid
. , P- 866.
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not become nations evoking the "dangers of premature inde _
pendence He pointed out that new states were vulnerable
to subjugation and, although independence too long delayed
harmful, he cautioned a policy of evolution toward
independence with thp x.SUb3eCt territory being guided toward
independence by the metropole
.
5
Bloc Politics: Organizing
For Participation
While it is true that the United states has, along
with other developed nations, exercised a controlling influ-
ence in the United Nations, it is also true that this situa-
tion has changed with the increase of new states in the Gen-
Assembly. The following statement by Irwin Wallace shows
the situation as of I960*
of the h ?
wealth. But in practice the leadership
d5n£
big powers in the General Assembly is just as evi-
in the worJdTg
mUCh th® Same patience there as elsewhere
In 1963, Sidney Bailey, scholar on United Nations
affairs, observed that doubling the United Nations membership
made it a more cumbersome body. 7 Earlier, Lincoln Bloomfield
5 Xbid
.
,
p. 868.
-
. „
^^artment of state Bulletin
, Vol . 38, Speech byIrwin Wallace
,
p. 875^ y
7 lj2e_United Nations: A Short Political Guide (NewYork: Praigir^ T963 ) ,157~T77
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had also pointed to the implication
African, but also of the Afro-Asian
tions
.
not only of the increased
group in the United Na-
San Francisco^onference^the'^Af0
-a
CUS * Fr°m 10 at thegrown to 46 and will soon i
r° Asian membership has
were two African spates sou^ofth^1?* Where therenow 20. Add Cuba and Mexico > Sahara, there area numerical majority Add the cd Y comes very close toto 9, plus Yugoslavia and onfv ^ bl°C ' grown from 5make up the crucial aAd decisive"??6 m°f? are needed toblV-8 23 in the General Assem-
The effect of African independence was an erosion ofinfluence and control exercised by the great Western powers
Manor concessions had been made to African representation in
the Security Council and it was clear that the presence of
Africa resulted in substantive emphasis on new African issues
as well as organisational business in the General Assembly
Establishing Political Machinery
African states found very quickly upon entry into the
United Nations that unless they were well-organized, they would
not be effective politically. The first step was the African
Caucusing Group which was formed pursuant to Resolution XI of
the Accra Conference of Independent African States in April,
1958. This agreement, drafted in May, 1958, after the Con-
ference, was signed by the Permanent Representatives to the
(New
8Lincoln Bloomfield
York: Harper and Row,
7 New Diplomacy in the United Nations
1970)
, p. 247.
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United Nations from Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Llbya
, Morocco,
Sudan, Tunisia
, and the United Arab Republic. it provided
for a coordinating body wording through a Secretariat at the
United Nations which would act on matters of common concern to
all African states, making recommendations, and implementing
decisions of the future African eConferences, as well as making
preparatory arrangements for them. 9 For these purposes the
tion established the Informal Permanent Machinery of
the Secretariat.
Although the African Group was the primary caucus,
were others. For example, the Commonwealth caucusing
group dealt informally with Afro-Asian-Anglo matters; the
Afro-Asian group was primarily interested in Middle Eastern
and Northern African problems, within the African continent
by the end of 1960, two primary groupings of states had emerged
which were to be reflected in African politics from time to
time within the United Nations. The "Brazzaville group," as
it came to be called, was composed of the former French ter-
ritories and was a generally more moderate, more Europe-
centered interest group. The "Casablanca group" was smaller
and generally more radical in character (Morocco, Ghana,
Guinea, Mali, Libya, Algeria, United Arab Republic). Until
this time the Afro-Asian states had a rather neutral status
in world affairs.
^Thomas Hovet,
Illinois: Northwestern
Africa In The United Nations (Evanston,
University Press, 1963), p. 79.
Africa Establishing A
Political Posture
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The Bandung Conference ino m 1955 had provided the Afro-
Asxan states with a framework of "neutralism and nonalignment „
as a course to follow in world politic.. Oespite this, at theAccra Conference of Independent African States in April, 1958.the Ghanaians drafted a memorandum which posed the following
questions : "On what pattern are we going to model our foreign
policies-
-isolation ism-
-non-entanglement?" and "Shall „e adopt
an independent course, or sh^n n
' S a11 WG allow ourselves to be caught
up in European affairs when our interests are dissimilar,"
The result of conference deliberations on the questions of
foreign policy was a condemnation of the division of the world
into two competing blocs and African states were urged to fol-
low a policy of nonalignment. 10 other Asian states, such as
India, consciously following the non-violent principles of
Gandhi, also counseled that "neutralism" should be a key in-
gredient of African policy. But African leaders who could not
accept strict neutrality on issues which affected them either
directly or indirectly, opted for "positive neutrality." The
late President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo said in 1961, for
example, "Thus we have chosen to be neutral in all issues con-
cerning world blocs." 11 The same year, Doudou Thiam (former
p. 299.
10 Ibid
.
, p. 31.
Philip Quigg, ed.
,
Africa (New York: Praeger, 1964)
230
Sm.wl , „a hua of t#>
... to ».™ wki onthe United Nations floor:
by
r
the
S
di!fe?ent cSunC"^^^VW° blocs is expressedfully scrutinized. S« speak must =«e-and others of
"non-commitment" p°^ b:lve neutralism"
alignment." what is important of
tlU others of "non-
mula but the reality of inapno's course, is not the for-
avoid using ambig^L Llms SSchT'' ^ mUSt thereforeWhen we speak of Positive Neutralism
6 °Pen tQ criticis ">-
ber that it is impossible to be nel^a^
6^ firSt remem-we have chosen is not a neutral nn^ l'- The course which
attitude, a specific * S ' 11 18 a Politicalproblem of peace. l2
? action, m regard to the
Although Asian and African countries had adopted a
"positive neutrality" doctrine, the United States had a more
difficult time accepting this position. But by the "Year of
Africa" it would achieve acceptance in both the Eisenhower,
and later the Kennedy Administrations. President Eisenhower,
on September 22, 1960, at the opening session of the United
Nations, speaking to the United Nations General Assembly, asked
that all nations respect the African peoples' right to choose
their own way of life and to determine for themselves the
course they choose to follow."^- 3
One major effect of the United Nations anti-colonialism
was to encourage the revolutionary element in the "non-self-
.
b2General Assembly Official Record s, 16th PlenaryMeeting, noT 1012 , September 22, 1961, p. 43.
^
^ ^
13 Public^Papers of the Presidents of the United States
Th^Grpflt- P-
707. AXI^WTidemar NielsoA,g ej3reat Powers and Africa (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 275.lelson s interpretation of this about-face in President Eisen-
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governs territories." As . result
,^
became increasingly subjected to two kinds Qf
_
“ and the other,
^ territQries cont^ ie
-
y revolutionaries, growing agitation by nationalist parties
encouraged and sometimes financed from abroad> ^ ^^
mpnsonment of leaders, and more agitation. in the
Onited Nations, pressure took the form of resolutions against
colonial powers.
It was at this point that Portugal became a member of
the united Nations in 1955. The colonial powers fought tena-
ciously against encroachment by the General Assembly on their
sovereignty in the non-self-governing territories. In the
previous year, however, the Bandung Conference of Asian,
African, and European Communist countries had passed a resolu-
tion condemning colonialism "in all its manifestations" and
declaring that "the subjection of peoples to alien domination
exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human
rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and
is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and coopera-
tion
.
Portugal felt that the United Nations Charter was
being used to hasten decolonization and wanted to avoid this
howei's attitude toward African neutralism and self-determina-tion, coming so late m his administration is tied to the pol-itical vulnerability of his Administration on these issuesduring the election of 1960.
Macmillan!
D
1964)"'pp?
i
6-7?
Se
' SgHnants of EmPire (New York:
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15 DStermined n0t t0 SUbmit t0 the “lienee
: r
° °niai p°wers
' *—
—
d the POSSesslon
y non self-governing territories An i0 l
- 9°la, Mozambique, and
19
h,a
,„tll
Portugal tevlseg lts g0nstieutiotl in 1951 ana reintrQ _
oed the term provinces," a term used prior to 1910. Portu-
gal claimed that these overseas areas could not be considered
non-self-governing territories, since they were part of the
national territory, a unitary state governed by one constitu-te. franco Mogueira, the Portuguese foreign minister, wrote
"this constitution did not recognize the existence within the
nation of non-self-governing territories, and it would be un-
constitutional for some parts of the nation to have one inter-
national status and others a different one. The interpretation
and application of its constitution was a question of each
government alone, and the Portuguese government denied the
United Nations the least competence in the matter." 16 m con-
sequence, the Portuguese did not consider that Chapter XI of
15 Ibid
.
, p. 7.
..
’ * Anti colonialist voices in the United
The Cnf^d
e
M ?
a
?
d m°re numerous than colonialist ones
alicio'
1
?
3 Uons Platform tends to compensate for the nation-
Rv !!»? ,
lack of established diplomatic and propaganda facilitiesBy gaining recognition as parties to an international dispute
tugal "
10
?? mf
1
! T slren9thened in their dealings with Por-'9
•
ust also be remembered that the term "non-self-governing" was not explicitly defined by either the Charter or
anti °cn?
ral
^
ssemb1
^' despite repeated attempts to do so by
- olonial members. y
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the Charter applied to them, and they had no intention of
supplying information as required by Article 7 3e . 17
In the face of this act of defiance, the General Assem-
bly made the first of several attempts to establish a committee
define the obligations of member states under Article 73e.
Through behind-the-scenes negotiations a committee would be
established to study and enumerate "the principles which
should guide members in determining whether or not an obliga-
tion exists to transmit the information called for in Article
73e." 18 on December 12, Resolution 1467 (XIV) was passed by
a 54 to 5 vote, with 15 abstentions.
The twelve Principles, when published as Resolution
1541 (XV) in mid-1960, made a clear case for calling Portugal
to account. 19 The drafting committee had been divided between
administering (Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States)
and nonadministering territories. In the case of territories
geographically separate as well as ethnically or culturally
,. .
Franco Nogueira, The United Nations and Portuaal(London: Sidgwick and Jackson', 1963), p. 78. TtTs a univer-
tence
doctnne that the United Nations has no compe-to discuss the Constitution of member-states. As anorganization of sovereign States, the United Nations must
respect the territorial composition and structure of each of
^
^ ,
member
—states as laid down in the respective Constitution
at the time of its admission. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs.isbon, Portugal Replies in the UnTted Nations . " ImpresensaNacional
, 1970, pp. 5-6.
18
Ibid
.
,
p. 6
.
19See, for example, the speech of the delegate of Iraq,
General Assembly Official Records
,
15th Session, 4th Committee,
1036th meeting, November 4, 1960, p. 1117.
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distinct fro* the "etropole, there was a ..prima facie obu _gation on the part of the administering authority to t
information. •• 20 Th„
r ransnut
re could be no derogation from these
obligations if there were considerations affecting
"the rela-tionship between the metropolitan State and the territory 1cerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the latter in aposition or status of subordination.
.
."21
Portugal rejected both the report of the Committee ofSix and the General Assembly resolution that arose from it and
argued the reasons in a long statement during a debate of the
Fourth (Trusteeship, Committee in the same session of the
General Assembly.
^
The basic argument of Portugal was that its relations
with its overseas territories were regulated by the national
constitution and the United Nations had no authority to dis-
cuss national constitutions; to do so would be flagrant inter-
ferenCe ln the lnternal affairs of member states, which was
20 Ibid
.
, p. 1117.
December 11 ' General Assembly Resolution 1467 (XIX, .
General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV)December 15, 1960. This pha se of the General Assembly's con-
the P?incip£es
e
a^d th T Wi fh ^ overwhelmin9 approval of
(six in Afrirs) ,
® speci ic enumeration of nine territories
information
Portugal had an obligation to transmit
and Srnor? 3 ' Angola ' Mozambique, Goa, Macao
235
expressly forbidden by Article 2(7, of the Charter « Pur
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^
administering powers
to Which of their territories the Declaration inChapter XI applied and on which they were win; ,
. ^
Y Wlllmg to transmit
“ ormation
. "For the General Assembly to assume that function
" tG P°rtUgal WaS * clear case of discrimination. -24
The correct interpretation of Chapter XI, in the
Portuguese view, could be arrived at only by examining the
Chapter within the context of the Charter. it could then be
that there were no provisions for international
supervision in Chapter IX and X (on international economic and
social cooperation, and Chapter XI. According to Dr. Nogueira
this made it clear that the latter had a different character.
He has argued:
and administer the international truo*
1 " order to apply
had established the Trusteffhi^Vfrusteeship system, it
been created for th^ c„cf ^
unci l- But no organ had
fnn'oc 1 it e SYStem of non-self-governing terri-
Charter fad fot "T" “at aS re^s this s?s?lm Se
part of tte U^teHSs " Tn'tt™ °n the
“Sifs f?™Ulate“dations,^ Sarfe^r-duties
,
to assume given responsibilities
. . . But
23Nogueira
,
op. cit . # p. 82.
24
tainea <„ ? Article reads, in part, as follows: "Nothing con-
tions to i f
S presei
?
t Charter shall authorize the United Na-ntervene in matters which are essentially within thedomestic [jurisdiction of any state or shall requirl tfe mem-
Charter .
n
Ubmit such natters to settlement under the present
236
nothing even remotely similar- i o inof the non-self
-governing torritor
110^ f°r in the caseUnited Nations concerning the 1 ' The role of thetended to be passive.
.
9
25
latter was evidently in-
Portugal troubles at the United Nations before I960
were rnsrgnif
i
cant compared with those ^^^ ^serrous to Portugal was the develops in the United Nations
of the idea that a
..colonial situation., is, in itself, an
aggression that automatically condemns the adrainistering power
-d justifies any action taken against it. Pepeated attests
were made by the Afro-Asians to have the Security Council
declare the situation in the Portuguese provinces a "threat to
peace." Were this done, it would be possible to apply
Chapter VII of the Charter, which provides for sanctions and,
in the last resort, military action against the offender. 27
The Assembly was at this point firmly in the control
Of a growi ng anti-colonial majority. Only nine states (includ-
gal, Dr.
2
Franco
P
Nogueirf
a
at
m
the
Minister of Portu-
Committee of the General 'Assembly
, February
1
"? ^ 5??®
F°Urth
•sr&aws,
2 f5 BS =?*= “S24: SSmSOfficial Tol- v f * * See the Security Council^ll||5l_fecord, 1st Year, 1st Session, no. 27~mhMlitTH?r
27
0 -, Q _ or P
‘ 38? * "A similar attempt was made in thecase of Rhodesia at the end of 1965. However, it was the
Chapter VT°r
V
to
nmen
fehat ' inAPri1 ' 1966 - successfully invokedvi 1 justify its oil blockade of Beira." This was
tho
P
^
rst
. instance in the history of the United Nations when
f
Security Council authorized economic sanctions backed by
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ing Portugal and the United States) abstain ar ained—mostly because
of differences over means, not ends-on the maj or Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples. Resolution 1514 was passed by the fifteenth General
Assembly in December I960. The importance of this resolution
as underplayed by the fact that it has become the standard by
which the Assembly judges all colonial matters. it has come
to represent a crucial extension of the United Nations role
in the decolonization process.
^
After a long preamble that concluded by proclaiming
"the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations," the Declara-
tion called for "immediate steps to be taken in trust and non-
self-governing territories that have not yet attained indepen-
dence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of these ter-
ritories, without any conditions or reservations.
.
," 29
James J. Wadsworth, Jr., the United States representa-
tive, gave as the reasons for U.S. abstention that the resolu-
tion remained silent on the contributions of the colonial
powers, including the United States, to the advancement of the
dependent peoples,- that, by insisting on absolute independence,
it ignored the provisions made by the Charter for self-government
within large political units; that the principles would result
in political fragmentation and fly in the face of political and
28Wohlgemuth, op. cit
.
,
p. 12.
29 Ibid
.
, p. 12.
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sconomic reality* f
,
t , that, contrary to the statement of the thirdprinciple, adequate preparation for selft -government was a
matter of elementary prudence- that th
. .
.
~ e keeping demand forthe immediate tranqfpvr °f POWer lgnored need for time in
e progress toward independence; and that, since every ter-
ritory was different, no single timetable could be imposed on
all
.
None of this reasoning persuaded the General Assembly
that "Portugal was not preparing its territories for self-
determination. "32 while the resolution ^ ^ ^
a recommendation, its firm tone foreshadowed, in 1960
, the
increasing militancy of the Assembly with regard to Portugal.
In Africa, with the rise to independence of the Belgian
Congo, "the first flame of African nationalism licked the very
borders of Portugal's richest territory, Angola." 33 By March 15
,
1961, rebellion broke out in Luanda, Angola, to be followed by
increasingly well-organized nationalist resistance in the other
African territories.
I960. —
~
~
ItiQn 1514 (XV)
' December 14,
tional preparedness should never serve nrof ' f .independence." For a full text n? fnf
a pretext for delaying
(December 14, 1960), p 21.
resolution see, A/PV/947
31Wamhouse, op. cit
.
, pp. 6-7, 11-12.
32Abshire and Samuels, op. cit
.
,
p. 379.
33wohlgemuth, op. cit
., p. 13 .
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On the same day, the Security Council met at the
request of its Afro-Asian members tQ ^
“ An9°la
- A resoluti
- introduced by Ceylon, Liberia, and
the united Arab Republic called on Portugal as a matter of
urgency to introduce reforms that would enable the Angolans
to exercise the right to self-determination, and it also pro-
posed the creation of a subcommittee to study conditions in the
territory. Although supported by Russia and the United States,
olution failed, because of abstentions, to obtain the
necessary votes.
^
U.S. support of the resolution came after thorough
consultations between the U.S. delegation to the United Nations
and the Department of State, and after specific approval by the
Secretary of State and President Kennedy. 35 United States
tion up to this point had been one of restraint on colonial
issues; for this reason the United States had abstained from
voting on the declaration of colonialism. Nevertheless, Amer-
ican support of the Security Council resolution was interpreted
a repudiation of the position taken in December I960 by the
outgoing Eisenhower Administration on the question of anti-
colonialism. Essentially the same resolution was subsequently
_
34
^ited_ Nations General Assembly Resolution urn (xv)
.pril 20, 1 9617^ The General Assembly called upon the qovern-ment of Portugal '•to consider urgently the introduction ofmeasures and reforms in Angola for the purpose of the imple-mentation of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)"; decidedto , appoint a subcommittee of five members to conduct such in-quiries concerning Angola as it deemed necessary.
fact that the United States supported this reso-lution is highly significant. It indicated a change of policy
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submitted to the General Assembly, where it wa .
, _
.
y ' s adopted over-
whelmingly, the United States a „„4gain voting in favor.
In the following weeks in public
. ,
oi statements throughout
c
e
M
COUntry
' ASSlStant SSCretary " StatS f°r ^ican **.1™
ennen Williams repeatedly called for Portugal to make
step-by-step preparations for self-determination in its African
The American position was welcomed enthusiastically
Afro-Asian diplomats because it involved a risk of rupture
the impending negotiations with Portugal for continued rightsOf U.S. access to the strategic facilities of thuiti e Azores, which
were due to expire in 1962
.
outbreak of rebellion in Angola on March 15 placed
Portugal in the forefront of U.N. concern, a position that,
along with South Africa and Rhodesia, it has occupied ever
since. The General Assembly has discussed the Portuguese ter-
ritories under two main headings— "The situation in Angola,"
and the Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with
Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations." While Angola
was the only territory where nationalists had resorted to out-
right rebellion, the first issue received the most prominent
treatment; since then, "with the spread of revolution and in-
creasing belief that continued Portuguese rule is the root
ment
e
of
e
Adl!?
election of President Kennedy and the appoint-
"ited Nations!
SOn “ ^ StateS delegate to
36Abshire and Samuels, op. cit.
, p. 382.
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0f thS V1° lenCe
' the general question of Portuguese
" 1Cy " 311 ltS territ°ri
- ^s come to the fore."37 Prom961 ^ 1968
' Sight reS“-—— by the general“ly ' fiVe * the
—‘t* Council
, all critical of Por-gal s overseas policy and demanding radical change. 38 Por -tuga 1 has shown no si cm ^ i9 complying with any of these resolu-tions
.
An account of the debates will indicate the attitudes
adopted at each stage by the major powers. While the Soviet
bloc and the Afro-Asians consistently voted in favor of the
the United States and the United Kingdom—acting
in concert on every occasion but two-sometimes approved,
sometimes disapproved, and sometimes abstained from voting. 38
Following the first General Assembly debate on Angola
on April 20, l 96 i, the Security Council ^ on ^ y ^ ^
consider an Afro-Asian resolution calling on Portugal to
desist from repressive measures" in Angola and to give
every facility to a United Nations subcommittee of five to
investigate the situation in Angola. Opposing the motion, the
Portuguese contested the right of the United Nations to inter-
37Wohlegemuth, op. cit
.
,
p. 13 .
3 8Abshire and Samuels, op
. cit
.
,
p. 380.
frequentlvH^'l'eaae
381 ’ The
.
authors state that abstention "is
like the united Ita^a
nC°n
rs
nlent C°UrSe °pen to a world P°«er
:
,n S ates, with so many ramifications to ifeoreign policy that some are bound to conflict."
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fere and asserted that Portugal was the ^ ^ ^petra tor, of "unbelievable savagery" and:
were aliln-inltigated^n^follow^ recent events in Angola
our borders; secondly, this action bro
la
!k
Prepared outside
wave of terrorism in northern »mni
u
?
ht °n a merciless
peoples were victims of savaao P
°la
f
where peaceful
terrorists—and those peaccfn?
atr°cities committed by
and white; thirdly in
PJ^ l pe°ples Were both black
national community 'shouldT!jjary Justice, the inter-light
—that is, pure terror?^ ^
P°n
^
ventS in their true
causing intimidation chaos ^ S° le purpose ofterritory of a Member State- fn
^
a<
r
tlon and death to the
the Charter and car^vi ^ ourthly, m the light of
similar questions +-vL r
Ut the practice of the u.N. on
With a P?ob?em Sl'intLnarordefr^ "0t °CCUpy itselfState. 40 1 order and security of a Member
After two days of debate, the Security Council adopted the
resolution, softened by a Chilean amendment expressing hope of
a peaceful solution, by 9 votes to 0, with Britain and Prance
abstaining. Two of Portugal's NATO allies, the United states
and Turkey, voted in favor. 4
1
On December 19, 1961, the General Assembly, with U.S.
and British approval, once again condemned Portugal for failing
40
the 96 fiih
statement made by the Representative of Portuqal at56t meeting of the Security Council on June 9 1961ge£U£ity_Council Resolution 4835
, June 9, 1961.'
at v
4
^
Commenting on the debate, Arthur Krock wrote in the^York^nes, June 13, 1961: "The perplexity of the United
United ^
ernment c^eated by the Afro-Asian activity in theNations against the Portuguese in Angola grows out of
?aieo
1G
?
w
^
lch require ^e Kennedy Administration to try simul-
Our fundLie°i-
r
T"
de
-
h°rses galloping in opposite directions,
do^
a amental military alliance in NATO, and its strength,pen greatly on the unity which this government is everurging. Our fundamental diplomatic policy is to demonstrate byvotes m the U.N. and otherwise that the U.S. unreservedly sup-ports movements for the independence of peoples everywhere."Quoted m Abshire and Samuels, op
. cit
.
,
p. 388.
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to comply with Chapter XI of the Charter and "refusinc t
. _
t g o sup-
P y information as required by it "42 _
„
.
Y But
' on this occasion,
debate was overshadowed by India's invasion of Goa on thePrevious day and the fruitless efforts of the Western powersto obtain any support for a "cease-fire," or even an expression
a'"PP'™ 1
' <—11.
— „„„ «*.
mitted several "worried appeals to the Security Council before
the fact, and two hasty Council meetings were held while the
fighting continued. Portugal's failure to obtain any resolu-
tion of support for a cease-fire-., a result of a Soviet veto
and African and Asian opposition-is perhaps the most flagrant
example of what Portugal sees as the United Nations' double
standard of condemning Portugal while condoning the acts of its
opponents." As the Representative of Portugal at the 944th
meeting of the Security Council on March 10, 1961, pointed out:
“sSs ££” “SI S'tS—irs-,2,s™
u?.-s
-1 H;
— j; “ r,r—
ss "**—<- °J KIlc
42
December S^Siral Assembly Resolution 1 699 (XVI) ,
with ChaoS It h tl no?mPllanCe °f tH^vernment oTPortugal
General $?. D“ited Nati°nS "lth
43Wohlegemuth, op. cit . p. 27.
44
goo pnrf
^_Nations_
_General Assembly Resolution 1699 (XVI)See Por1:uguese Representative GaFin * s statement to the 944th
—
meeting of the Security Council on March 10, 1961.
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0n J“Uary 25
' 1962
' the General Assembly re-opened
e guestron of Angola and considered, for the first time, ademand presented by Poland and Bulgaria for sanctions against
• Thrs resolution was rejected in favor of an Afro-Asran resolution that reaffirmed the inalienable right of
-the
Angolan people to self-determination and independence, depre-
the repressive- measures against the people of Angola and
called upon Portuguese authorities to desist from these mea-
sures.- The Assembly decided to continue the Sub _co[mnittee
on the Situation in Angola; and, requested states to use their
influence to secure Portugal's compliance with the present
resolution; more importantly, the Assembly requested "members
and those of the specialized agencies to deny Portugal any
support and assistance which might be used by it for the sup-
pression of the Angolan people. "47
The United States including all the NATO group except
Prance supported the resolution. In a statement before the
General Assembly, Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. Representative to
the United Nations, cautioned the Assembly against the use of
force to effect changes in Angola or any other colonial ter-
ritories
:
January 1
0
°nS General Assemblv Resolution 1742 (XVI)
.
46 Ibid
.
47 Ibid
.
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Our most earnest wish i? fu 3 j.
^o
10
k?
WS should w°rk together to
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. the L Report of the sub-com-forms initiated by the Portn P°rt "otes the announced re-this would seem to reflect so^Se Governra^t in Angola ? .Of Portugal of the nled to fd^r?^63 ?- bY the ^ernmentrealities of the sihla fin ad iust its policies to the
national community. 48
and the °Pini°n of the inter-
According to the Ngwjforkjeraid Tribune
, commenting
on January 26. "Stevenson's warning apparently took account of
two sources of anxiety in the United States and among its
Western allies: the fear that countries of black Africa might
really try to form a military command to intervene on the side
of the Angolan nationalists and the apprehension that the Soviets
mrght send 'volunteers’ to Angola, carrying the seeds of war to
Africa.
"
49
Portugal's response to the resolution in the General
Assembly took the form of a direct attack on the United Nations
Sub-Committee on Angola:
reflects
re
in
r
?t,
f Nations Sub-Committee thus
whrch from the very beginning has characterized Se diacussron of the matter illegitimately conductefin the
4 8
, .
United States-United Nations Press Release 8914
rr
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tmeat
.State Bulletin
, March 5, 1962,PP. J 5 39
.
See also American Foreign Policv- rnrrentDocuments
, 1961, pp. 884- 88b, 889-690.
° Y ~ Lu
49Quoted in Abshire and Samuels, op. cit.
,
p. 382.
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Organization. it is cHrmi-p'
condemn the initiative Lk^by^he^ th! report does notmassacred innocent and defen^T h lnvaders who brutallyreport is based almost whoUv on h Clvilians • • - the
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false charges
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lY eresay allegations and
The Portuguese representative accused the United Na-tions of closing its eves fuy to these and other aberrations. Asan example, he made reference to the time Xndian troops
^berated'. Goa in December 1961 and the fact that this
..Xndian
aggression was condoned by the n mY 6 U ‘ N
- ">a:>°rrty." The failure ofthe Security Council to order a cease «3 -frre in Goa caused Adlai
evenson to declare: "We have witnessed tonight an effort to
rewrite the Charter to sanction the use of force
.
.
. when it
purpose
_ This approach can only lead to chaos ^
to the disintegration of the United Nations. "51
In 1946, the Indian Congress Party took the decision
to annex the Portuguese state of Goa. The Indian Government
called on Portugal to hand over Goa and its dependencies. On
April 12
,
I960, Portugal petitioned the International Court of
Justice on the question of its right to access to the enclaves,
and the Court upheld Portugal's sovereignty over the terri-
t0rlSS and itS right to access to them. The Indian Government
50
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l
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not only did »o t respect this judgment ^ ^ ^ ^
unilaterally declared the annexation of the Portugese enclave!
Without any consultation with the local population, pinally.
on March 14, 1962, the Indian Government declared the annexa-
tion of Goa, Damao and Diu by a unilateral act of its Parlia-
ment, as it had done earlier with Dadra and Nagar Aveli. This
was done without consultation with the populations concerned
and without any reference to Portugal or, for that matter, to
the United Nations. 52
On December 18, 1961, the United Nations Permanent
Representative of Portugal, Vasco Vieira Garin, addressed a
letter to the President of the General Assembly and the Presi-
dent of the Security Council, in which he was moved to say:
meant the General Assembly and^^Se^has since then not only ignored the question of Goa Indits dependencies but has actually prevented its discus-sion m the General Assembly. in order to do this ithas resorted to a subterfuge, which consists in allegingat, in a certain committee report, Goa and its deoen-9
SdiaTunfon"
50" 11^ 33 ''-tionally 'united" with thfIndian Unio
... . the United Nations, basing itself on
in ^
and entlrely arbitrary phrase (nationally united)a mere committee report, tries to condone an act of
oi its own
e
ciartefi
a
!
e
?
ti0n °f ^ fundame"tal Principles
53
i
. ^
he relevant documents on the case of Goa have beenpublished by the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in aWhite Paper comprising four volumes entitled "Vinte Anos deDefesa do Estado Portugues da India."
53
p. 274.
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, op. cit ..
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When the matter of the Portuguese territories was next
-sea, at the ena of the U.N. Ceneral Assembly went
even further than it had in the past. A resolutions* paSsea
on December 14, condemned the attitude of Portugal as
inconsistent with the United Nations Charter; reaffirmed the
inalienable right of the peoples of the territories under For-
tuguese administration to <^ifP 0 sel -(^etermination and independence;
urged the Portuguese government to: recognize immediately the
right of the peoples of the territories to self-determination
and independence; cease immediately all acts of repression and
Withdraw all military and other forces at present employed for
that purpose; promulgate an unconditional political amnesty
and establish conditions that would allow the free functioning
of political parties within and outside the territories with a
view to the transfer of power to political institutions freely
elected and representative of the peoples; and grant indepen-
dence immediately thereafter to all the territories in accor-
dance with the aspirations of the peoples. The resolution fur-
ther requested all states to refrain from offering assistance
to the Portuguese government, and to take all measures to pre-
vent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the
Portuguese government; and requested the Security Council, in
54 -
December
General Assembly Resolution 1807 (XVII )
,
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the event of noncompliance with the resolution, „ tQ ^ ^
appropriate measures to secure compliance." 55
This was the first time since the opening of thedebate that the United States and Britain both defied the
majority by recording a negative vote; they repeated the per-
formance a few days later when a further resolution. 55 relating
cally to Angola, requested the Security Council to take
all appropriate measures,
"including sanctions, to obtain
Portugal s compliance." 57 one can conclude that it was the
demand for sanctions, hinted at in the first resolution and
explicitly stated in the second, that led the United States
and Britain to object. Once again the General Assembly re-
affirmed the inalienable right of the people of Angola to self-
determination and independence and supported their demand for
immediate independence. The General Assembly requested the
seven agaiHi^being
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Is Portugal's policy in its provinces in Africaial threat to international peace and security?
250
Security Council to take appropriate measures, including
sanctions, to secure Portugal's compliance with the present
resolution and with the previous resolutions of the Assembly
^ 1
1
— 58and the Council.
In July, 1963, the Security Council, at the request of
thirty-two African states, met again to discuss the Portuguese
territories and to hear a delegation representing the OAU.
meeting was also attended by Portuguese Foreign Minister
Nogueira, who rejected all accusations against Portugal, and
went on to attribute the trouble in Angola to "a vast network
of foreign interests, ranging from governments, political par-
ties and even business enterprises, endeavouring to disturb
the peace in Angola." 59 The Portuguese Foreign Minister went
on to invite African Governments to "send their qualified
representatives or leaders whom they might name to see for
5 8General Assembly Resolution 1819, expressed th<-
of^heYhf ”g“°«l.to implement the provision!
counfri P Q
C aration on the granting of independence to colonial
15^4
a
£
d PeoPle s contained in General Assembly Resolution1 (XV) of December 14, 1960, and its refusal to implementResolutions 1542 (XV) of December 15, 1960, 1603 (XV) ofpnl 20, 1961, 1654 (XVI) of November 27, 1961 and 1742 (XVI)™ nTy a30 ' 1962 ' "Constitute a source'of international ’
peace and
a
security?"
33 WSl1 35 3 Seri°US threat t0 world
.
Statement made by the Representative of Portugal(Foreign Minister Dr. Franco Nogueira) at the 1042nd meeting
of the Security Council on July 24, 1963, quoted in PortugalReplies m the United Nations
, pp. 3 47, 354 .
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themselves the conditions in the Portuguese overseas terri-
a" to examine f°r
and^
Y Ch haS n°thin9 in with what has been de-
scribed here by some ." 60
to
lnVltatl°n
' like a similar one subsequently made
ecretary-General, WaS refused
- The meeting ended with
- e adoption of a resolution^ by 8 votes to 0
, „ith ^
United States and the United Kingdom abstaining. The Security
Council rejected Portugal's claim that its territories are
overseas provinces of the metropole; determined that the
situation in the territories was seriously disturbing peace
and security in Africa; called upon Portugal to recognize the
rlght °f PSOPleS ° f ltS territories to self-determination and
independence
; requested all states to refrain from offering the
Portuguese government any assistance which would enable it to
continue its repression of the peoples of the territories and
to take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and
military equipment for this purpose to the Portuguese govern-
ment. As part of a Security Council resolution, the last demand
was mandatory, even on countries that abstained from voting
for it .
"
62
60 t , . ,Ibid.
,
p. 354.
61
Security Council Resolution 5380
, July 31, 1963.
62 Ibid
.
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United States Ambassador Adlai F Q+-
, ,
i E * Stevenson explainedthe U.S. abstention on the basisn that the resolution wasdrafted "in either- 9 gS °r f°rm best ^lculated to achieve
° rSSUltS Whi°h W6 311 SSek 33 quickly and as harmoniously
as possible
. .
.
. while the United States^^^
provisions of the resolution just adopted, we do
agree with much of the substance of the resolution and have
from the very infancy of our republic believed in the princi-
ple of self-determination of peoples.
.
. . We firmly believe
that the developments we all want can be achieved and can only
e achieved in an orderly, peaceful manner and without further
violence and suffering on both sides ^- as a consequence of such
negotiations conducted in good faith ." 63
AS to that portion of the resolution calling upon mem-
ber states to refrain from the sale or the supply of arms and
military equipment to Portugal, Ambassador Stevenson reminded
the Council of the United States' longstanding policy of pro-
viding no arms or military equipment to Portugal for use in
its territories. Mr. Stevenson concluded with the expressed
hope that other states would exercise a similar restraint,
avoiding actions of any kind which could further increase the
qr a).„.=
“statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, United
of Vo?e ln
r
?he
n
poriu
e
' ^ ^ SeCUrity Council, In ExplanationP t guese Territories Resolution (United States
uL ? Nations , Press Release no . 423~2
~
,
July 31,
PP 307 308
°
-
partment of State Bulletin
. August 19, 1963,
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™ fully „assure that the solution will w •
means . 64
90 throu9h peaceful
^December, 1963, the General Assembly adopted a
reso utron by 91 to 2 (Portugal and Spain against, with
abstentions, including the United states and the United
Kingdom, again renting the Security Council to take action
this time to give effect t„e o its own decisions of July. The
Council met on December 11 and, in a new resolution^ (passedby 10 to 0 with France abstaining) called on members to com-
ply with its July resolution. It reguested the Secretary-
General to promote negotiations with Portugal and report back
in six months. 67
The following day the New York Times reported that
"African delegates welcomed the fact that the United States and
Britain, which abstained on the July 31 resolution, voted for
it today. "68
64
1963.
65
1963.
66
i
67.
68,
P-
Genera^ Assembly Resolution 1913 (xvttt, December 3,
Security Council Resolution 5480 (XXII,
. December 11,
Ibid
.
See New York Times
, December 12, 1963, p. 27.
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The December 11 Spmrif,,
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ecurity Council Resolution was met bya blistering attack by the Port,,™y uguese representative at the
1083rd meeting of the Security Council. Foreign Minister Dr
Franco Nogueira criticised the Security Council for failing todeal with problems "which do affect peace and security, or
which may affect peace and security in the world." 69
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A few weeks before the meeting of the Security Council,
African delegates to the International Conference of Public
Education at Geneva had walked out as a protest against the
presence of the Portuguese. This was the beginning of a cam-
paign designed to exclude Portugal from participating in any
agencies of the United Nations and other international organ-
izations. This was followed by Portugal's explusion from the
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in 1963. About
eighty delegations (of the Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs) walked
_
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United Nations Trade and Development Conference in
April 7
, 1964, in protest against Portugal when its
delegate began to speak. The adoption of a resolution in^1965, by the executive committee of UNESCO, barred Portugal
from taking part in the International Conference of Public
Education and the International Conference on Illiteracy. Dur-
ing the 19th World Health Assembly in May, 1966, Portugal's
right to participate in the Regional Committee for Africa and
in the regional activities was suspended. 71
In 1964
, the General Assembly was paralyzed by a dis-
pute over the question of payment for vt peace-keeping operations,
and most of its time was occupied in maneuvers to prevent the
Union, as the chief defaulter, from being expelled from
the organization. The United Nations Committee on Colonialism
adopted a resolution by a vote of 20 to 0, with four absten-
tions (Australia, Britain, Italy and the United States) urging
Portugal to comply with previous U.N. resolutions on granting
independence to its overseas African territories, and calling
for a study by the United Nations of foreign economic interests
in those territories which may be "impeding" the granting of
independence. The Manchester Guardian reported that "...
during the current debate much has been made, particularly by
the Soviet representatives, of the activities of British, Amer-
ican, and West German business interests in Portuguese Africa.
71World Health Organization, Press Release WP/31,May 27, 1966, p. 4. ” -
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These
, it was suqcrestpd , •e , are maklng fabulous profits underpresent regime and have an active interest in
, , preventing theindependence of the territories . "72
On July 21, 1964, the Organization of African Unity
“°pl“ ““>“*<» up„„
....
"h° “ “ '‘ r“ay a°” “ “ „atrade relations with- Pnrfimni ,W th o tugal and South Africa and to refuse
them the use of African airports and harbors. A second reso-lution urged all oil producing countries in North Africa and
the Middle East to refuse oil hipments to Portugal and South
Africa
.
' J
With the exceptions stated above, discussion of the
rtuguese territories had to wait for the summer of 1965
when the U.N, Committee on Colonialism (Committee of Twenty-
Four) visited Africa, and received delegations and petitions
from thirteen nationalist parties from the Portuguese terri-
tories. seven were Angolan, three were from Mozambique, one
was from Portuguese Guinea, one was from the Cape Verde Islands,
and was one from Sao Tome e Principe. At its final session,
the Committee, by 18 votes to 2 (United States and United King-
dom) with three abstentions (Australia, Denmark and Italy)
7 Manchester Guardian
, July 3, 1964, pp. 12-14.
July 22,
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adopted a resolution74 criticizing the NATO countries for
thexr alleged support of Portugal and calling once again for
sanctions. Ambassador Stevenson of the United States, while
observing that he could not accept the Portuguese view that
"self-determination meant the agreement and consent of the
Population to a certain political structure, type of state,
and administrative organization," said that the United States
was against violent solutions and still believed in persuasion.
The British representative, who had been under fire over Rho-
desia, took the same line.^~*
The Portuguese representative directed his comments
that portion of the resolution criticizing NATO countries
for supporting Portugal:
tions or
n<?t sUpplying any armaments, any muni-
o^side^hr^^aphlcL^L^? 1 .^ ^ir6 Lr USS-facture and supply 93 percent of our own military 'require-ments and needs.
. . and what is more the accusing delega-tions seem to be thinking in terms of vast minify 9
caII? 7
g°
nS ln largS areas
' which is certainly not the
This was the prelude to a new drive against Portugal
during the 1965 session of the General Assembly. In November,
7 4 . ,
Tllri p lf) 1^ ted Natlons Document A/AC 109/124 and Corr. 1,
75 Ibid
.
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Earlier on May 7, 1965, Senegal had requested aUnited Nations Security Council to consider the
, p. 394.
meeting of the
"repeated vio-
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however
, the Security Council rejected an AtAfro-Asian demand
ror an economic boycott nf .of Portugal, and the United states
and ^United Kingdom both abstained from voting on the reso-
u lon finally adopted. The Security council, ending
ays of debate on the Portuguese territories, passed a resolu .ion 7-0, with Britain, Prance, the Netherlands and the United
States abstaining, asking "all states to refrain from q£
Portugal any assistance which would enable it to continue its
repression of the people of the territories under its admin-
istration." The resolution also ashed all states to take the
necessary measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and
military equipment and materials for the manufacture and main-
tenance of arms and ammunition to be used in the territory. 78
Having failed to obtain a vote for sanctions in the
rity Council, the Afro-Asians made another bid in the
Assembly, where they succeeded, on December 18, in putting
through a resolution 79 calling for a world-wide economic and
arms boycott of Portugal. The resolution contained the follow-
ing provisions inter alia: (1) a condemnation of "the colonial
policy of Portugal and its persistent refusal to carry out the
antho?iV°
f Senegal
.' s air sPace and territory" by Portugueseu r ties operating from Portuguese Guinea. 9
19fiS „
?7
~-
rity Council Resolution 218/218
. November 23,also. The Times (London), December 24, 1965, p. 7.
78 Ibid.
, p. 7
1965.
79General Assembly Resolution 2107 (XX)
, December 18
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resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security c •m s Council."An appeal to United Ma+--atl°nS mSmbers to take the following
‘ ‘”‘"t
'> *«“*> •« « diplomatic
(b) closing of their ports to Portuguese vessels;
rSfUSal ^ “ transit facilities for Portuguese
aircraft; M) a boycott on trade with Portugal. (3) An appealto Portugal NATO allies to ban the supply or sale of arms
ammunition, and military equipment to Portugal .'80 The vote
this time was 66-26, with 15 abstentions and 10 countries
absent. The small majority against Portugal indicated that,
while almost all members of the United •u Nations were willing to
condemn it publicly, only three-fifths were prepared to con-
template action against Portugal, despite the fact that most
of them would not have been affected by it. similar resolu-
tions continued to be voted in 1966 and 1967 with no new
development, except that, in 1966, the General Assembly recom-
mended that the World Bank and other specialised agencies
not cooperate with Portugal, a recommendation that was
respected in 1967. On April 9, 1966, the U.N. Security Coun-
cil adopted a resolution, 81 by a vote of 10 to 0 with 5 absten-
tions, endorsing Britain's use of force to prevent ships from
coming into Mozambique ports with oil for Rhodesia. Once again
on December 16, 1966, the U.N. Security Council, by a vote of
8 0 lbid
.
8
1
Abshire cind Scunusls. op. cit n tcm q__ r- nAssembly Resolution 2107 (XX) . December 'll; 1965.
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11 to 0 With 4 abstentions (Soviet Union, France, Mali
,
Bul_
garxa), imposed mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. The
Portuguese Government made public two letters sent to United
Nations Secretary General Thant by Foreign Minister Nogueira
on February 3. One letter stated that the sanctions imposed
on Rhodesia had caused Mozambique
"serious financial and econ-
omic prejudice, calculated at some $28 million." The letter
asked that consultations begin to determine "the manner of
payment of the compensation to which the province of Mozam-
q e has a right. The second letter questioned the validity
of the sanction resolution in light of the abstention of two
permanent members of the Security Council (Soviet Union and
Prance) and questioned the Council's power to legislate
against such international conventions as freedom of the seas
and the right of landlocked countries to access to the sea. 82
Portugal, which together with South Africa, had upheld
freedom of trade with Rhodesia, claimed that the blockade was
a repudiation of the notion of neutrality. Dr. Nogueira
bluntly described his country's relations with the United King-
dom as bad, because England had "used Portugal as a scapegoat
in a situation for which Britain knows we have no responsi-
bility .
"
As a result, in February 1967, Portugal became the
first country to invoke Article 50 of the United Nations
82Portugal Replies in the United Nations, p. 395
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Charter by claiming almost $10 million in compensation from
the united Nations for "serious financial and economic preju-
dice to Mozambique" resulting from the imposition of sanctions
against Rhodesia, a lead which was subsequently followed by '
both Zambia and Malawi. 83
By November 1968, both the strength of the General
Assembly resolution and the voting pattern changed. Previous
references to Portuguese policy as a "crime against humanity"
were dropped, as were requests that the World Bank suspend
loans to Portugal. As an example, on November 21, 1968, the
General Assembly Trusteeship Committee adopted a resolution
condemning Portugal s refusal to grant independence to Angola
and Mozambique. In comparison with resolutions adopted in
past years, this one was much more moderate. It did not con-
tain any threat of sanctions, and perhaps for this reason
the resolution received a larger majority.
The American ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J.
Goldberg, in an address made before the American Negro Leader-
ship Conference on Africa, conveyed what was to be the United
States' attitude toward the Portuguese territories, for the
latter part of the 60s, when he said:
Portugal is a longstanding friend and NATO ally of the
U.S. But, regrettably, our close association is cloudedby our differences over the future of these territories.
83 Irving Kaplan, Area Handbook for the Republic of South
Africa (Washington, D . C . : U.S. Government Printing Office, T971)
,
p . 162 .
262
bodies^h^Ued^ions^f in various
Council. Speakinc for ! c
dlng the Security
clear, as have my predecessors
S
that
ateS
'
1 have made it
support the riqht of fho ?' we unequivocally
to self-determination.
h peoples of Angola and Mozambique
representativefofthe^ricln stat Portu9al endended, unfortunately without es - These contacts
remains what it wafin the“tT?? - . baSlc issuewhich the peoples of f nd a formula by
the right of self-determination in^^spL^ofUnited Nations Charter. Q „ pirit of the8 4
Ambassador Goldberg went on to state what, in his view,
would be a workable formula for resolving to everyone's satis-
faction the problem of the Portuguese territories.
"The first
Step, in our view, is for the parties to commence a genuine
dialogue on the basis of recognition of the principle of self-
determination. This is the indispensable way to a peaceful
solution of the troubles which afflict these two territories.
The United States, as a friend of Portugal and the peoples of
Angola and Mozambique
. . . win continue to do all it can
both in and out of the United Nations, to facilitate such a
dialogue
.
m 85
Once again m 1969 relations between Portugal and the
United Nations became strained when the Security Council
adopted three resolutions on the complaints submitted by
84 aAddress before the American Negro Leadership Con-ference on Africa at Washington, D.C., November 26, 1968. SeeDepartment of State Bulletin of December 1, 1968, p. 290.
8
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,
p. 290.
263
Zambia
, Senegal, and Guinea 88 „a , censuring Portugal for
"attacking villages in the three territories."
Commenting on the moderation of the language of the
resolutions, Le Monde reported that, "even if other attacks
rred ... it would probably be much more difficult
if not impossible, to find the necessary majority for the
applications of sanctions against Portugal, rather than cen-
suring it. Sanctions touch on economic interests whereas
condemnation does not.
.
m87
Seymour M. Finger, u.s. Representative to the United
Nations, summarized the position of the Nixon Administration
when he stated that: "In Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau
we see the last remaining major areas of the African Southern
Hemisphere which are still dominated by a metropolitan power-
Portugal. Let me say
. .
. that this is an anachronism in the
modern world. The United States firmly supports the right of
the people of Angola and Mozambique to self-determination." 88
Mr. Finger expressed the view that the problems of
Southern Africa require the utmost patience. "First of all,
, c
^Security Council Resolution 2 68 of July 28, 1969(Senegal)
,
Resolution 273 of December 9, 1969 (Zambia)Resolution 275^? December 22, 1969 (Guinea).
8 7Le Monde (Paris), July 30, 1969, p. 15.
88 oSeymour M. Finger, U.S. Representative of the UnitedNations Preparatory Committee for the Tenth Anniversary of theDeclaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-tries and Peoples, United States-United Nations Press Release,April 17, 1969.
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it is clear that countries outside Southern Africa are in
general not prepared to wage the major and probably cata-
strophic war which would be required to dislodge the regimes
now in power." 89 m other words, as odious as the denial of
human rights and self-determination in this area was, the
U.S. did not believe that the situation in the Portuguese
territories represented a threat to international peace and
security
.
During the years 1970 through 1972, the United Nations
Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Imple-
mentation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Special Committee of Twenty-
Four)
,
took up the cudgel for the granting of independence to
the Portuguese territories. In a series of resolutions the
Committee of Twenty-Four aimed their attack at what they
termed "massive aid from the NATO countries and the military
and economic support Lisbon was receiving from the United
States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom,
9
1
and France."
A recurrent theme in these resolutions reflected the
judgment that the NATO governments would have to dissociate
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid
.
9 1 See Special Committee Resolution AC. 109/362, August 18,
1970; Resolution AC. 109/364
,
September 25 ,'“197 0. Department of
State Bulletin (October 1970) , vol . 17.
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themselves from the insurgencies in the Portuguese terri-
tories, the objective being the isolation of Portugal at
both the political and military levels. The resolutions main-
tained that the NATO powers were a decisive factor in Portugal's
ability to continue her colonial wars. Moreover, "it must
also be underlined that Portugal's grand design is strengthened
by the colonial alliance between Portugal, South Africa, and
Southern Rhodesia.
The United States representative to the Special Com-
mittee, commenting on the resolution, recalled that his dele-
gation had repeatedly expressed its profound conviction that
the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau had the
inalienable right of self-determination. But his delegation
remained convinced that the situation in the Portuguese ter-
ritories differed markedly from that which prevailed in say
Southern Rhodesia. The United States therefore considered
that the Committee's approach should be tailored to the spec-
ific circumstances in each case. The American delegation con-
tinued to express the belief that the best way to pursue the
goal of self-determination for the peoples in the territories
under Portuguese administration was through persistent peace-
ful efforts to find common ground. The resolution adopted by
the Committee did not "contribute to this objective. On the
92see Special Committee Resolution AC 109/364, Septem-ber 25, 1970. ~ '
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contrary, it would help to strengthen the hand of those in
Portugal who opposed any meaningful search for a peaceful,
negotiated compromise. In addition, the resolution was based
number of assertions which the U.S. delegation did not
share and it would therefore cast a negative vote. "93
During its meetings in September 1971, the Special
Committee adopted three resolutions concerning visiting mis-
to the territories in Southern Africa, and territories
under Portuguese control. The language and tone of the resolu-
tions reflected the United Nations- insistence that Portugal
take steps in granting independence to its "colonial depen-
dencies .
"
On September 14, 1971, the Special Committee adopted
a ten-power resolution relating to the Portuguese territories,
m which it reaffirmed the inalienable right of the peoples of
Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and other territories under
Portuguese domination to self-determination "in accordance with
the provision of General Assembly resolution 1514 (xv)
. it
condemned the persistent refusal of the Government of Portugal
to implement Resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolu-
tions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. 94
93Seymour M. Finger, U.S. Representative of the
mittee of Twenty-Four, United Nations Monthly Chronicle,Vol. VII, no. 9 (September 1970)
, pp. 18-24 .
“
Com-
94 *United Nations Special Committee Resolution of Septem-ber 14, 1971, quoted in United Nations Monthly Chronicle,
Vol. VIII, no. 9 (October
-
1971)
, pp. 71-72.
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The resolution reiterated its appeal to the military
antes of Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tron to discontinue mil itary assistance of any^ ^ ^
Government of Portugal, and to prevent the sale or supply of
weapons, military equipment and material to Portugal which it
perpetuate its colonial domination in Africa." An
important provision in the resolution dealt with the trans-
mission of information from Non-Self-Governing Territories
under Article 73e of the Charter. The Special Committee
eplored that, despite the repeated recommendations of the
General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Special Com-
mittee, "Portugal, having responsibility for the administra-
tion of Non-Self-Governing Territories, had not transmitted
the required information in compliance with Article 73e of
the Charter." 95
The United States Ambassador to the United Nations,
Charles Yost, explained the United States* opposition to the
resolution by arguing that since 1961 the United States has
maintained an embargo on all arms for use in Africa by any of
the parties involved in the disputes over the Portuguese ter-
ritories. "Our military assistance program to Portugal, a
NATO ally, has in recent years arranged only $1 million a
year. This assistance is used to enhance Portugal's capabili-
ties in antisubmarine warfare and air and sea defense." 96
95 Ibid
.
,
p. 72.
96 Ibid
.
,
p. 73.
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in a key resolution adopted by the Security Council on
ecember 8
, 1970, Portugal's NATO allies were petitioned to
stop military aid to Portugal. The resolution also asked NATO
countries to discourage their nationals from making agreements
w ach would support Portuguese domination of Angola, Mozambique
and Portuguese Guinea, and in particular to cease any activity
'
related to the construction of the Cabora Bassa dam in Mozam-
bique.
The representative of Portugal at the United Nations,
Ambassador Garin rpnoafo^i , .
' repeated the reservations that his delega-
tion had always expressed concerning United Nations (and
subsidiary organs) resolutions on the Portuguese territories.
"This year. United Nations resolutions had been drafted in
terms that were much more extreme and violent than those
adopted at previous sessions ." 98 The Portuguese representa-
tive could not see any advantage in such an approach. Such
resolutions almost invariably disregarded the arguments put
forward by the Portuguese delegation explaining in detail the
direction, objectives and realities of Portugal's policy.
"It was an elementary principle of justice," stated the Ambas-
sador, "that the views expressed by a party to a dispute
should be taken into consideration before any attempt was
made to pass judgment ." 99
Securd-ty Council Resolution 290, December 8, 1970by a vote of 11 to u with 4 abstentions (France, Spain, UnitedKingdom, United States). F ' r a
98 Ibid
.
"ibid.
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Ambassador Garin repeated his earlier remarts in
stating that the establishment of an atmosphere of respect
°n the part of all nations is imperative if Portugal is tQ
create the spirit of mutual trust and friendship in Africa
vrtal to the maintenance of peace and stability in Southern
Africa
. "Such draft resolutions such as the one under con-
sideration make this- impossible .
"
10 °
Ambassador Yost maintained that charges that Portugal
is diverting u.s. arms to Africa are untrue, charges that
U.S. military assistance frees substantial resources for use
in Africa were unfounded. Reports of U.S. arms in the Por-
tuguese territories, when investigated, according to Yost,
invariably proved to be World War II or Korean War vintage
articles long since passed out of U.S. control. 101
On November 14, 1972, the General Assembly on the
recommendation of the Special Committee, adopted Resolution
2918 (XXVII) which affirmed that the national liberation
movements of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape
Verde were the authentic representatives of the "true aspira-
tions of the peoples of the territories concerned." It
recommended that, pending the accession of those territories
100 Ibid.
101See
States-United
Statement by Ambassador Yost (U.S.)
Nations Press Release 190
r December
United
8, 1971.
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independence
, all Governments, the Specialized
and other organizations within the United Nations^
should, when dealing with matters pertaining to the terri-
torres,
"ensure the representation of those territories by
the liberation movements concerned and in consultation with
the Organization of African Unity (OAU)." 102
The Assembly deemed it imperative that negotiations
should be initiated at an early date between the Government
Of Portugal and the national liberation movements. The
Assembly expressed its concern for the full and speedy imple-
mentation of the Declaration on decolonisation with respect
to Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), and Cape Verde, par-
ticularly in order to bring about as a matter of priority
"the immediate cessation by Portugal of its colonial wars and
all acts of repression against the peoples of the territories
In apparent contradiction to those paragraphs in the
resolution calling for negotiated settlement of the disputes
within the territories, the Assembly went so far as to appeal
to all Governments, specialized agencies and other organiza-
tions to render to the peoples of the Portuguese territories,
m particular the populations in the liberated areas of those
territories, all the moral and material assistance necessary
102
(vwtt) at United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2918(XXVII)
, November 14, 1972 . ——
103 Ibid.
,,103
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to continue their strugqle "for u-gy t the achievement of their
inalienable right to sel f-determination and indepen<Jence „ 104
While supporting the right of the people of the terri-
tories to choose their own representatives, the U.S. legation
could not agree with the operative paragraph which sought tohave the General Assembly mahe that designation on their behalf
It expressed once tore its reservations about violent solutions
to those problems and to reference in the draft resolution
implying support for such activities. The U.S. delegation
expressed its opposition to the words in the operative para-
graph of the resolution calling for "all the moral and material
assistance necessary to continue their struggle for the achieve-
ment of their inalienable right to self-determination and inde-
pendence. The U.S. delegation interpreted this as an
implied approval of armed struggle.
The Portuguese representative observed that the main
objective of the draft resolution was to have the Assembly
"accept as true the claim by certain political movements (in
the territories) that they were the representatives of the pop-
ulation of Angola
, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, and Cape
10 6Verde. The Portuguese delegation accused the sponsors of
1
^
4
Ibid.
. The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 98 in
nnTiL^- 6 (Brazil, Portugal, South Africa, Spain,U ited Kingdom, United States) with 8 abstentions.
105
^ited Nations Monthly Chronicle
, Vol. IX, no. 11(December 1972)
, pp. 33-34.
106 Ibid, p. 34.
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the resolution with attempting to pressure the General Assem-
bly into giving legitimacy to what was nothing more than a
"gratuitous assumption of certain political groups in the
Portuguese provinces, since the populations in question had
never recognized in them the title which they claimed." Since
the populations in question had never recognized these polit-
ical groups as their liberators, "the draft resolution before
the Assembly fell to the ground because it no longer had any
solid basis .
"
10 7
The fifteen years of debate over the Portuguese terri-
tories can be summed up by saying that, as the tenor of dis-
cussion became more inflamed, the pressure of some Afro-Asian
states to pass from words to deeds became so intense that in
the 1970s both the General Assembly and the Security Council
have passed resolutions appealing to member States to extend
moral and material support to the Portuguese insurgents. Having
succeeded for several years in keeping the demand for sanctions
out of resolutions by diplomacy, the United States and the
United Kingdom were forced, in spite of the risk of alienating
the Afro-Asians, to vote against such resolutions. If it were
illustrated by a graph, Anglo-American support for the oppon-
ents of Portugal in the General Assembly would appear as a
curved line rising from the abstentions of 1960, reaching its
apogee in the affirmative votes of late 1961 and early 1962,
and then descending to the "nays" of December 1962. The
abstentions of 1963, dropped once more to the "nays" of 1965
lQ7 lbid
.
,
p. 34
.
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through 1967, levelled with the abstentions of 1968, and
descended again with the "noes" of 1969 and the early 1970s
For the Security Council, a graph would have much the same
shape
.
Conclusion
Portugal's Case
Portugal's case rests on strict legal interpretations
of the United Nations Charter. As have other colonial powers
in the past, Portugal sees Article 2(7) of the Charter as its
main protection: "Nothing
. . . i„ the present Charter shall
authorize the U.N. to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.
.
,"
108
As Por-
tugal points out, "there is nothing more vital for Portugal
than its territorial integrity." The U.N. resolutions on its
overseas territories "amounts to interference with the internal
life of the Portuguese nation." 109 Therefore, says Portugal,
the resolutions clearly violate the Charter.
Portugal invokes both the Charter and United Nations
history in contending that Chapter XI is inapplicable. The
history of the General Assembly, in Portugal's eyes, proves
that the applicability of Article 73 is for the individual
108Portugal s legal argument for claiming exclusionfrom the process of decolonization is presented in FrancoNogueira
' s book, The United Nations and Portugal
, pp. 139-188.
109 Ibid
.
,
p. 134
.
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administering state itself to decide. The Assembly, through
Resolution 66,!) of December 14. 1946, merely
-took note" of
the original list of non-self-governing territories submitted
by colonial powers. Even the twelve Principles were in the
form of a "guide" to members. The only possible conclusion
for Portugal is that all states consider that "it is exclu-
sively up to them to interpret their own laws and to determine
which of their territories, even if non-self-governing, do not
come under Article 73. "HO By passing such resolutionSi ^
Assembly acquiesced in this practice.
Thus, even if, for the sake of argument, Portugal's
rseas provinces are considered non-self-governing,
"it is
still up to Portugal to decide whether they come under Article
73. Portugal must decide in the negative, since Article 73e
admits of security and constitutional limitation on the obliga-
ti°n to transmit information to the United Nations." 111 "The
Portuguese nation constitutionally is, and always has been, a
unitary State, regardless of the relative geographic situation
of its various provinces." 112 Furthermore, this relationship
was obtained when Portugal was admitted unanimously to the
United Nations. This very fact "signifies beyond any possible
110General Assembly Official Records, 11th Session,656th Plenary Meeting, February 20, 1957, para. 82.
Ill Ibid.
,
para. 73
.
1 12 Ibid.
,
para. 73.
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the
— - accepted states as they
were, recognizing their constitutions and basic structures. -U3
Since Portugal considers Article 73 as clearly inappli-
ca e, rt rs not surprising that it dismisses resolutions
allegedly based on that article-including Resolutions 1541
and 1542-..because they are at variance with both the letter
and the spirit of that article
. Portugal complains that
the Charter is being amended "by a simple majority vote," which
”St 1
":
Vitably haVe effect of "killing the Charter it-
_ T r~ •IISself.
Most important of all, however, and most disturbing to
Portugal, is united Nations "blindness to the value of Portu-
gal’s unique philosophy of government and civilization. "U6
For centuries, Portugal has been building the only successful
multiracial civilization the world has seen-not merely "co-
existence of different racial
. .
. groups" but a "society
where all ethnic groups are
. . . knitted together with a deep
feeling of oneness." 1^ The present disturbances ^ ^
territories are explained as resulting not from a genuine desire
113Nogueira
,
op. cit
.
, p. 140.
114
Comrcitte^T^^XsT^eeting^November^^igsT^para?
5
^
011
'
115 Ibid.
116
1963, para ^
Nations Document A/AC 109/36, April 1,
117 Ibid
.
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120
for national independence, but rather are "revivals of past
stages of evolution
•
- . not by themselves vigorous enough
to counter the unity which has been acquired." 118
After so many years of defending itself in United
Nations debates, it is not surprising that Portugal has come
to feel itself the victim of the "grand anti-Portuguese con-
spiracy on the international scene." 118 For Portugal, the
General Assembly is "giddy with racial and political hatred."
The nationalists are either controlled by communists or are
communists themselves. "Russia is behind an j-kd -LS o n a il the movements of
pseudo-emancipation." 12 ! Onlv consnir^™ u ^spiracy, it seems, can
account to Portugal for so much unremitting hostility.
Portugal has made a vigorous and skillful defense of
its position before the United Nations on legal and diplomatic
grounds, steadily insisting that the country is a unitary state
and that it is irrelevant to consider the "provinces" in Africa
in connection with debates on colonialism.
African Case
The African states in the United Nations, however, con-
sider all talk of Portugal's sovereign rights irrelevant; sov-
I 1 OxxoGeneral Assembly Official Records
,
17th Session,
Annexes, Add! to Agenda Item 29 (A/5286)
,
November 14, 1972,
para. 63.
1 1 QX3Nogueira
,
op. cit ., p. 137.
120United Nations Document A/PV 1155, October 18. 1972.
p. 22.
121 Ibid.
,
pp. 28-30.
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ereignty acquired bv colonialY conquest is "not only Immoral,
illegal. "122 India, when faced with the problem of
redeeming Goa, stated the position most clearly: "„e cannot
" thS tWentiSth °entUry aCCe^ P-t of international law
which was laid down by European jurists
. . . specifying that
colonies in Asia and Africa which were acquired by conquest
conferred sovereignty, on the colonial Power ." 123
Since it is the Africans who are most intimately in-
lt is they who have been most impatient with Portugal's
"intellectual sleight of hand." 12 * In the General Assembly>
where their numbers carry great weight, they maintain that the
promise of economic and social reforms (while welcome if these
are actually implemented) merely serves to deflect world atten-
tion from the central issue of self-determination and indepen-
dence. Since Portugal has shown every sign of remaining obdur-
ate on this principle, the Africans came to feel that "radical
surgery is required ." 123 The General Assembly has already
called for sanctions on Portugal and has asked that member states
aid the nationalists with money, material, and diplomatic sup-
TOO,
Internation^l’
1
Af?
m
-
Clark,
T
"NeW Forces in the United Nations,"i ational fairs
, vol. XXXV (July 1960), p. 329,
123Delegate of Liberia, Security Council Officialtn Vpa r- QP7f>i m^ ^ 4- ~~ ,
—^^ 4- 4-cl
,
L.ct i xu c urrRecords
,
16 h Ye , 987th Meeting, December 18, 1961, para. 90.
„
^Delegate of Senegal, United Nations DocumentS/PV 1031, April 22, 1963, p. 6 .
125
, , „ _ .
Delegate of Ghana, United Nations Document S/PV 1044.July 26, 1963, pp. 17-20.
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111 P°rtUgUeSe Poiicy, the Africans have hinted thatthey may then go further c
, „ „
' The Security Council may one day
UPOn
* t0 dlSCUSS more serious
.
.
. incidents
^ thrSaten t0 Plt p°rtuguese troops against the united
African nations
. .
nl26
The United Nations Case
Like Portugal's, the United Nations' case has both legal
and political aspects mho i ^ i. T e legal argument is based on the
assumption that the Charter is a "dynamic instrument" con-
sisting of the original document and the interpretations re-
sulting from the Security Council and Assembly actions and
resolutions
.
^ 27
Resolution 1541 (v), 12 * which laid ^ groundwQrk fQr
asserting Portugal's obligations to the United Nations, was
the climax of a long process of interpretation, explanation and
application of Article 73. The United Nations contends that
under the Charter, nations pledged themselves to develop friend-
ly relations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples (Article 1, para. 2), and
Document"s/py
1
! 03
n
&
Apri^^ 9?
n
I96 :|
BraZZaVille,
'
t^ed
127Wohlgemuth, op. cit
.
,
p. 28.
128
.
.
. .
studY of Principles which should guide members indetermining whether an obligation exists to transmit informa-tion under Article 73(e) of the Charter.
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administering powers declared it their duty to develop self-
government (Article 73b,
. fl long series Qf elabQrations and
interpretations, culminating in Resolutions 1514 (xv> and
1654 (XVI), 129 have afflrmed that self-determination and a
"full measure of self-government" normally exist only under
conditions of political independence. Self-determination has
become a fundamental human and political right, a valid prin-
ciple in international law. What may have been simply a
solemn declaration in the Charter is today a recognised, per-
haps enforceable, obligation. In insisting on an older, out-
moded interpretation of political reality, "the Portuguese are
trying ... to stand against the tide of history." 130
Article 73, according to Portugal's opponents in the
United Nations, is not restricted to "colonies," but covers all
"territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure
of self-government." The factors listed in Resolution 1541 are
simply an explanation and elaboration of the meaning of this
Charter phrase. Analysis of the status of Portugal's overseas
129
—
-
1
^
Gd
^
ations Resolution 1514 (XV ) , Declaration onthe Granting or independence to Colonial Countries and People-
fBQ/S/qf Q^ 7^
r
^°luti°n (A/L * 323 and Add - 1-6); adopted
„
'
947th Plenary meeting, December 14, 1960, pp. 1273-74-Uni ted Nations Resolution 1654 (XVI ) . Implem4ntatiin of theDeclaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-tries and People: 38 power draft resolution (A/L.366 and Add. 1-
adopted (97/0/4), 1066th plenary meeting, November 27, 1961
pp. 871-72. '
13° Deiegate Qf India/ security Council Official Records.16th Year, 987th Meeting, December 18, “1961, para. 45.
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provinces in t6rm c? n-F 4- v-, ^ ^ j-e s of these factors •'makes it clear that they
are non-self-governing and that Article 73 applicable= ^
“ 3bltantS are ge°^phicauy , ethnically
, and culturally dl„.tmct from metropolitan Portugal: the minister for overseas
1tones and the governors in each territory have wide
powers to impose rules developed in .i m the metropole; the central
government can pass arbitrary decrees and take executive mea-
sures in the territories: and very few indigenous inhabitants
participate in what little voting and local self-government
there is." Thus the fact that Portugal calls its terri-
tories "provinces" rather than "colonies" is irrelevant to its
obligation under Chapter XI.
The most important part of the Assembly's case against
Portugal is that its policies constitute an inherent threat to
international peace and security. "if pr00 f is needed, one
need only to point to guerrilla activities in Angola, Mozambique,
and Guinea; to the support and sanctuary given the nationalists
by other Africans; and to Portugal's military build-up in the
territories, including the arming of white settlers ." 132 As
a consensus grows that the situation in the Portuguese terri-
ies is seriously disturbing peace and security in Africa"
(this wording parallels neither that in Chapter VI nor VII, but
131
n.
/
pv lnin
^legate of Liberia, United Nations DocumentS/PV 1040, July 22, 1963, p. 28.
132 Ibid
.
,
p. 28.
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couia presumably provi(ie a basis for action under either), the
case against Portugal is immeasurably strength-
one ; for then the variety of remedies provided by the Charterboth for peaceful settlement of disputes and for countering
threats to the peace can be brought into play.
The strength of Portugal's opponents in the United
Nations with respect to that organization's handling of colo-
nialism would not be complete without reference to the growing
efficacy of African wars of "national liberation." As an
example, the cause of the insurgent forces fighting in Portu-
has been, to all intents and purposes, legitimized
by the United Nations System. The importance of this legit-
imization of African wars of "national liberation" by the inter-
national system means the recognition by various U.N. bodies
that the struggle against colonialism and apartheid in Southern
Africa is a "legitimate endeavour" as far as the purposes and
the principles of the United Nations Charter and other U.N.
declarations are concerned.
Against all this there has always been the complaint
by some critics 133 that the Afro-Asian group is using its near-
majority position in the United Nations simply to stir up racial
and political trouble in the Portuguese colonies. The argument
is often made that United Nations concentration on colonialism
f i ripripp
*ome
'
" The United Nations: The Crisis of Con-
23 g
, Vital Speeches of the Day (February 1, 1962), pp. 237-
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had led to the adoption of a double standard of behavior by
“ny ° f thS nSWly eleCted countries
. Lord Home has observed
that: No one who has witnessed what has happened in Hungary
and East Germany can have any doubt that Russia's colonialism
is the most cruel and ruthless in history. The United Nations
members know this to be true, but they seldom condemn the Rus-
sians and constantly harass Portugal . "134 Because ^ double
standard as applied to Europeans and Russians, and Europeans
and Afro-Asians has become so blatant. Lord Home was moved to
say
:
show
U
itself
N
tn
i
h
nS; and in Particular this Assembly, mustn o be impartial, must be seen to be imoartiai
answer” h^t-he
t0 ask
.
this question: I am not sure of the
Of •
th®re growing up, almost imperceptibly, a codI
countrSs°and
W
a
er
f h
the
r iS °ne rUle fo^ the^ommuAst
One for the k ??°
t e
F for the Democracies and their allies’bully, who deals in fear, and another forDemocracies and their allies
.
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The United States Case
As a former colony with a strong anticolonial tradition,
the United States shares many of the ambivalences of the non-
colonial European states. It is eager to assure the former
colonies that it has steadfastly supported the principle of
self-determination and has publicly and privately and contin-
uously urged Portugal to accept its obligations. But the NATO
obligations of the United States and its security interests in
134 Ibid.
,
p. 237.
135 Ibid
.
,
p. 238
.
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the military base on the Azores have played an important role in
shaping United States policy on the question of the Portuguese
territories in Africa. And as Portugal often reminds the
united States, U.S. obligations to support its NATO allies can-
easily be divorced from an obligation to support their
colonial policies. Thus the United States in a generally un-
successful attempt to placate both sides, finds itself pleading
for resolutions that amount to much less than what the majority,
and rather more than what Portugal, feels able to accept.
During debate, the U.S. may indicate "there is no conflict of
principle before this house," but it votes more often with
France and the United Kingdom than, say, with Norway or Sweden.
Fundamentally, the United States approach to the issue
of the Portuguese territories has proceeded on several premises
st, to discredit the notion frequently expressed in United
Nations debates that Western involvement in the Portuguese ter-
ritories merely sustains Portugal's resolve to keep hold of the
colonies; the United States responds with the argument that the
influence of any nation, however powerful, in this day and age,
m the internal affairs of another country is severely limited.
The idea that the United States, by any action—including the
use of economic and military force—could bring about funda-
mental changes in another society is without foundation.
Secondly
,
the United States understands that it cannot
pursue policies which simply accept the situation in Portuguese
Africa as it is, or contribute to its perpetuation, nor those
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which endorse violence as a means to change. Consequently, theUnited States has claimed to pursue an arms embargo policy
all sides within the Portuguese territories.
Thirdly, the United States believes that any meaningful
contribution to change in the area of the Portuguese territories
IS not through the pressure of
open the doors of communication
lation
.
isolation
, but through keeping
with all elements of the popu
stly, while the United States has remained sympathetic
to the objectives of many of the United Nations resolutions, it
has mounted increasing opposition to the types of U.N. action
it considers beyond the organization's ability to implement.
The changes in tactics from early support of Portugal's oppon-
ents in the United Nations to one of opposition in the late
1960s and early 1970s reflects this belief. These manuevers
were the result not only of American reluctance to take drastic
measures against a NATO ally, measures that, without any cer-
tainty of being effective, would further divide the Western
alliance and risk more unrest in Africa; they also reflected a
growing disillusionment with the consequences of too precipitate
a decolonization. One independent African country after another
had succumbed to civil war--the Congo, Sudan, Nigeria—or had
been taken over by military dictatorship—Algeria, Ghana, Dahomey,
Upper Volta, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic—while
most of the remainder became one-party states. All this caused
second thoughts about the timing of self-determination and the
need for a fresh diplomatic approach toward decolonization.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Robert Gardiner, former Ghanaian head of the United
Nations Economic Commission, once proclaimed that Africa is
for the Africans, and the Portuguese will not be Africans.
Gardiner maintained that so long as there is an idea of a
civilizing mission," some pattern is being imposed from
the outside, and this is "implicit paternalism." 1
At the same time, Gardiner noted that there were dif-
fering viewpoints among African leaders. President Banda of
Malawi, adjacent to Mozambique and within the South African
economic orbit, firmly believes in economic cooperation,
rather than isolation, throughout Southern Africa. It is
his view that economic development in Portuguese Africa now
benefits Malawi. He explained his position to other black
African diplomats asserting that the railroads of Mozambique
eventually be African, and therefore, all economic devel-
opment and independence should be encouraged. Some Africans
of former British Africa are resentful of the many ways—cul-
tural, economic, and even military
— that states of former
French Africa have maintained their ties with the old metro-
pole. To them, an independent Angola and Mozambique could,
p. 107.
L
W.P. Kirkman, Unscrambling An Empire (London 1966)
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if independence evolved under the aegis of Portugal, offer
a similarly distasteful situation. 2
Victor Ferkiss has appropriately observed that the
Portuguese Africa poses the question of African
identity more clearly than has any former colonial territory.
This would be true, he says, even if Angola and Mozambique
were to become independent while yet forming part of a Lusi-
tanian cultural community, an action that would conflict with
the spirit of Pan-Africanism; Ferkiss states:
-The very ties
of culture which might bind an interracial Angola and Mozam-
bique together and to extra-African countries would be a
rejection of most of what is symbolized by 'negritude and the
African personality'": Ferkiss notes that "independent states
of black Lusitanians
, states based not on traditional African
cultural bonds but on a universalistic mystique, run counter
to African cultural nationalism." 3 African nationalists
could not easily accept this situation, which clashes with
their goals, and independent Angola and Mozambique could be
torn apart not only by racial, social, and tribal divisions
but by a conflict between those seeking to reinstate purely
African identifications and those opting for a nation pri-
marily nonwhite in race but consciously Western in Culture." 4
2
,
.
Ibid., p. 107.
3 .Victor C. Ferkiss, Africa's Search for Identity (NewYork: Praeger, 1966), p. 1077 L
4 Ibid.
,
p. 107.
287
The issue of Portuguese Africa, then, for American
foreign policy is so complex and so overlaid with emotion,
that it is essential to formulate with the greatest possible
clarity the guiding features of a workable new American
policy. The difficulty of this task, for American policy-
makers, is exacerbated by the recent military coup in Lisbon
which overturned the Caetano government and brought General
Spinola into power. A great deal of speculation is now taking
place over what the new regime intends for Portugal and its
territories, but this brief treatment of the situation will
confine itself to examining the highlights of the coup and
its implications for American foreign policy toward Portugal
and its territories.
Background
The outside world was as surprised as Portugal was
stunned at the recent military takeover in Lisbon on April 25
1974. Owing to the colonial implications of the coup, the
leaders of African liberation movements, certain news agen-
cies, and even other governments believed that the well-
publicized ideas of General de Spinola were to be the guide-
lines of a new policy. But that is an oversimplification
which can seriously mislead one as to the nature and purpose
of what happened in Portugal. 5
5Antonio De Figueiredo, "Portugal: A Country for
Historians," Nation
,
vol. 218, no. 20 (May 18, 1974), p. 616.
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The junta, which proclaimed a few basic goals that
have apparently met with the approval of the overwhelming
majority of the population, confined itself to the overthrow
of the President, the government, and institutions such as the
DGS (security police), the censorship board, the regime's
Single-party system, paramilitary organizations like the
Portuguese Youth, etc. The actual business of governing is
to be entrusted to a "provisional" or caretaker government
appointed by the junta; most likely it will be drawn from the
"Center," where most of the best-known political and financial
nicians are to be found. The immediate emphasis, it seems
is upon the economic and social situation, and one of the
first tasks of the provisional government will be to engineer
a return to normal business conditions.
The crucial first question, for American policy-makers,
is what the government and the junta decide to do about Africa,
and how far they are ready to drag their new President into
ending colonial involvement. Critics of Portugal's African
policy feel that "only a clean break there can undermine the
kind of interests and attachments, whether commercial, finan-
cial, subversive or merely demagogic, on which the ultras and
their likely allies must rely. Only that sort of break can
bring the Portuguese people face to face with the facts of
their own 'under-development', can restore the hughly inflated
• 1
6 Ibid p. 616 .
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a™y to civilian life, and can then give this _
the chance of economic salvation." 7
in an exchange of remarks following a meeting between
President Nixon and President Spinola, on June 19
, President
Spinola alluded, rather oblique ly , to the colonial situation
when he said: "A very important factor underlying the success
of these talks was a total identity in the thinking regarding
a staunch defense of peace, the respect for democratic prin-
ciples, and the hallowed principles that underlie the right
to self-determination of peoples which is expressed in the
free will of those peoples regarding the choice of their
destiny. "8 President Nixon responded by assuring Spinola of
the continuing support of the United States. "Because,"
President Nixon stated, "an independent, free, prosperous
Portugal is vital not only to the Atlantic alliance but vital
also to the interests of the United States as well as to the
,9interest of the people of Portugal."
American expert on Portuguese colonial affairs, Basil
Davidson believes that it is Spinola 's objective "to contrive
that Portugal should somehow retain its position of 'privi-
leged economic intermediary' between African land and labour
Ibid
.
,
p. 617
.
O
State Department Bulletin,
no. 1829, “p. 119.
~~~
9
Ibid
.
,
p. 120.
(July 15, 1974)
,
vol
. 71,
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on one side, and, on the other
' 311 those interests which now
them or wish to exploit them, principally the large
transnational corporations concerned with the extraction of
minerals
, including oil.-” Oavidson concludes ^^
this in mind, "Spinola rightly sees this as the only sure
guarantee of 'survival' now, or Portugal's existing
'system'
of power relationships, however archaic and stultifying these
in fact may be; and he believes that Portugal's NATO allies
will support him in this. What he seeks, in short, is some
kind of NATO-buttressed
'neo-colonial solution .'" 11
Whatever course of action Spinola may adopt, there is
every good reason to believe that the liberation movements will
negotiate for nothing less than Portuguese military and polit-
ical withdrawal. The wars may be reduced by an un„illingnes s
of parts of the Portuguese armed forces to continue with them;
they may also be enlarged by South African intervention. Yet
the Portuguese position remains relatively weak, so that one
may speculate that Pretoria will intervene only "in extre-
1 7
mis
.
c . .
10Basil Davidson, "The New Portugal and Africa," NewStatesman
,
vol. 87, no. 2253 (May 24, 1974), p. 724 .
P * 7 ??: Davidson conjectures that: "Thisthat the wars will go on so long as the junta and thegovernment are prepared to agree with him, since there isevery reason to believe that the liberation movements aresaying what they mean when they reject any such solution."
12 Ibid
.
,
p. 722
.
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Given these and other such factors. United States for-
eign policy toward Portugal and its territories should seek
the following objectives: First, the goal must continue to
be the avoidance of great power rivalry, dominance, or con-
flict, within the Portuguese territories. During his Africa
trip (February 1970), Secretary of state William Rogers made
this quite explicit. when he said: "We do not believe that
Africa should be the scene of a major power conflict. We on
our part do not propose to make it so. Fundamentally, we con-
sider that such a course would be wasteful to all parties.
It certainly would not be in the interest of the African
13
states .
"
Second, negotiation or settlement can only be accom-
plished, practically and in principle, by the parties directly
involved. What has ultimately to be done cannot be done by
third parties or elements alien to the areas in question. 14
Of course, the behavior of the other great powers will have
a direct bearing on these objectives and on how we respond to
a given situation.
Third, in exercising its influence, the United States
must for reasons of self-interest and self-respect continue
13New York Times
, February 12, 1970, p. 3.
14Whether literate or not, the Portuguese for decadeshave had no clear access to new ideas and new facts, at least
of a political sort. No doubt many may really think them-
selves at grips with the agents of Moscow or Peking or, as
Salazar used to warn, of the USA.
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to support the principles of self-determination and equal
human rights. The United States early recognised the force
Of African nationalism and the African achievement of inde-
pendence, and nationhood for African peoples. The United
States now has a practical interest in the maintenance of
that independence, within an environment of political sta-
'
' y nd growth. In areas such as Angola and Mozambique,
where the problems of colonialism are stubborn and filled with
passion, the United States has unfortuantely been caught in
the crossfire between those advocating violence to achieve
decolonialization, those who seek change by peaceful means,
and the preservers of the status quo. American policy-makers,
however, can receive some surcease in the fact that every
recent indication from the leadership of the liberation move-
ments, whether private or public, shows that they have no wish
to make their victory a means of Portuguese humiliation. Nor
is there any suggestion that Portuguese military and political
withdrawal need imply the withdrawal or dispossession of the
bulk of the settler communities.^
The American response to this troublesome problem
area is that African people have the right to self-determina-
1 5 M On the contrary
,
most of the settlers can expectto stay exactly where they are. There is evidently no reason,furthermore, why the new Portugal could not then hope for aprivileged cultural position, and even possibly for some kind
of privileged commercial position, in territories where the
Portuguese language will remain the medium of instruction and
of common use." See Davidson, op . cit
.
,
p. 724.
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tion. Official U.S. response has been to encourage peaceful
Progress towards that goal, and to eschew violence as a
prescription for the political iliq n f* 1 l ls o Southern Africa. One
conclusion reraains, however, quite clear: as long as residual
colonialism and racial inequality prevail in Portuguese
Africa, our interest in self-determination and majority rule,
those ultimate practical considerations in stability and
order, will be placed in jeopardy. Likewise, colonialism
adversely affect our other interests elsewhere on the
African continent.
would appear, then, a propitious opportunity for
the United States to encourage the creation in Portugal of a
democratic government. President Spinola has promised that
elections will be held within a year, and the country is al-
ready moving toward them, with formerly clandestine parties
declaring themselves, and exiles and "emigres" returning.
Although the provisional government may propose a truce to
the African liberation movements, colonial policy would have
to emerge out of the normal functioning of a duly elected
government and constituent assembly.
Today in Lisbon, Oporto and Coimbra, as well as in
Luanda and Lourenco Marques, the middle-class parties, in-
cluding the Socialists and the Communists, display an impres-
sive degree of cohesion and maturity, as if the people realized
that, given its geographical position in Europe and its re-
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sponsibili ties in Africa D ,
' Portugal cannot afford reckless
adventure or civil war. 16
Against this background, resort to force by any out-
side power would not only upset the fragile process of
"coalition-building" in Portugal, but would be contrary to
commitments under the United Nations Charter and a breach of
detente" the United States presently enjoys with the two
major communist powers. There is an additional practical
reason of great human meaning which deserves to receive
special emphasis. There exists, within the Portuguese terri-
tories, an almost total disparity of armed strength between
the whites and the Blacks. This relative disparity, plus
the moral climate prevailing among the whites who monopolize
the modern weapons, has made it possible on a few occasions
for thousands of Blacks to be killed within a period of a
few weeks in reprisal action. 17
If by the sudden introduction of a major new external
military factor the life-and-death struggle between whites
and Blacks m the region were precipitated, the immediate
result could be an appalling loss of life—Black life—because
1
6
.. IIXT
De Ffgueiredo, op. cit
. f p. 617. De Figueiredo
the^n-U
NOW fc
e
at the parties are emerging, it appears thate most significant group within the left wing is to be thePortuguese Democratic Movement (formerly CDE)
,
a mixed front
of Socialists and Communists rather than the established Por-tuguese Communist or Socialist Parties.
"
17For a detailed account of casualty figures, seeHerb Shore, "Mondlane, Machel and Mozambique: From Rebellion
to Revolution," Africa Today
,
vol. 21, no. 1 (Winter 1974),
p . 12
.
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of the present inability of the Blacks to defend themselves
and the practical impossibility of outside forces to rescue
or protect them.
Thus, in effect, the United States, and other outside
powers, must continue to stand firm on its political prin-
ciples; it must begin to show a more vigorous and purposeful
kind of concern over the dangers posed by Portugal's colonial
crisis for international peace and stability. Yet the United
States must put aside the one element of its power which might
make a decisive difference, its armed strength. Obviously,
such stipulations are nearly self-contradictory. But not
totally. m the narrow space between lie areas of possible
and appropriate diplomatic action.
First and more foremost, the United States government
should continue its active participation in multilateral
efforts through the United Nations and other diplomatic
machinery to condemn discriminatory practices and colonialism,
and to employ measures other than force to attempt to persuade
the present regime in Portugal to take a fresh diplomatic
approach towards their African possessions. Such multilateral
action is not in itself likely to have a decisive, or even
significant, effect. But the principles embodied are those
which the United States symbolizes and which the international
community, if it stands for anything, must assert. So long
as efforts are directed toward activating a political process,
rather than toward the imposition of a formula or the use of
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force, they deserve backing. Moreover, it is not inconceiv-
able that over the longer term, despite intractability of the
present situation, they can result in some gains as circum-
stances change. Combined with other efforts, the possibility
of their effectiveness greatly increases.
Second, with respect to its own national action, a
fresh and hardheaded review of all remaining forms of coopera-
tion and assistance with Portugal (which would require a fuller
understanding of the present regime's intentions regarding
their territorial possessions) is necessary in order to deter-
mine whether American economic and military assistance to
Portugal under NATO arrangements, does not in fact constitute
intervention" on the side of white control in Africa.
The policy here suggested is one that began and, unfor-
tunately, ended with the Kennedy Administration. For the
first time the United States, in reviewing its relations with
Portugal, went so far as to vote against Portugal, a NATO
ally, in the United Nations and argued forcefully for change
in her territorial policies. In addition, a form of arms
embargo was imposed. It is true that the Kennedy policy did
not limit shipment of arms and equipment to Portugal in the
context of NATO, but pressure was brought to bear to insure
that these NATO arms were not used in Portugal's African wars
Under the current administration, the basic thrust of
the Nixon Doctrine is to maintain a low profile in world
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affairs and to avoid Vietnam-style commitments. Nevertheless
Portugal has retained an important bargaining point vis-'a-vis
the United States: the important United States military base
in the Azore Islands. The Portuguese have used the base rights
as a lever to influence the Nixon Administration's policies
toward their country. Such island bases are vital to the
United States. They permit overseas influence without in-
volvement in countries that are often turbulent and hostile to
the united States military. In return for a continued Amer-
ican presence in the Azores, which the Nixon Administration
views as vital to NATO and to U.S. interests in the Middle
East, Portugal has been able to obtain a change in United
States policies toward Southern Africa and toward itself.
This process has worked as follows.
Independent of any Portuguese initiatives, but at the
same time as the Portuguese were pressuring the United States
about use of the Azores base, the Nixon Administration made
a study of policy in Southern Africa. As often happens in
issue areas of low salience, this policy reevaluation was
conducted entirely within the confines of official Washington.
It did not attract public notice until 1971, some two years
after it was completed. Upon the direction of the President,
Dr. Henry Kissinger ordered preparation of a National Security
Council memorandum outlining policy options for Southern
Africa. Requests for such memoranda are regularly made and
passed on to the appropriate offices in the Department of
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State, Department of Defense, and other interested agencies.
They are drafted by interdepartmental coordinated groups, and
the draft memorandum is sent to Dr. Kissinger's office for
final polishing by his staff. The memorandum is then brought
before the President in a meeting of the National Security
Council for his decision. 18
The study of u.S. Southern African policy presented
the President with three options. 19 The first was called the
"Dean Acheson" option after the late Secretary of State, who
had argued this point of view publicly and privately. it
stated that the United States should treat Portugal and the
Republic of South Africa as friendly sovereign nations with-
out regard to their internal policies." 20 The second option
was the "more of the same" option, a continuation of the
policies of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. This
involved verbal attacks on South African apartheid and Por-
tuguese colonialism combined with arms embargoes and limited
official involvement with these two governments. The third
18
F?r a full critique of the policy process involvedin the planning of United States foreign policy, see Herbert JSpiro, "Planning of U.S. African Policy," paper orepared forthe annual conference of the African Studies Association,
Denver, November 3-6, 1971.
19New York Times
,
April 2, 1972. See also, U.S. Congress,Senate, "Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain,"
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Res.
2JL4, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., February 1, 2, and 3, 1972 (Wash-ington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).
20 Ibid.
,
p. 234.
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option
, „hich was adopted by fche administrat . on> has
characterized as the "tar-baby" option. This is the
given it by opponents within the State Department who feared
that if begun it could not be abandoned if it proved to be a
failure. This option argued that the United States in-
fluence on Portuguese Africa and South Africa could best be
exercised if increased communication and contacts with the
white government were begun. "Selective involvement and
friendly persuasion rather than constant condemnation were
regarded as more likely to achieve changes in the racial and
colonial policies of the region." 22
The Nixon Administration accepted the "tar-baby" option
for three apparent reasons. "First, it accorded with the
President's and Dr. Kissinger's beliefs that the United
States is only a marginal actor in that area." 23 Moreover,
involvements like that in Vietnam must be avoided in the
future. "Second, the 'tar-baby' option is consistent with
the arguments of those who hold that increased economic devel-
opment in Southern Africa as a whole will lead to an improve-
ment in the situations of local black Africans." 24 Thus, as
21 Ibid
.
,
P- 234 .
22 Ibid
. f P- 235.
23 Ibid
.
,
P- 235.
24 Ibid
. P- 235.
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the local economies grow they will increasingly depend upon
local demand for goods and services to spark continued growth
in production and employment. Finally, the option selected
is in agreement with the arguments of American corporations
such as union Carbide, Gulf oil, and the Foote Mineral Com-
pany, which demand a more "businesslike" relationship with
Portugal and South Africa. 25
In yet another important way, the application of the
Nixon policy in Southern Africa has been consistent with the
options outlined above. The military embargoes were re-
defined so that two Boeing 707 airliners could be sold to the
Portuguese government. These planes can carry troops to
Angola and Mozambique. Small civilian-type jet aircraft were
sold to South Africa. These planes can be used for recon-
naissance as well. The United States government granted
Union Carbide's request to import chrome ore from boycotted
Rhodesia: President Nixon's failure to oppose the Byrd
Amendment to the Military Procurement Act of 1971, which
ended the ban on the importation of Rhodesian chrome, is
charged by critics "to have contradicted international law as
established in a United Nations resolution .
"
2
^ An agreement
was signed under which South Africa could resume selling gold
to the International Monetary Fund; this eased the seriously
25 Ibid
.
,
p . 235
.
26 See U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before the Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittees, 91st Cong., 2nd
sess.
,
February-December 1970, vol. TT
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strained South African balance of payments situation and
earned South Africa $307 million from gold sales in the first
six months of 1970. In the United Nations, the United States
for the first time in history used its veto in the Security
Council to defeat a resolution calling for an expansion of
sanctions against Rhodesia. This led black Congressman
Charles Diggs of Michigan to the unprecedented step of re-
signing from the United States delegation to the United Nations
charging the government with "hypocrisy" in its voting on
African affairs at the United Nations. 27 The United States
also voted against the General Assembly's annual resolution
against apartheid.
The most dramatic demonstration of the Nixon Admin-
istration's commitment to the Nixon Doctrine in Southern
Africa took place when the United States and Portugal reached
a new agreement over the continued use by the United States
forces of the Azores base. The new Azores pact remains wit-
ness to the overall strategic significance of the Portuguese
empire to the Nixon Administration.
Finally, an essential element of any future United
States role in Southern Africa (Portuguese Africa) would be
to permit the forces of change to operate short of the point
where African disorders would produce major international
2 7Charles Diggs, "We're On The Wrong Side," Africa
Report
,
vol. 18, no. 3 (May-June 1973), p. 37.
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dangers. With this objective in mind, the first task of
United States policy would be to help create a strategically
sterile environment in Africa. Basically, this objective
will require taking the initiatives to remove Southern Africa
as an area of direct or indirect cold war military competi-
tion and to buffer it against disruptive intervention by
external powers. This, in turn, means attention to the pos-
sibility of an understanding or agreement between the United
States and the Soviet Union, tacit or explicit, regarding
security matters in Southern Africa. Such an understanding
encouraged by a new spirit of "detente" between the two major
superpowers is a distinct possibility.
On these grounds there is reason to believe that the
Soviet Union might possibly be receptive to American initia-
tive in this direction. Sub-Saharan Africa is not a region
of primary importance to Soviet strategic objectives. Like
the United States, the Soviet Union is not bound by general
strategic commitments in Africa and has relative freedom of
maneuver. Soviet economic, political, and military programs
on the continent to date have produced no great profit; and
in the Congo, where a near-confrontation with United States
forces occurred, Russia was humiliated. In actual fact, a
degree of withdrawal by both the United States and the Soviet
Union from head-on competition in Africa and other parts of
the world has been the case. Soviet behavior in relation to
current security issues, such as the SALT talks, suggests the
303
possibility that
,
to advance its own vital objectives, the
U.S.S.R. may be prepared to reduce
international exposure and burdens
likely place to begin.
the scope of its present
Africa would seem a
If an approach along these lines were decided to be
desirable and feasible, the broadest possible area of agree-
ment should be explored. Recent political developments in
Portugal demand the reduction of any further supply of arms
and military equipment that could be used by either Portugal
or the insurgents within the territories. Agreement on the
total and permanent removal of military, naval, and air
installations on the African continent might be another ob-
jective. Another goal would be an agreement between the two
superpowers to desist from military intervention—directly or
by surrogate—when disorders erupt in independent Africa and
from attempts to change boundaries or political regimes by
force
.
Such a pattern of Soviet-American cooperation, in
short, would be a step of fundamental importance both in pro-
tecting Southern Africa and the rest of the continent from
external meddling. The opportunity for a timely, new initia-
tive in Soviet-American cooperation in Southern Africa would
seem to be considerable.
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